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DISRUPTIVE POLITICS

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2019 Editorial Team

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Acknowledgments

We would like to start off by thanking everyone who participated in the making of UJPPS' second publication; without all of your hard work and efforts this would not have been possible. Thank you to Dr. Daniel Stockemer for providing his knowledge and guidance as well as facilitating the course two years in a row. Thank you to all the reviewers, editors and copy-editors for spending hours evaluating and working closely with the authors to revise and polish their papers. Thank you to the School of Political Studies or providing the course and giving undergraduate students first hand experience and an opportunity to engage in the journal process. Finally we would like to thank all of the authors who have submitted their papers, your participation is greatly appreciated.

Introduction

The Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Policy and Society (UJPPS), established in 2018, is the University of Ottawa's premier undergraduate political science journal. The purpose of the journal is to make available academic research created by students from across the globe.

This unique journal is by and for undergraduate students, and as such operates in two distinct spheres. As a journal run by students, it provides a learning opportunity within the realm of academic writing, editing and publishing. By soliciting, reviewing and editing submissions for the journal, the editorial team familiarizes themselves with the academic publication process. As a journal for undergraduate students, it provides the possibility for publication and access to new and interesting research. Authors featured in this journal are given the opportunity to have their work peer-reviewed and managed by an editor. This gives young academics a welcoming first-hand experience in the publishing world. In order to ensure the quality of the journal and educational benefits for the students running it, UJPPS was institutionalized within the university and is offered annually as an upper-level social sciences course.

The theme for the 2019 issue is Disruptive Politics, which evaluates the transformations of the political and social world. In a rapidly changing world, it is essential to highlight work done in politics, policy and society that challenges the status quo. We received 24 submissions from a multitude of universities from North America, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East and Asia, addressing topics including, but not limited to, activism and social movements; conflict; challenges to democracy; populism; migration; security and surveillance; justice and accountability; as well as technology and media politics. The UJPPS editorial team was impressed by the quality and calibre of the submissions. In our second edition of the journal, the 11 chosen articles question immigration policy, highlight the critical work done in conflict management and even conduct their own media analysis research.

The prize for the best article of the 2019 edition was awarded to Trevor Zapple for their outstanding work entitled "A Narrow Wind: Corruption, Governance, and the Global Rise of the Authoritarian Right." This exceptional piece carefully examines the linkage between social trust, corruption, and rising tendencies towards populist authoritarianism. All of this was made through the utilization of the social theory of trust. This work uses a large amount of data and evidence to determine if the ability of states to control corruption is connected to rising authoritarian tendencies around the world. Conclusions drawn from the work indicate that there is a significant effect of both perceived level of control of corruption and the quality of governance, as is measured by the state's adherence to the rule of law. With emergent challenges to world order and liberal democracies this work is an exemplary display of the study of disruptive politics on a global scale, while simultaneously displaying domestic political challenges that contribute to these patterns and trends.

One major theme covered in this edition of the UJPPS is immigration. Over one third of the selected papers for this issue were related to this contemporary topic. Within this topic two articles are related to the Dutch immigration case, and two related to specific refugee crises that have occurred within recent years. The first paper, written by Sebastian Medina Camacho, titled "Abrupt Shifts in Dutch Integration System: Analysis of Dutch Integration Policies" examines the transformation of Dutch integration policies from encouraging multiculturalism to encouraging assimilation. This article also looks at causes for this policy change. This study is important because it examines how immigrants were treated and the means used to integrate them into society. Here, the author uses a punctuated equilibrium theory which relates to rapid changes in policies to conduct their research. Ultimately, the author finds that punctuated changes in Dutch integration policy were the result of Islam being highly politicized and tensions between immigrants and natives of said territory.

The next article follows the same interesting line on the Dutch case. The paper "Race, Gender and Migration" by Kirsten Samson examines the ways populists disrupt the lives of Muslim immigrant women in the Netherlands using an intersectional lens. It also conducts a detailed case study on populist discourse, particularly the proposed "headrag tax." This is a relevant topic because it shows the effects of nativist populism outside of high-profile electoral victories. Besides that, this piece highlights the different ways in which race, gender and religion interact to produce unique social standpoints and exclusions. To do this, the author contrasts the position of native-born Dutch women and Muslim migrant men with that of Muslim migrant women in a thoughtful manner. The findings suggest that populist discourses have filtered down into the daily social lives of migrant women, producing a form of politicization of their bodies and clothes unlike that faced by migrant men or native Dutch women.

Shifting the focus from immigration issues to refugee crises, the following two articles provide a smooth transition into the intricacies and subtleties of two important contemporary refugee crises: the German migrant crisis, and the Hmong refugee crisis. Taking on a subject which has undoubtedly caused "disruption" in official political discourses over the last few years, Luise Goldi Schöneberg, from RWTH Aachen University in Aachen (Germany), presents "The Political Assessment of the Refugee Question by the Political Parties". In this article, the author looks at how German political parties framed the subject of refugee migration before and after the federal election of 2017. Schöneberg does this by contrasting these discourses according to Max Weber's distinction between "ethics of conviction" and "ethics of responsibility" to illustrate the differing strategies used by parties to tackle this issue.

The second piece that covers this topic deals with an issue occurring outside of Europe—the Hmong refugee crisis. In "What We Know about the Hmong Refugee Crisis", Sheila Maylee Yingwangkay seeks to analyze similarities between the Hmong refugee case and the Syrian refugee crisis. This research is important because it examines the history of a vulnerable group and looks at refugee applications processes and programs. Moreover, the author seeks to use the Hmong refugee crisis to predict the Syrian refugee crisis. Yingwangkay uses media coverage of both crises to conduct their research and use keywords to narrow their search. In the end, the author finds that there are similarities between the Hmong and Syrians in that they both face chemical warfare, and face obstacles when crossing borders that contribute to high mortality rates.

Another popular subject for this edition is international relations, and more specifically, foreign aid. The first of the two submissions on this topic, this time from NYU, is titled "The Effect of Chinese Foreign Aid on Civil Conflict in Sub Saharan Africa" and written by Sabrina He. Here, the author seeks to understand the effects of Chinese foreign aid on intrastate conflict in Sub Saharan Africa. He makes a significant contribution to the discourse regarding the influence of external demand shocks, which are often proxied by agricultural commodity shocks and exposure to banking crises, by using recipient country's birth region as a proxy variable for Chinese foreign aid. The author demonstrates how the addition of Chinese foreign aid in subnational regions with pre-existing low conflict intensity raises the probability of future conflict, whereas regions with pre-existing high conflict intensity will reduce the probability of further conflict.

Following the discussion about foreign aid and its consequences, an interesting paper was submitted by James Victor Gibson called "Exportation of the Carceral State". This paper sought to understand liberal humanitarian aid as a mechanism of control. In the case of Central American countries, governments prioritize US national security agenda over the rise of corrupt regimes and mass human rights abuses. The findings are vital for understanding how global powers use security aid to exercise influence and power over smaller countries. The author employed methods of theoretical and case-based research to advance his argument. The results indicate that the US actively employed liberal humanitarian aid policy to not allow for the building of a stable, democratic and inclusive state for the citizens of Central American countries.

Diverging from foreign aid while remaining under the scope of international relations, we present an interesting article about the Arab Spring. Kaleigh Alexandra Calvao's paper "Egypt vs. Saudi Arabia: Alternative Path to the Arab Spring" examines case studies of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The author investigates why the former experienced the Arab Spring while the latter did not, seeking to buttress the academic understanding of the preconditions of revolutions. Calvao discusses the era of Gamal Adbel Nasser's leadership of Egypt and examines the authoritarian rule of the Saudi state. Findings reveal that the values of Pan-Arabism, secularism, modernity, as well as social justice and reform, which Nasser's rule instilled, were key elements of why Egypt became embroiled in the Arab Spring.

We have a wide range of topics from the many manuscripts we received, thus assuring that the reader will find something of their interest. For instance, in her article, "Somalia and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: Examining Gender as the Key to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Success", Tabitha Mirza from the University of Ottawa critically engages with the impacts of The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States by using Somalia as a case study of its effectiveness in promoting gender equality during peace-making processes. Mirza adds theoretical depth by comparing streams of feminism and how their visions of gender inequality can have an impact on the implementation of the New Deal.

In "The Irish Gay Rights Movement and Political Opportunity Structures," Kaelan McCone focuses on the Gay Rights Movement in the Republic of Ireland from 1990 to 2015. McCone focuses on two anomalies of this movement: Ireland's liberalization in times of economic hardship and Ireland's decision to put gay marriage to a popular vote (as opposed to a parliamentary vote). In order to explain these anomalies, McCone contends that the AIDS crisis of the 1980s created political opportunity structures that allowed activists to disrupt and change the legal structure of the Republic of Ireland.

As the last paper of this edition, we bring to you another submission from a University of Ottawa student, Andrew El-Azzi: "How Inequality Undermines Democracy: The case against the

United States, and Beyond". This paper explores the relationship between economic inequality and the healthy functioning of democracy. It uses Antonio Gramsci's idea of hegemonic production to discuss how inequality creates and reproduces institutions that maintain inequality and how this plays a role in elections. The paper focuses on the American example, and the issue of interest groups, campaign finance, and ideology, but the conclusions have broad implications for the world as a whole.

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A Narrow Wind: Corruption, Governance, and the Global Rise of the Authoritarian Right

Trevor Zaple, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

Abstract

The advancement of populist authoritarian tendencies in liberal democracies across the globe has been topic of concern in both academic and mainstream political thought. Several populist movements in the West have expressed a desire to stem corruption as part of their overall platform. Is the state's ability to control corruption connected to a rise in authoritarian tendencies? Using a social trust theory lens on corruption, this paper examines the linkage between social trust, corruption, and rising tendencies toward populist authoritarianism. Using panel data from 32 countries over a period ranging from 1995 to 2014, statistical evidence is presented to show evidence of the link between social trust, the state's ability to control corruption, and the rise in authoritarian tendencies. A state with a high level of governance and a falling level of control over corruption has a higher likelihood of experiencing a rise in authoritarian tendencies.

Keywords: Corruption; Global Governance; Authoritarianism; Social Trust; Populism; Political Trust; Rule of Law.

I: Introduction

On October 28th, 2018, the Brazilian presidential election ended with former military officer and avowed right-wing populist authoritarian Jair Bolsonaro winning. The left-leaning Worker's Party that he ran against had in 2016 been driven out of power in the Chamber of Deputies; Bolsonaro's election finished off the complete electoral defeat of a party that had ruled in Brazil since the 2003 election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro is a controversial figure, within and outside of Brazil. He is an admirer of Brazil's previous military dictatorship, whose rule from 1964 until 1985 was marked by human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings (Reeves, 2018). He has vowed to torture leftist opponents, clear "Marxists" out of the universities, to ignore human rights when convenient, to strip environmental protections from the Amazon rainforest, and has made abusive comments regarding gender and sexual minorities (Reuters, 2018). Why did Brazil choose to veer off in such a hard-right, authoritarian direction?

One common theme that recurred throughout the electoral campaign was the corruption that had flourished under the previous Worker's Party government (Reuters, 2018). Donald Trump, whom Bolsonaro voiced a policy and attitude-driven affinity for, also ran a presidential campaign that played upon American perceptions that the federal government in Washington, D.C. was thoroughly corrupt and that he would "Drain The Swamp" upon his arrival in the Oval Office (C-Span, 2016). He decried his opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as a "corrupt elite insider" (BBC, 2016). For these two, the perception (and at times, the stark reality, in the case of Bolsonaro's predecessor Lula da Silva) (Londono, 2017) of corruption in governance was a major factor in the wave of popular support that buoyed their success.

Bolsonaro and Trump are just two examples of a rise of populist right-wing authoritarian governments that have cropped up across the globe in the past several years. The post-Soviet space of Eastern Europe, parts of the Asian Pacific region, and the post-Arab Spring MENA region have all experienced a rise in authoritarian governance since 2013, and with Trump and the Five Star Movement in Italy even the liberal democratic order of Western Europe and North America have experienced this phenomenon. Is corruption, specifically the state's ability to control corruption, a major factor in this authoritarian rise?

This paper will examine the links between the rise of right-wing authoritarianism and the state's willingness or ability to control corruption. Using panel data comprising 32 countries over a period between 1995 and 2014, this paper will show that control of corruption is a major, significant factor in whether a state will experience a rise in authoritarianism. This paper will begin by examining the links between corruption, social trust, and right-wing authoritarianism in the literature. It will then outline the design of the study, display the results, and discuss the results in light of the theory built from the literature.

II: Literature and Theory

Corruption is a pervasive, endemic problem that has been the focus of the international community since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the turn of the 21st Century. Definitions of corruption can vary depending on what exact aspect of corruption one wishes to study. A general-purpose definition that captures most aspects of the problem – and, consequently, one that is cited often in the literature - is that corruption is "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Treisman, 2000: 399). This definition is broad and captures both 'petty corruption' (typically the acceptance of bribes by public officials in order to provide services to the public) and 'grand corruption', which Susan Rose-Ackerman defines as "collusion among the highest levels of government that involves major public sector projects, procurement, and large financial benefits among high-level public and private elites" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 27).

Higher levels of corruption are often shown to have negative effects on social trust, and this corrosive effect on social trust in turn has a negative effect on aspects of the state and governance that rely on open and honest coordination for ethical success. Social trust theory is largely an outgrowth of Robert Putnam's early work on social capital, which is a combination of norms, networks, and social trust, and holds that a key factor in the maintenance of a successful democratic state is a certain level of trust between citizens in that state. (Putnam, 1993). Social trust is the key linkage here, as several studies have noted that corruption can be seen as the basis for the disintegration of state functions, state institutions, and the trust that citizens have in those bodies and therefore in each other. Higher levels of social trust are correlated with higher levels of confidence in the institutions of the state (Granlund and Setala, 2012); higher growth in corruption is found to influence a lower perception of other citizens in general (Rothstein and Eek, 2009).

Social trust has also been seen to have an influence on judicial institutions as well as institutions charged with governing economic matters (Bjornskov, 2009). Anna Alon and Amy Hageman, in a study of post-Soviet transition states, find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of "particularized trust" (trust in personal family and friend networks) led to a reduced willingness to comply with tax regulations (Alon and Hageman, 2012). The influence of social trust on institutional trust has been seen as a "mediating factor" between perceived levels of corruption in society and an individual's life satisfaction (Ciziceno and Travaglino, 2018). The well-trod link between corruption and economic growth has also been studied through a lens of social trust, with the finding that both the absence of corruption and higher levels of social trust are significant in states that feature faster rates of economic development (Seritzlew et al, 2014).

Some studies find a more direct route between social trust and corruption without the intervening factor of institutional confidence. Peter Graeff and Gert Svendsen defined social trust as "positive" social capital and corruption as a "negative manifestation" of social capital, using the divide between universalistic and particularistic networks to frame the two (Graeff and Svendsen, 2012). Applying this framework to a study of European countries, they find that corruption directly impacted poorer European states economically, and that "the augmentation of positive social capital could work as an effective counterforce to corruption, even if it does not compensate for the economic loss" (Graeff and Svendsen, 2012: 2844).

There is some evidence of a correlation between social trust and the overall mores of a society. A study on corruption and trust finds that the potential for universalistic attitudes, particularly collective action for environmental concerns, is sharply reduced in areas with high levels of corruption (Harring, 2012). A cross-national study by Natalia Letki finds that "the creation of stable, transparent, and efficient institutions is necessary for the emergence of a culture of honesty and civic morality among citizens" (Letki, 2006: 321). Letki's study conflates a number of questions of social mores into a single indicator; while this technique is replicated in part here, it should be noted that each of the questions that is subsumed under the social mores category indicates different types of morality. Briefly, it can be stated that there is a difference between being willing to evade fares for public transportation and being willing to evade taxes. However, the conflation gives a useful indicator of the general overall social mores of a particular state, and as such it is used here.

Corruption's effect on democracy has also been studied, although the majority of the literature in this branch focuses on the effect of corruption on voting behaviour, particularly electoral turnout (see Dalhberg and Solevid, 2016; Stockemer et al, 2013; Miles, 2015). Democracy is more than just electoral snapshots, however; turnout is important, but so is civic engagement. The link between social trust and corruption involves also studying the link between institutional decay and civic engagement, often in the form of political and non-political volunteering. In a study of twenty European democratic states, Nicolas Griesshaber and Benny Geys finds that denser "inclusive" social networks (networks based on voluntary service and universal membership potential) were correlated with lower levels of corruption; "exclusive", in-group defined organizations had the opposite result (Griesshaber and Geys, 2012: 72). Jose Lopez and Jose Santos find similar results with regard to the negative aspect of this – that the "formation of closed particularistic groups" were a "breeding ground for the development of corruption and rent-seeking" (Lopez and Santos, 2014: 706-7). Another study, on political participation in European countries, finds further evidence that poor governance, in the form of corruption, negatively impacts civic engagement (Hoaghe and Quintelier, 2014). John Ishiyama, et al, finally, find in a study of Georgia that there is a positive association between levels of social trust and the rate of volunteering; they tie this correlation to an explanation as to why Georgia displays higher level of social trust and institutional confidence than other post-Soviet states in the region (Ishiyama, et al, 2018).

The link between the rise of authoritarianism and the control of corruption lies in social trust as well, in that a decay in institutional confidence would be (as per Granlund and Setala) represented in a decay in general social trust. This decay in social trust, driven by the perception that the deck is stacked against the ordinary citizen by the kind of 'corrupt elites' railed against by Bolsonaro, Giuseppe Conte, and Donald Trump, drives increasingly large sectors of the populace of certain states to gravitate toward populist authoritarian figures as a way to provide easy answers to their reduced level of trust in the basic nature of the state. This can be seen as a backlash against the economic policies of neoliberalism that have resulted in increasing inequality and wealth concentration (Bugaric and Kuhelj, 2018; Chacko, 2018); this effect is exacerbated in democracies, where the "public expects its government to be not only competent but ethical" (Wang, 2016: 229). The connection between the lack of control of corruption and the rise of authoritarianism is also linked specifically to right-wing ideology; Dalibor Rohac et al. find that corruption is linked to larger vote shares for right-wing populist parties, although they caution that this effect is diminished somewhat when controlling for institutional quality over time, and tends to inflate when combined with immigration effects (Rohac et al, 2017: 393).

Given the literature consulted, we should expect to see that states with certain characteristics will show greater odds of moving into right-wing authoritarianism. First, states which show less control over corruption will have better odds of becoming authoritarian; they will also show lower levels of general social trust, have lower levels of civic engagement, and have higher percentages of citizenry willing to break standard social mores against cheating and stealing. As per the findings in Wang, states with higher levels of governance should also show a greater affinity for moving to authoritarianism if combined with the presence of a requisite level of corruption; Wang's conclusion that "the contribution government performance makes to building political trust can be seriously damaged once the government gets involved in corruption" (Wang, 2016: 228) will be tested on a wider scale than just in East Asia. Finally, states with higher percentages of the populace supporting right-wing ideologies should also show a greater affinity toward moving into authoritarianism.

III: Methodology

In order to study the effects of corruption and other variables on the chances of a state turning toward authoritarianism, panel data was constructed from four waves of the World Values Survey, comprising any country that had been surveyed at least three times during the most recent four waves. This gave a set of 32 countries and 108 instances ranging from 1995 to 2014. Specific variables were chosen to model specific effects and are listed below.

In order to model corruption, the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator is used. Corruption indicators have received a mixed reaction in the literature, as they are typically based on elite perceptions of aspects of corruption; as such, it is unsure from an empirical standpoint if it reflects the actual "level of corruption" on the ground (Gingerich, 2013; Knack, 2007). The Control of Corruption indicator is, however, used here for two reasons. Typically, quantitative studies on corruption will use either the World Bank indicator or the Corruption Perception Index, published by Transparency International. The first reason for choosing the World Bank variable is that the two are highly correlated (r=0.93) and can thus be used at times interchangeably. Given this, the second reason is that the Control of Corruption indicator is specifically more suited to our purposes, in that it measures the state's success or failure specifically at the *control* of corruption within the state, rather than its overall level. It must be stressed, however, that the World Bank's methodology for generating the Control of Corruption indicator is based in part on business leaders, elites, country analyst and non-governmental organization's *perceptions* of the state's ability to control corruption. The specific definition used in constructing the indicator is "capturing *perceptions* of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010: 223); emphasis in the above definition is added by the author for this paper.

In addition, another World Bank indicator, Rule of Law, is used to measure the quality and performance of governance, as per Wang (2016). Both World Bank-derived variables are standardized scores between -2.5 and 2.5, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

A measure of social trust is gathered from the ‘general trust’ question in the World Values Survey, which asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement “In general, most people can be trusted.” This is a standard measure of social trust, used in studies such as Serritzlew et al (2014) and Reeskens and Vandcasteele (2017).

A measure of the support for hard-right politics is captured by the self-placement variable contained in the World Values Survey (WVS); the question asks respondents to place themselves on a 1-10 scale where 1 indicates far-left beliefs and 10 represents far-right beliefs. In order to capture the rise of specifically *right wing* authoritarianism, the proportion of respondents answering the question with a value of between 8 and 10 is used.

Two other variables were used to capture levels of civic engagement and the base level of morality in society. Civic engagement was gathered from a series of questions in the WVS that asked respondents if they had ever volunteered for a variety of organizational types; to prevent multicollinearity, specifically non-political volunteering positions were used, such as sports teams or cultural groups. A sense of a society’s mores was gathered from a series of questions that asked the respondents to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how justified they felt a series of antisocial actions were, ranging from fare evasion on public transportation to accepting a bribe as a public official. The proportion of those who answered between 8 and 10 on each question was added and the arithmetical mean was used as the general ‘moral barometer’ of the society. This is similar to the technique used in Letki (2006), although this paper drops the portion of the indicator that deals with religious-cultural items such as homosexuality or abortion since our interests here skew more toward universally unacceptable behaviour in society, as opposed to polarizing items whose taboo nature depends from country to country and even between regions within those countries. As stated previously, there are some problems with conflating differing types of morality questions under an overall heading of "social mores", but it gives a useful snapshot of the general state of those social mores and as such the technique is partially replicated.

The dependent variable, coded as whether a given country has taken a turn toward authoritarianism in the past five years, was interpreted broadly in order to increase instrument sensitivity. A country was coded as 'turning toward authoritarianism' (indicated as "Authoritarian" in the results) if it had met at least one of two conditions: it had a significant (greater than 0.3) drop in The Economist Intelligence Unit's *Democracy Index*; or it had dropped in either the Civil Rights or Political Rights ratings for Freedom House's *Freedom In The World Index*. This provided a list of states comprised of: Brazil, India, Mexico, Moldova, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Turkey, Egypt, and the United States.

As control, the logged value of GDP per capita for the year observed and the unemployment rate in the country for the year observed were used. These are standard control variables used in most corruption studies.

These variables are then placed into a panel generalized linear model that provides a maximum likelihood estimation; this process was provided through the 'pglm' package for R (Croissant, 2017). This model was chosen for two reasons. First, the use of a binary dependent variable requires a type of logit/probit regression, which the PGLM model provides; secondly, it allows the regression to consider change in variables within groups over time. It differs in output from the more typical ordinary least squares regression in that instead of R-squares it provides the logged value of the likelihood of the model, which allows for comparisons between models. The coefficients must also be interpreted in terms of log odds; a one unit increase in the independent variable increases or decreases the log odds of the dependent variable outcome being Authoritarian by a given amount.

IV: Results

Table 1 (Dependent Variable: Authoritarian Outcome)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control of Corruption	**-1.599*** **	**-1.752*** **	**-2.185*** **	**-2.38*** **
	(0.46)	(0.532)	(0.669)	(0.674)
Rule of Law	**1.345** **	**1.858*** **	**2.332*** **	**2.346*** **
	(0.479)	(0.56)	(0.678)	(0.71)
Trust	-	**-0.034***	-0.021	-0.019
		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Right Wing	-	**0.041***	**0.042***	**0.044***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.021)
Social Mores	-	-	**0.11***	**0.125***
			(0.049)	(0.058)
Civic Engagement	-	-	0.032	0.038
			(0.02)	(0.026)
GDP	-	-	-	0.66
				(0.68)
Unemployment	-	-	-	0.027
				(0.034)
C	-0.068	-0.318	**-1.4***	-4.52
	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.669)	(3.068)
Log-Likelihood	-65.19	-55.18	-43.02	-42.19
Iterations	4	5	5	5

(*Significant coefficients in bold with asterisks indicating significance level, standard errors in parenthesis*)

Model 1 considered the corruption variable and the rule of law variable on their own with the dependent variable. Model 2 adds in the social trust variable and the measure for right wing support. Model 3 combines all independent variables, and Model 4 includes all independent variables and the two control variables of GDP and unemployment. Table 1 shows the results as well as output statistics from the model.

From the results, the clearest indicator is that there is a strong, significant effect of both the perceived level of control of corruption and the quality of governance, as measured by the state's adherence to the rule of law. A one unit increase in the Corruption of Control (CoC) variable sharply decreases the log odds of a state becoming authoritarian, showing evidence for the idea that the perceived loss of control over corruption and its subsequently damaging effects is a cause for populations to move toward authoritarianism, and its vows to clean the system up. Simultaneously, a higher level of governance indicates a higher likelihood for an authoritarian turn; the effect is large and significant in the models, but in a separate panel generalized linear model regression (included in Appendix A) that considered it on its own with the dependent variable the effect was quite smaller (although still significant) and the sign was flipped, indicating that without considering corruption we can expect states with a better grasp on the rule of law to have a better 'defence' against turning toward authoritarianism. With consideration of corruption, though, the relationship becomes much stronger and moves in the opposite direction, indicating that the effect of corruption on the dependent variable is much greater in countries where the populace expects more from its government.

Adding measures of social trust and support for right-wing ideologies into the equation shows small, significant effects. However, once measurements for civic engagement and social mores are added in, social trust loses significance. Across the board, the log odds increase in the dependent variable outcome when considering right-wing support remains constant, albeit fairly small. The measurement of social mores has a small, significant effect, but the level of civic engagement does not. The control variables of GDP and unemployment have no significant consideration in the final equation.

Considered together, the combination of control of corruption and the adherence to the rule of law (and its resultant level of governance) has the largest predictive effect on whether a state will experience a rise in authoritarianism. The level of support for right-wing ideologies and the basic level of social mores have smaller predictive effects; while they show evidence toward refuting Letki's claim that the 'effect of civic morality is unfounded' (Letki, 2006: 307) and to support Rohac et al.'s initial finding that support for right-wing ideology is linked to corruption, the effects are fairly minimal when compared to the effect of the main two variables. The lack of significance for the civic engagement variable indicates evidence that studies of civic engagement's effect on controlling corruption and strengthening democracy may lack a certain level of overall generalization.

Generally, what the results demonstrate is that the states most at risk of experiencing a rise in authoritarianism are those with highly developed state infrastructure that have allowed corruption to flourish in society, willingly or otherwise. These are states where citizenry has come to expect more from their government; Wang describes them as states where the 'public expects its government to be not only competent but ethical' (Wang, 2016: 229). When they stray from ethical behaviour, the resulting loss in confidence in the state drives the populace to elect authoritarians in order to punish the corrupt and fix the problem, which tends to confirm the idea that Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris bring up when they discuss the rise of populist authoritarianism as a 'backlash' (although their focus is on a 'cultural backlash', rather than one driven by poor ethical standards) (Inglehart and Norris, 2017: 446). These authoritarian outcomes may be slightly more likely in states with larger support for right-wing ideas in the population, and in states with somewhat looser social mores regarding cheating and stealing. It does not, however, seem to have anything to do with the general level of trust citizens have for each other in a given society.

As a final, technical note, Wang (2016) insists that the proper examination of both measures of corruption and measures of governance requires an interaction term in order to fully model the relationship (Wang, 2016: 218); his 'discrete choice model' finds that the interaction term between the two variables had a negative relationship with political trust (Wang, 2016: 223). An equation similar to the models outlined above was run with such an interaction term (the results table is included as Appendix B) and found that the only major difference was that the effect on the log odds for both corruption and governance were reduced slightly, and that the variable for right-wing support fell outside of statistical significance. The Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, and Social Mores variables remained significant; when the interaction between the first two variables is considered, the particular partisan flavour of the tendency toward authoritarianism seems to matter less. While the interaction term was not significant at the 95% level, it did display the expected sign, indicating that it has a negative relationship both with Wang's level of political trust and with the authoritarian outcome modeled here. It may be that there is a link between a rise in authoritarianism and a reduced level of social trust, but it may be a more indirect relationship than is modeled here.

V: Conclusion

The rise of authoritarianism in both liberal and illiberal democracies has been a topic of some concern in the latter half of the 2010s. Elections of populists with authoritarian tendencies and right-wing rhetoric have featured prominently in the politics of Italy, Poland, Hungary, Brazil, and the United States, among others. One possibility for this rise, derived from theories on institutional decay by Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Daniel Treisman (2000), is that it is a form of backlash against the failure of the state to control corruption; the resulting decay in institutional confidence drives the populace to embrace rhetoric from authoritarians promising to 'clean up the mess' of corruption . Using panel data from 32 countries over nearly 20 years, this paper shows some evidence for this theory, showing that when states with high levels of governance experience a loss of control over corruption, they are more likely to experience a rise in authoritarianism. While there is also some evidence that this phenomenon occurs more in states with higher support for right-wing ideas and lower levels of social mores, the effects of these predictors are small, especially when compared to the effects of corruption and quality of governance. This paper shows that there is some evidence for the theory that a populace's response to an authoritarian anti-corruption campaign is strongly more positive when there is a perception that corruption is actually getting out of control in the country, and the populace expects better from its government. Given the results, we can see that corruption and populism are more strongly linked in more established or developed democracies; that is, where the rule of law is deeper and more firmly entrenched, higher levels of corruption are linked to higher probabilities of authoritarian-flavoured populism.

We could apply the finding here to a case like the United States, and state that one theory behind the rise of Donald Trump is that American voters were fed up with the rise in corrupt behaviour in their governments and replied well to Trump's message of draining the swamp. We can see a drop in the American indicator for Control of Corruption (1.66 in 1999 to 1.27 in 2011) and a high level of Rule of Law (1.6 in 2011) as well as rising support for right-wing ideas (from 17.13 per cent in 2006 to 21.74 per cent in 2011). Given the results of the model for this paper, we can see that there is a clear sequence of events that may have taken place: the perceived rise of corruption in governance in a state with an advanced level of the rule of law and a growing population of right-wing support led to a situation where the electorate felt comfortable embracing an authoritarian electoral campaign that promised to reduce or end that perceived high level of corruption.

Additional research should be directed toward teasing out further implications of this research regarding the link between corruption and populism. Qualitative analysis, particularly with regard to elite interviews and open-ended surveys, would offer crucial details in filling in more subtle aspects of the link between corruption and populist movements in long-developed, well-established democracies. Triangulation between the quantitative research presented here and qualitative exploration of the linkage would provide a more holistic view of how corruption and populism interact with each other in states with high governance indicators.

Additional research would also be required to break down the effect of social mores by particular type; that is, is there a specific behaviour like fare evasion or tax avoidance that makes a better predictor than the others that are included in the measurement used in this paper's model. It would also be instructive to examine regional effects, especially with regard to the civic engagement variable, to see if, for example, civic engagement becomes significant when examining the post-Soviet region, or if the effect is contained to Georgia alone. Finally, further localized case studies are needed to flesh out the role of corruption and anti-corruption drives on the rise of authoritarianism at the individual country level.

APPENDIX A

Table 2 (Dependent Variable: Authoritarian Outcome)

Variable	Model 1
Rule of Law	**-0.27 ***
	(0.13)
C	-0.038
	(0.12)
Log-Likelihood	-71.769
Iterations	3

(Significant coefficients in bold with asterisks indicating significance level, standard errors in parenthesis)

APPENDIX B

Table 3 (Dependent Variable: Authoritarian Outcome)

Variable	Model 1
Control of Corruption	**-1.773****
	(0.663)
Rule of Law	**2.004****
	(0.699)
Trust	0.008
	(0.023)
Right-Wing	0.034
	(0.021)
Social Mores	**0.098***
	(0.0496)
Civic Engagement	0.045
	(0.026)
Control of Corruption: Rule of Law	-0.541
	(0.289)
C	**-1.462***
	(0.697)
Log-Likelihood	-41.117
Iterations	5

(*Significant coefficients in bold with asterisks indicating significance level, standard errors in parenthesis)*

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Trevor Zaple is in his final undergraduate year at Western University, moving on to graduate school in the fall. In addition to his academic pursuits he is a published author, father, clathrate gun control activist, and avid producer of plunderphonics.

Abrupt Shifts in the Dutch Integration System: Analysis of Dutch Integration Policies

Sebastián Medina Camacho[1], Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, smedinac@sfu.ca

Abstract

In 1970, the Netherlands introduced several multiculturalist policies with the purpose of integrating newly arrived immigrants. Almost three decades later, the Netherlands' integration policies have transformed into a harsh model of civic integration. So how can the shift from multiculturalism to a harsh integration model be explained in the Netherlands? This article argues that the dramatic change in Dutch integration policies was caused by the extreme politicization of immigration and Islam, and tensions between Dutch natives and immigrants. This essay uses the punctuated equilibrium theory and the weaving policy metaphor to explain the shift in the Dutch integration system. It then concludes by highlighting the importance of the perception of aliens in policy change.

Key words: Netherlands; Immigration; Punctuated Equilibrium; Weaving Policy Metaphor; Policy Entrepreneur; Integration

"I think we can all do better."

-Jim Jeffries

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Introduction

The integration of immigrants into their host societies is necessary for immigrants' development and success. Western European countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) have shifted away from a multiculturalism rhetoric, where they claim to use multicultural policies, towards harsher civic integration policies[2] in the last twenty years. An example of this is when David Cameron claimed that state multiculturalism had failed (Meer et al, 2015). Although, other countries such as Germany and Denmark, have kept their civic integration agenda (Meer et al, 2015). Robert H. Cox (1992) claims that big European countries are often given a disproportionate amount of attention when studying policy science. This essay will veer away from this and instead use the Netherlands as a case study. The Netherlands, once proudly considered a multicultural country, adopted several of these policies in the late 1990's, and has become a model of integration for many European countries such as Germany, France, and England (Meer et al, 2015; Joppke, 2007).

The Dutch model for immigration and integration stands out among other Western European countries because it is the only model in Europe that requires a language test and basic knowledge of Dutch society prior to an immigrants' entry (Joppke, 2007; The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005; EMN, 2012). The Newcomer Integration Act (1998) and the Aliens (Abroad) Act (2005) are the main policies that characterize the harsh integration model in the Netherlands (EMN, 2012; Bruquetas-Callejo, 2011). The sudden shift from a multicultural country to a harsh integration system leads to the following question: How can the shift from multiculturalism towards harsh integration be explained in the Netherlands? This essay will argue

[2] Sergio Carrera and Anja Wiesbrock (2009) define civic integration as: "the use of integration as a norm in immigration law, and the organisation of integration courses or introductory/orientation programmes, tests and contracts" (p.3).

that the politicization of immigration and Islam, and tensions between Dutch natives, like Indigenous Dutch people, and third-country nationals, such as aliens from a non-EU country, has led to several dramatic changes in Dutch integration policies.

This essay will support its main argument by using the punctuated equilibrium theory, for example non-incremental policymaking along with support from policy and policy entrepreneurs. This essay will therefore use relevant literature and government statistics to support its claims. As such, the essay will first provide a literature review. Then, it will proceed to explain the social dynamics of Dutch society in the 20th century as a background for the understanding of further integration policies. Next, it will discuss the foreign workers program from 1950-1973. Afterwards, it will review the multicultural period in the Netherlands from 1983-1994. Then, it will review soft civic integration policies from 1994-1999 and events that led to the implementation of harsher versions of these policies during the first half of the 2000's. Subsequently, it will explain the harsher civic integration policies from 2005- till today and how punctuated equilibrium can be used to explain them. Lastly, this essay will build a "Weaving" metaphor proposed by Howlett et al (2015).

Literature review

Immigration in the Netherlands has been a widely studied subject and Ruud Koopmans has been amongst the most influential academics in the field. Koopmans (2010) argues that the implementation of multicultural policies backfired on the integration of immigrants. By comparing the Netherlands with other countries where multiculturalism has not been practiced, he claims that those who have implemented multicultural policies have failed to properly integrate immigrants (Koopmans, 2003; 2010). Brug et al (2015) then explain the politicization of immigration in the Netherlands where they claim that far-right politicians have framed members of the Muslim community as being incompatible with Dutch norms and values. Vasta (2007) and Maria Bruquetas-Callejo et al (2011) then elaborate upon the evolution of Dutch integration policy and then from the pillarization process describe the development of this. Peter Scholten (2011;2013), on the other hand, has observed that the framing of the immigrants has been a key factor in the non-incremental policymaking of integration. He further explains the influence that policy learning from earlier policies has on policy change. Even though there is a vast amount of literature on this subject, there is no literature that highlights the importance of a policy entrepreneur and islamophobia regarding the non-incremental change of the policy making process. This essay aims to fill this gap in literature and provide a new insight about the policy analysis of the Aliens Act. In the next section, a brief history of the integration and immigration policies of the Netherlands will be presented to show the abrupt changes in the current integration system.

Pillarization

To understand the evolution of integration policies, it is essential to understand the process of pillarization (verzuiling) in the Netherlands. The term pillarization refers to the division and segregation of political and religious groups (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009). In the early 17th century to avoid coercion between Catholics and Protestants, these groups were separated and given their own-state sponsored and semi-autonomous institutions (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009; Vasta, 2007). Later, during the early 20th century, the socialist and liberal 'pillars 'were added to the pillar system (Maussen, 2009; Shrover, 2010; Andeweg and Irwin, 2009). By 1930, these groups had their own health care, welfare system, education system, radio stations, political parties, soccer leagues, newspapers, and trade unions (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009; Bax, 1988). This segregation led to a peaceful society in which the members of these groups stayed within their community parameters (Vasta, 2007). The few people allowed to leave the community parameters were elites with the sole purpose of solving problems between groups (Shrover,2010). Several authors (Shrover, 2010; Bax, 1988) and politicians also claim that with the entrance of Muslim aliens a fifth pillar was created. But, Andeweg and Irwin (2009) claim that although non-western immigrants had their own schools, religious temples (i.e. mosques) and radio stations subsidized by the government; this group was not big enough to form their own pillar. So, instead they labelled Islam a social cleavage (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009).

By the late 60’s pillarization started to lose importance in the Netherlands. The native Dutch stepped out of their closed communities and started to interact with members from other pillars (Shrover, 2010). By 1994, the segregation between communities was minimal; and was only noticeable through schools and political parties. The shift from pillarization to individualism, like depillarization, was an important factor in the formulation and evolution of integration policies because it represented Dutch society becoming a homogeneous country instead of a minority-based country. The government also started to focus more on the individual rather than on the group (Cox, 1992; Vasta, 2007). After the depillarization process was completed, non-western individuals joined the group of outsiders in the now homogeneous Dutch society. This process led to the desire to make non-western aliens equal by integrating them into Dutch society.

Foreign Worker Program 1950-1973

The shortage of work after WWII led to establishing a foreign workers program. Like many other countries, such as Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands had a shortage of low skilled labour in the 50’s which led to the creation of the Foreign Worker Program (Maussen, 2009; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). This program was formulated behind closed doors by the Ministry of Justice and Social Affairs (Bonjour & Shrover, 2015; Scholten, 2013). Consequently, it began as a strict and selective program (Bonjour & Shrover, 2015). In the policy, the government framed immigration as a necessary focus to improve the stagnant economy (Scholten, 2011). At first, southern European and former Dutch colonial workers were preferred for the program (EMN, 2012). Eventually, during the mid 1960's the program relaxed and became more tolerant towards the immigration of spouses and children (Bonjour & Shrover, 2015). Simultaneously, workers from Turkey, Morocco, and former Yugoslavia were also recruited under the same program (EMN, 2012). In 1969, there were 69,000 foreign workers living in the Netherlands (Maussen, 2009; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). Moreover, many of these workers earned and used the right to family reunification (Bonjour & Shrover, 2015).

With the population increase of non-western immigrants, mainly from Muslim countries, social tensions between natives and immigrants intensified (Brug et al, 2015). In response, in 1970 the Dutch government issued the Memorandum on Foreign Workers (Nota buitenlandse werknemers), in this, they claimed that the Netherlands "was not, and should not be a country of immigration" (Maussen, 2009, p.128). Then, when the oil crisis hit in 1973, the Dutch economy suffered from high unemployment and low commercial activity; this led to the discontinuation of the foreign workers program (Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011; Maussen, 2009; EMN, 2012).

Even though there were no more foreign workers coming to the Netherlands, many workers were still eligible for permanent residency which entitled them to family reunification rights, and entrance to the welfare system, which would include a pension plan, unemployment benefits, public health, and children allowance (Bonjour & Shrover, 2015; Brug et al, 2015; EMN, 2012). Neoclassical economists argued that when there were no job opportunities in a host country, immigrants would typically follow the market trend and return to their countries, but the Dutch society was completely different from the neoclassical theory arguments (Castles, 2004). Due to high unemployment, immigrants became dependent on government benefits such as the unemployment insurance provided by the welfare system (Maussen 2009). Their dependence on the unemployment benefits, along with high levels of unemployment, low levels of education, and low salaries for low skilled labour led to the segregation and ghettoization of immigrant neighborhoods (Maussen, 2009). This created more tension between immigrants and natives. This also incentivized people to ask the question why were immigrants reluctant to leave the Netherlands? Stephen Castles (2004) claims that immigrants became reluctant to leave the host country when they started seeing more life opportunities in addition to the possibility for family reunification. The permanent stay of non-western immigrants, their segregation and tensions against natives eventually created the need for integration policies.

Multiculturalism 1983-1994

Established in 1972, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WWR) was a semi-independent institute responsible for reports on various policy topics; to which some scholars referred to as Dutch technocracy (EMN, 2012; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011; Kickert et al, 1995; Scholten, 2011). In 1978, WWR was tasked to formulate an integration system (Scholten & Timmermas, 2010). Subsequently, in the late 70's the Dutch government created another council for integration policy development and research called the Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM) (Scholten & Timmermas, 2010). As such, multicultural policies were eventually adopted by the Dutch government in the early 80's. In 1983, the Ethnic Minorities Act was formulated by the WRR (Scholten, 2011) and since the Dutch government did not want to politicize the topic, they passed the Ethnic Minorities Act behind closed doors (Scholten, 2011; 2013). Several other multicultural policies were also created after the implementation of the Ethnic Minorities Act (Kickert et al, 1995). These policies included easier access to a path to citizenship, less strict family reunification policies, the inclusion of the immigrant's mother tongue in the school curriculum, the right to vote in local elections, and full access to the welfare state (Kickert et al, 1995). This policy was then framed as a "Mutual adaptation in a multicultural society" (Scholten, 2011, p.82). In summary, these policies show that the Dutch government was ready for the opening of the society and was welcoming of immigrants.

However, the effects of multiculturalist policies were detrimental for integration. Ruud Koopmans (2010) claims that multiculturalism was extremely unsuccessful in integrating non-western immigrants because it created "easy access to equal rights, including unrestricted access to welfare state arrangements, and in combination with a large degree of facilitation of cultural differences, have had unintended negative effects on the socioeconomic integration of immigrants" (p.2). This means that integration is harder to achieve when the state actively nourishes immigrants, this leads to a constant dependence on the welfare-state. Additionally, since first and second-generation immigrants from non-western countries tend to have lower language skills, they have higher unemployment levels, and higher segregation levels (Koopmans, 2010).

Although, Koopmans (2010; 2006) claims that Germany, a country that has never applied multicultural policies, has had more success with the integration of non-western immigrants in comparison to countries that have practiced multiculturalism in the past (i.e. Netherlands, UK, and Sweden). He substantiates his claims with evidence that multicultural policies have led to poor language skills, low participation in the labour market, high degrees of segregation, and over representation in prisons (Koopmans 2010; 2003). These social problems have also led to more tension between native Dutch citizens and immigrants (EMN, 2012). In response to non-European immigrants' high levels of unemployment and their dependence on unemployment benefits, Dutch natives in the 90's disagreed that the Islamic community was a contributor to Dutch society and the economy (Duyvendak, & Scholten, 2011; Scholten, 2011; 2013). As such, by 1994 multiculturalism was seen as a complete failure and as if there was a constant discussion of immigrants' dependence on the welfare state (Vasta, 2007). The dependence on unemployment benefits, the corrosion of the welfare state, and low levels of integration then triggered the politicization of integration.

Soft Civic Integration 1994-1999

The errors of multiculturalism led to adopting a civic integration model. In 1989, the WWR created a new report on the integration of non-western immigrants. In this report, the technocratic council claims that immigrants have rights and obligations in Dutch society (Scholten, 2013). These obligations were to contribute socially, economically, and especially to the welfare-state (EMN, 2012). They also framed immigration as requiring socio-economic participation (Scholten, 2011; 2013). In light of this information, the lower house of parliament had the first National Minorities Debate in 1994 (Scholten, 2011; Brug et al, 2015). During the debate, they discussed that immigrants had the duty to integrate into the labour market, which would simultaneously allow them to contribute to the economy and society (Scholten, 2011). They also claimed that the Netherlands was a country where differences had to be respected (Scholten, 2011). Peter A. Hall (1993), argues that the "most important learning is [done from] a previous policy itself" (p.277). He defines policy learning as "a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process" (Hall, 1993, p.278). In 1994, the Aliens Act was passed; this act implemented language classes for adults as well as active citizenship classes (Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). The change from multiculturalism to soft integration policies also showed that Dutch politicians and bureaucrats experienced some policy learning from the failure of multicultural policies, and with the WWR's new information.

Harsh Civic Integration 1999-2005

The civic integration act evolved into a harsh integration mechanism four years later. In 1999, another policy titled the Newcomer Integration Act 1998 was introduced. This policy was stricter than the former because the act made immigrants take compulsory courses about integration into the workforce, Dutch language classes and a society exam (Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). Under this act, municipalities were also forced to subsidize integration programs to help with the integration of third country nationals (EMN, 2012). Furthermore, for the first time in Dutch history, third country nationals would face sanctions if they were reluctant to attend these courses (Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011; Vasta, 2007). The low levels of participation in the economy made the Dutch government act against those living off of unemployment benefits. In 2000, the Modern Migration Act was introduced which added the necessity of having a sponsor in order to achieve permanent residency (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). These acts were the result of incremental changes to the integration system.

Towards 'New style integration' 2000-2005

In the first few years of the new millennium, the politicization of Islam and integration increased substantially. In 2000, there were 152,693 Moroccans born in the Netherlands and 178,027 Turks born in the Netherlands (OECD, 2018) (See **table 1**). Most of these immigrants had poor language skills and low education (EMN, 2012). The failure of the multiculturalism model lead to the discontinuation of several multicultural policies, such as including their mother language in the school curriculum and those that did work faced tougher regulations when they applied, for rights like family reunification (Vasta, 2007; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). In 2000, Dr. Paul Scheffer published an article called 'The multicultural drama" (Scholten, 2013; Vasta, 2007). This article ignited public debate about the low integration of non-western immigrants, specifically Turks and Moroccans (Scholten, 2013; Brug et al, 2015). That same year, the Second National debate on Minorities in the lower house of the parliament took place (Brug et al, 2015). This debate focused on the mistakes of multiculturalism and how social distance affects the economic integration of immigrants (Brug et al, 2015). The failure of multiculturalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, in cumulation 9/11 incited the rise of far-right parties and politicians (Otjes, 2011). Among these politicians was Pim Fortuyn, former sociology professor in the University of Rotterdam, and leader of the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) (Otjes, 2011). Although, unlike most far-right politicians in Europe, Dr. Fortuyn believed in women and LGBT rights (Otjes, 2011; Brug & Mughat, 2007). Pim Fortuyn was often described by the media and scholars as a charismatic leader that brought people together with the help of free publicity from his significant media presence (Brug & Mughat, 2007, p.33). But his clear hate against Islam and his populist beliefs led to his assassination just before the 2002 elections (Scholten, 2013). In spite of his assassination, the LPF still won several seats in the lower house of parliament which allowed them to form a coalition government with the Freedom and Democracy party (VVD) and Christian Democratic Appeal party (CDA) (Otjes, 2011; Brug & Mughat, 2007). However, the absence of a strong LPF leader created party discrepancies and these disputes led to the dismantling of the government in 2003 (Otjes, 2011).

The release of Dr. Scheffer's article and the assassination of Fortuyn contributed to the increasing amount of Islamophobia and media criticism against immigrants wherein it rose to its highest levels yet (See **Image 1**), Dutch natives began calling for a harsher integration process, which Simon Otjes (2011) labeled the 'The Pim Fortuyn Effect' (Scholten, 2013). Another event that explains the high politicization was the assassination of film director Theo Van Gogh in 2004 (Scholten, 2013; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011). Van Gogh was assassinated by a Dutch-Moroccan terrorist because of Van Gogh's direction in a movie that portrayed violence that some Muslim women have experienced (Scholten, 2013). This subsequently framed Muslim immigrants as dangerous to Dutch society (Scholten, 2011). As seen in **Image 1**, the publication of articles on migrant integration peaked when *The multicultural drama* was published in 2000, during the campaign and assassination of Fortuyn in 2002, and when Theo Van Gogh was assassinated (Scholten, 2013). By definition, policy windows are "the moments or 'windows' of opportunity which policy actors [policy entrepreneurs] c[an] take advantage of to move items onto the government agenda" (Howlett et al, 2016, p.279). These events open a policy window by politicizing immigration and integration of non-western aliens.

	1996	2005 (January)	2020 (Forecast)
Allochtonen* - Population in total	2,498,715 (16,1%)	3,112,431 (19.1%)	4,152,415 (24.7%)
Turkish origin	271,514	357,911	451,717
Surinamese origin	280,615	328,312	374,720
Morrocan origin	225,088	314,699	431,957
Dutch Antilles + Aruba origin	86,824	129,721	188,865
EU-24		810,070	
Non-western Foreigners (Turkish, Africa, Latin America, Asia, with exception of Indonesia and Japan)	1,171,113 (7.5%)	1,691,982 (10.4%)	2,425,016 (14.4%)
Total population Netherlands	15,493,889	16,294,847	16,799,820

* In its population figures, the Netherlands distinguishes between "Autochtone" and "Allochtone". According to official Dutch CBS Statistics, a person with at least one parent born overseas is designated as "allochtoon", regardless of the place of their birth (Holland or elsewhere). This is an unusual way of categorising national data on immigration, and implies that Dutch figures on immigration appear as somewhat inflated in international comparisons.
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).

Table 1: Retrieved from Michalowski (2005)



Image 1: National media agenda: annual number of newspaper articles in national media on migrant integration (1990–2011). Retrieved from Scholten (2013)

Verdonk's New Style Integration 2005 to date

The events that occur in the first half of the 2000's opened a policy window. Rita Verdonk, the Minister of Immigration from 2003 to 2007, was the policy entrepreneur for the Aliens (Abroad) Act. What exactly is a policy entrepreneur? As explained by Michael Mintron and Phillipa Norman (2009) policy entrepreneurs have specific roles as:

> highly motivated individuals or small teams [that] can do much to draw attention to policy problems, present innovative policy solutions, build coalitions of supporters, and secure legislative action... they can be in or out of the government… they have [the] willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return. (Mintron & Norman, 2009, p. 649- 651)

There are several characteristics that these individuals demonstrate that help them, like their ability to properly define a problem, a display of social activity, and the ability to form teams (Mintron

& Norman, 2009). Although not all policy entrepreneurs display these characteristics, those with these strengths tend to be more successful (Mintron & Norman, 2009). This essay proposes that they also have the ability to properly frame a problem and its solution. A policy entrepreneur should define the problem by framing it in a way that would sell their policy. Rita Verdonk used this ability to successfully set the agenda for the Dutch government while she was Minister of Immigration (Scholten & Timmermas, 2010). So Verdonk framed a necessity for harsher integration policy to socio-culturally integrate dangerous Muslim aliens (Brug et al, 2015). In her policy, immigrants were framed as a potential danger to Dutch society because they rejected the Dutch values and language (Scholten, 2011, p.82). Verdonk is a policy entrepreneur because she invested time, energy, reputation, and her government position to bring together the problem, solution and politics to accomplish the implementation of harsher integration policies in the Netherlands. This last point will be discussed more broadly later in this essay.

Verdonk used the fear and rejection of immigrants to open dialogue for a harsher integration and full retrenchment of previous multicultural policies. While she was Minister of Immigration, she introduced the Aliens (Abroad) Act; this policy aims to lower the acceptance rate for low-skilled labour and decrease family reunification for immigrants from a non-western background (The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005; Scholten, 2011). The Aliens (Abroad) Act aims to decrease family reunification and to ensure the socio-cultural integration of non-western aliens (Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2011; The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005). This is done by making immigrants who are also third-country nationals have to integrate before entering Dutch soil, which consequently makes it harder for third-country nationals to migrate to the Netherlands. The bill states that the immigrant must pass the knowledge test of Dutch language, values and society prior to entry to the Netherlands (The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005). The Minister for Immigration and Integration (2005) claims that while Dutch society should provide opportunities to immigrants, they are still expected to integrate and contribute to the enrichment of the Dutch society. Several other bills were passed and eliminated to ensure the full integration of immigrants (Scholten, 2013). Mandatory Dutch language, values and society courses were reinforced with high sanctions against aliens who dropped out of or failed the courses, and a full retrenchment of subsidies to non-western institutes (Scholten, 2013; Scholten & Timmermans, 2010).

The use of expert information in formulating these policies was necessary. In 2001 the WRR published a report of ethnic minorities' integration. But this report was ignored by policy elites because the WRR was framed as a council with multicultural bias (Scholten & Timmermans, 2010, p.534). Instead, Verdonk used data from the Social and Cultural Planning Agency (SCP), several conservative academics such as Ruud Koopmans and Paul Scheffer, and Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (Niespen & Scholten, 2017). This information was then used to frame the solution in a more effective way for Verdonk's intentions.

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

The radical change from multiculturalism to soft integration and then to a harsher integration system can be explained by using the punctuated equilibrium theory. This theory was introduced by Niles Eldredge and Stephen Gould to explain sudden changes in the evolution of species (Givell, 2010). This theory refers to "long periods of relative stability or incrementalism [that are] interrupted by a burst of dramatic change" (Givell, 2010, p. 188). This term is used in policy sciences to refer to a policy that has had an incremental path that is abruptly interrupted by a radical change, but following this radical change, a long-term form of incrementalism arises (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). Baumgartner & Jones (1993) see this process as a change in the agenda setting of a government. This change is often ignited by policy learning from an earlier policy, new information or technology, policy entrepreneurs exploiting windows of opportunities, changes in public opinion, a crisis, war, media exposure, parliamentary discussion, or more (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Jones & Baumgartner 2012). These changes led to a major change in the policy system that was followed by several years of slow incremental policy change (Givel, 2010, p.188). Another important factor for the punctuated equilibrium theory is framing an issue and agenda setting (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Jones & Baumgartner 2012). Changes in agenda setting may occur differently depending on how an issue is framed (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2012).

As seen in the Netherlands, there were changes from no integration policy during the foreign labour program, to the emergence of multiculturalism following the civic integration act, and eventually the development of harsh integration policies that can be characterized by radical and abrupt changes in the integration of non-western immigrants. The segregation and acceptance of permanent stay of foreign workers led to technocratic decisions from the WRR to implement multiculturalism (Scholten, 2011). The failure of this system led to the creation of an economically oriented integration (Vasta, 2007). Despite this type of system successfully reducing unemployment (see **Image 2**), the culmination of Paul Scheffer's extreme politicization of immigration, Pym Fortuyn's campaign and assassination, 9/11, Theo Van Gough's assassination, and the harsh integration trend in Europe all contribute to the acceptance of Dutch harsh integration policies in 2005 by imposing an anti-immigrant sentiment on the Dutch society (Scholten, 2011; Michalowski; 2005). As said before, the framing of non-western aliens during these changes is one of the many influential factors of agenda setting and punctuations in policy. The shift from pillarization to individualism may have also added to the explanation of the change in the alien's framing and the agenda setting of the Dutch government.

The anti-Muslim feeling in Dutch society played a big part in the development of the policy. Aileen Tom (2006) argues that "changes in immigration policy are made to address economic and security problems, [and] they are also often the result of disguised racism and xenophobia" (p.451). Among the Dutch natives, the notion of the incompatibility of Islam and European values incremented after Pym Fortuyn's Campaign and the assassination of Theo Van Gogh (Tom, 2006; Romeyn, 2014). This disguised feeling played a big role in the punctuated equilibrium in 2005 and the notion of undesirability of Muslims is still present among the Dutch natives today. In fact, in 2015, 88% of Dutch natives perceived Islam as a violent religion and 66% of Dutch natives had a negative view of immigrants arriving from the Middle East and North Africa (Abdelkader, 2017). It also appears that policies in the Netherlands became harsher towards Muslims with the banning of face coverings in public places including burqas and niqabs in June 2018 (Reuters, 2018). This incrementalism after a punctuation is evidence of punctuated equilibrium, and also evidence of intolerance among policy makers.



Source: CBS.

Image 2: Autochten* refers to Indigenous Dutch and Allochtonen* refers to a person born inside or outside the Netherlands with at least one immigrant parent. Retrieved from Michalowski (2005)

The next section will study the policy process of the Aliens (Abroad) Act by using a model created in 2016 by Michael Howlett, Allan McConnell, and Anthony Perl. This essay will emphasize agenda setting and the agenda building process since they relate most to the punctuated equilibrium theory.

"Weaving" the policy

Michael Howlett, Allan McDowell, and Anthony Perl (2016) formulated a model in which several policy frameworks were adapted into a mega-framework. The weaving policy metaphor includes the cycle model, the advocacy coalition framework, multiple streams framework, and punctuated equilibrium theory (Howlett et al, 2016). This essay will add the presence of a policy entrepreneur to the model. Although the policy entrepreneur is present in the Baumgartner & Jones (1993) and Howlett et al (2016), it is essential to understand his or her presence and interaction with the problem, solution, and sometimes politics.

Agenda building- Critical juncture 0.5

Howlett et al (2016) claims that at the beginning of every policy there should be three streams: problem, solution, and politics. This essay argues that the presence of a policy entrepreneur is sometimes necessary to understand how these streams tie together. As was said before, a policy entrepreneur is the one that pushes a policy when a window of opportunity is opened. But what happens when the window of opportunity is not opened yet? This essay will assume that most of the time the policy entrepreneur has already found a solution to the problem or a problem to a solution. This actor may push the solution and/or the issue that would fit his or her own personal agenda.

Cobb et al (1979) argue that there are three types of models for agenda building. The first one is outside initiative model, which argues that non-governmental actors or groups would bring an issue to the government with the hopes of punctuation, incrementalism, or even stagnation (Cobb et al, 1979). The second is the mobilization model, in which the actor or group is inside the government and would have to bring an issue by mobilizing political actors and civilians to set governmental agenda (Cobb et al, 1979). The third model is called inside initiative, where government elites want the issue to be in the government agenda but not expanded towards the mass public, for example staying within elite government circles (Cobb et al, 1979). This essay will propose a fourth model, the mobilization-inside model, to describe the Aliens (Abroad) Act.

Rita Verdonk, as the minister of immigration, was in a comfortable position within the government elite to set the agenda because she did not have to mobilize the government nor the public to agree to her agenda setting. Especially since she gained support among Dutch voters for starting a huge debate about Islam and its dangers to the Dutch society, and this would reflect in the following elections (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009). The model that this essay proposes would fit for many other populist politicians in positions of power as well, such as Donald Trump, Sebastian Kurz, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, or in this case Rita Verdonk. In this critical juncture, the policy entrepreneur would help bring the problem, solution, and politics together (See **image 3**); but the closeness of the streams would depend on the amount of power the policy entrepreneur has.



Image 3: Adapted from Howlett et al. (2016)

Agenda setting- Critical juncture 1

Due to the high politicization of migration and Islam, Verdonk used this policy window to set government agenda to include a harsher integration system (Scholten, 2013; Brug et al, 2015). The policy window was opened with the assassination of Fortuyn and Van Gogh. Several other factors such as 9/11 and the high segregation of minorities also contribute to the opening of the policy window (Brug et al, 2015; Romeyn, 2014). So Rita Verdonk used these events to set the agenda for a tougher integration process.

Policy formulation- Critical juncture 2

Rita Verdonk used the advice of SCP and data from academics and CBS. SCP advised the government to set a test that would prove whether or not the immigrant was susceptible to integration in a Western country (Nispen & Scholten, 2017; The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005). Because immigrants often dropped out of integration programs that frequently only taught low level language skills and contributed to high levels of unemployment, it was still necessary to ensure that new immigrants had the ability to speak enough Dutch to ensure their participation in the labour market (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010; The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005).

The formulation was planned so immigrants started their integration process before entering Dutch territory (The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005). Since families that were unable to pay for Dutch classes abroad had no chance at immigrating, this also suggests that the Dutch government was rejecting immigrants from poor backgrounds and using the policy to control migration (The Minister for Immigration and Integration, 2005). During the formulation of this policy, immigrants from non-western countries were also framed as dangerous for the Netherlands (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2010).

The Minister for Immigration and Integration (2005) claims that while drafting the bill, advice was taken from several governmental and non-governmental groups, like the Alien Affairs Advisory Committee (ACVZ), and the National Consultative Committee on Minorities (LOM), and from collaboration groups like Consultative Body on Turks (IOT), Lize (National Government consultation partner for South European communities), Collaboration Group of Moroccans and Tunisians (SMT) and Refugee Organisations in the Netherlands. (EMN, 2012).

Decision Making- Critical juncture 3

Because of the high politicization of these issue by Dutch media and the recent political assassinations of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, most parties favoured integration. Therefore, bills like the Civic Integration Abroad Act (2005) passed without problems or severe opposition (Brug et al, 2015). As such, this demonstrated Verdonk's perfect timing to introduce the bill to parliament and since most European countries had already applied policies of the same nature, these harsh integration policies were more easily accepted (Meer et al, 2015).

Policy implementation- Critical juncture 4

The Ministry of Immigration, integration, and asylum is in charge of applying the Aliens Act and the Dutch government places a large amount of the responsibility on integration of the immigrant (EMN, 2012). If the immigrant qualifies for entry, they must complete the integration courses and present active citizenship. As said before, this policy was meant to decrease immigration and integrate the immigrant. If the immigrant was reluctant to participate in their integration, the government would not consider the individual to be a member of Dutch society (EMN, 2012). In other words, if the immigrant did not voluntarily participate in their integration, the government would not allow the individual to remain on Dutch soil.

The policy implementation process also depends on collaboration with several ministers, agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) (EMN, 2012). Municipalities also play a big role in procedure implementation, such as those related to housing refugees, promoting participation among natives and immigrants, providing naturalization papers, registering immigrants, and ensuring the integration of migrants (Scholten, 2013; ENM, 2012). Therefore, several agencies belonging to the Ministry of Immigration, integration, and asylum work together to implement this policy. The Repatriation and Departure Service agency manages the deportation of immigrants, either voluntarily or forcefully (EMN, 2012). The Integration and society department is in charge of the promotion of participation of immigrants in Dutch Society. This department is also responsible for the social and cultural integration of third country nationals, like non-EU citizens (EMN, 2012). The Ministry also cooperates with the Netherlands Employees Insurance Agency (UWV), which is in charge of helping third country nationals find work as fast as they can (EMN, 2012.

The implementation of this policy requires inter-ministry cooperation. The Consular Affairs and Migration Policy Department (agency that belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is in charge of fostering the compulsory language and society exams to third country nationals before entering Dutch soil (EMN, 2012). The Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations is in charge of monitoring the process applications of third-country nationals, this ministry is mainly in charge of applying the Nationality act, or naturalization (EMN, 2012). The Ministry of Security and Justice monitors the legal status of third country nationals on Dutch soil (EMN, 2012). Lastly, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is in charge of overseeing the income security of immigrants and their inclusion in the labour market (EMN, 2012).

Evaluation of the policy- Critical juncture 5

The policy has not been successful in lowering migration numbers from family migration or family formation immigrants nor fully integrated non-western immigrants. Although from 2005 to 2007 there were fewer immigrants that came to the Netherlands for family reunification, but the number of newcomers has increased since 2007 (Statistics Netherlands, 2016). This means that the Aliens (Abroad) Act has not been successful in limiting immigration (see **image 4**). The annual report on integration (Statistics Netherlands, 2016) claims that in 2015 immigrants experienced high unemployment, high school leave, over representation in prison, and they had a higher dependence on welfare benefits compared to their significant others (see the annual report in integration 2016). Again, this report shows that the integration of immigrants has been limited. The incremental policies that followed the Aliens (Abroad) Act such as the banning of burqas in public buildings portrays a new reality in the socio-democratic country (Reuters, 2018). Harsh integration policies do not show a desire to integrate immigrants, but instead portray populist Islamophobia among political elites. The Aliens (Abroad) Act therefore marked the beginning of racist policies that deterred immigrants from the Netherlands.



Image 4: Image retrieved from Statistics Netherlands (2016)

Conclusion

When considering whether the Netherlands has the chance to revert the integration system to a multicultural base, or at least an intra-cultural base, this essay argues that it depends. Perhaps the Netherlands will win the next soccer world cup with a multi-ethnic or multi-religious team which may change the framing of non-western immigrants and lead to a punctuation in policy. Maybe, this would eventually force the Dutch integration system to be reversed back to a multicultural model. Or maybe nothing would happen, and alternatively integration policies could experience incrementalism towards a harsher path.

In conclusion, punctuated changes in Dutch integration policy happened because of the high politicization of Islam and integration, and the high tensions between immigrants and natives. The study of the integration policies in the Netherlands can be explained by using punctuated equilibrium theory supported by the policy learning and policy entrepreneurs' concept. Other types of policy tools that can be used in this analysis are advocacy coalitions, and Peter Hall’s work on the policy paradigm shift. However, it is necessary to study integration policies in Europe, because they show the harsh reality that non-western immigrants face in a coercive host country. The overall study of immigration also helps people better understand other social and economic policies.

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Race, Gender, and Migration: Augmented Exclusion in the Netherlands

Kirsten Samson, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada

Abstract

In an era of increased support for far-right populist movements, women of colour are positioned to experience increased exclusion in European politics. This paper will examine how migrant women of colour experience exclusion and oppression in the Dutch political landscape. This paper presents a case study of the Netherlands, examining the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV). I seek to answer the question: how do women of colour who have migrated to the Netherlands experience augmented levels of exclusion as compared to migrant men of colour, and can Dutch feminist discourse mitigate high levels of exclusion? The paper finds that far-right populism in the Netherlands excludes and oppresses women of colour, preventing these women from attaining inclusion and equality.

Keywords: populism, far-right populism, women, feminism, Partij voor de Vrijheid

Introduction

Far-right populism is increasingly visible in the European political landscape, with the Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) possessing particularly radical anti-immigration stances (Akkerman, 2015, P. 41). This paper will seek to answer the following question: how do women of colour who have migrated to the Netherlands experience augmented levels of exclusion as compared to migrant men of colour, and can Dutch feminist discourse mitigate high levels of exclusion? I will conduct a case study of the Netherlands that examines how the PVV influences the Dutch population's opinions surrounding migration. This paper will argue that far-right populism in the Netherlands excludes and oppresses migrant women of colour, preventing feminism from achieving inclusion and equality for individuals with these intersecting identities. For the purpose of this paper, far right populism in Europe is conceptualized as a right-wing political ideology that enforces 'European cultural belonging' or autochthony discourse that is often paired with a campaign against Islam (Vietan, 2016).

First, I will provide a literature review and the theoretical framework. Second, I discuss the autochthone-allochthone discourse in the Netherlands, demonstrating how Muslim migrant women are targeted as allochthones. This section will examine the PVV's instrumental use of gender equality discourse to divide feminist discourse, creating a dynamic that separates autochthones and allochthones, further entrenching exclusion.

Third, I will conceptualize far-right populism, analyzing the PVV stance on migration. This section will identify Muslim migrants of colour as the key targets of the PVV's anti-immigration stance. I will argue that women are disproportionately excluded from Dutch social relations insofar as the PVV is concerned with migrant women who wear headscarves. Finally, the paper will analyze varying levels of party documentation borrowing qualitative content analysis and interview-based research to demonstrate the exclusion of Muslim women from the Dutch population. Finally, the paper will question the ability of feminist discourse to mitigate the exclusion of Muslim women of colour.

Literature Review

There are three key themes in the academic literature on the conditions of Muslim women in the Netherlands: (1) gender equality policy in the Netherlands has changed; (2) far-right populism has developed to a fuller extent with the introduction of the PVV; and, (3) the 'headrag tax' is a widely denounced policy initiative which nonetheless has significant effects. Since the turn of the century, Dutch gender equality policy has seen a shift to a focus on migrant women's equality – it is believed that there are issues with migrant [Muslim] culture, and there are no issues with dominant culture and society (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007). Roggeband and Verloo (2007) reach such a conclusion using strategic framing to analyze the evolution of frames over time by studying policy documents and transcripts of parliamentary debates (from 1995 to 2005) regarding the integration of minorities and the emancipation of women. One of the most notable policies that demonstrates a shift in the framing of gender equality is the introduction of the 'headrag tax.' This idea was forwarded by PVV leader Geert Wilders who stated that women who chose to wear a headscarf should have to pay an annual tax of 1000 euro which would be then donated to women's organizations (Korteweg, 2013; Vietan 2016). Korteweg conducts her analysis of the 'headrag tax' using transcripts of parliamentary debate, newspaper responses, and interviews with politically active women where she analyzes frames to see how they produce varying discourses (Korteweg 2013, p. 760-761). It is key to note that the PVV has influenced Dutch political and public debates and policy since 2006 (Vietan, 2016; Korteweg, 2013). Currently, the literature focuses on changes to gender equality policy, especially given the introduction of the PVV.

It is also necessary to analyze research limitations. There is limited research into how policies of the PVV impact people in the Netherlands specifically, although the literature on

European countries in general and their interactions with far-right populist parties is much more extensive (Vrânceanu & Lachat, 2018). For this reason, there are limitations in understanding the interaction between the influence of the PVV on feminist and women-centred organizations. There is, however, research of this nature in other countries and contexts. Notably, Yilmaz (2015) suggests that the political landscape has changed, focusing on culture-based identifications in Denmark. This has meant that feminist and traditionally sexist forces have converged, which has sometimes led to progressive groups (including the feminist movement) to criticize Muslim immigration (Yilmaz, 2015, p. 38). In the literature, the key reasons for far-right party criticism toward Muslim people is the focus on 'Islamic practices' that are seen to violate women's rights. Such practices include genital mutilation, the veil, the headscarf, healthcare concerns, and gender segregation in public facilities (de Lange and Mügge, 2015, p. 77). Key to these issues is the assumption that Muslim women should be saved from male-domination which is seen as inherent to Islamic traditions. To adequately address the intersections of the subject material of this paper, I use intersectionality theory as this paper's framework.

Theoretical Approach: Intersectionality Theory

This paper uses intersectionality theory as its theoretical approach. The paper applies an intersectional frame to observe context-specific identities. Intersectionality considers how varying identities (i.e., race, gender, class, age, ability, and sexual orientation) can overlap to create power dynamics that discriminate certain groups and individuals (Cho et al., 2013). Intersectionality theory extends beyond this definition. It is used to show how discrimination and disadvantage do not simply add upon one another; rather, intersectionality theory determines how identities can intersect and produce unique forms of disadvantage (Best et al., 2011). Thus, this paper examines how racialized women who are religious minorities are impacted by the PVV.

Intersectionality theory is useful in this context by providing analysis to capture and engage with the contextual dynamics of power that exist in the Dutch political landscape (Cho et al., 2013). Further, intersectionality grants the ability for open-ended investigation into overlapping and conflicting dynamics of race, gender, sexuality, nation, and other inequalities (Lykke, 2011). Thus, I examine race, gender, nation, and religious intersections of identity in this paper.

The paper also briefly discusses the presence of liberal feminism in the Netherlands. Liberal feminism posits that social justice can be achieved for women with formal legal equality (Okin S.M., 1994, p. 41). In the context of this paper, Dutch liberal feminism is cited as a method to achieve equality for women but does not consider the unique intersections of gender, race, and religion. Thus, liberal feminism sees equality as attainable through formal legal mechanisms, while intersectionality acknowledges that power dynamics are entrenched in all aspects of public and private life (e.g., legal systems, the family, and political institutions). Intersectionality theory, by examining the unique forms of discrimination experienced by individuals with various intersecting identities, recognizes that formal legal mechanisms are only one aspect of the search for equality. Likewise, Dutch feminist discourse that focuses exclusively on legal mechanisms for equality will inadequately address existing power dynamics that precipitate discrimination and disadvantage. Although liberal feminism is a theory that could have been implemented in this paper, I use intersectionality theory due to its centrality in defining contemporary and emerging feminist approaches and its ability to identify how particular power dynamics in the Netherlands precipitate exclusionary political and social outcomes (Cho et al., 2013). Liberal feminist approaches, due to their value on women's equality without using an intersectional lens, may in fact be disrupted by the PVV's anti-immigration discourse. Focus on culture-based identifications by the PVV can lead to the convergence of traditionally feminist and non-feminist groups to critique Muslim migrants and immigration, just as in Denmark (Yilmaz, 2015). Therefore, intersectionality theory is used in this paper to analyze how Dutch women of colour are impacted by far-right populism.

Dutch Autochthony and Far-Right Populism

The experiences of women of colour are impacted by autochthony discourse, which is an important aspect of far-right populist ideology. Autochthony is a method of labelling people that are Indigenous to an area, with the root words meaning to have ‘come from the soil’ of a place, while ‘allochthone’ is a label that functions as an implicit call to exclude strangers (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005, p. 386). In the Netherlands, however, the term does not refer to indigeneity. Instead, autochthony is enforced by ideas of what it means to belong to Dutch culture. It is critical of immigration, specifically the immigration of Muslim people. In Europe, Muslims have become a primary target for autochthony discourse (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005, p. 397). In the Dutch context specifically, allochthone has come to mean ‘of foreign descent,’ implicitly referencing Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their children (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 275). Most Muslim women in the Netherlands are Turkish or Moroccan migrants (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 284), thus these individuals are seen as migrant people of colour who are assumed to be Muslim women. Vietan’s interview-based research quoted a woman who has been excluded vis-à-vis social segregation in the Netherlands. The interviewee states: “I still have a lot of white Dutch friends who only know me as a token, a kind of their own example of the *allochtone gemeenschap* [allochthone community]” (Vietan, 2016, p. 629). Muslim migrant women experience social segregation that has transcended political discourse and become a common-day practice. Autochthony in the Netherlands threatens an intersectional approach to feminism in its exclusion of allochthones.

Autochthones are considered an ideal Dutch citizen which reinforces their power as it excludes migrants and disregards their unique experiences and identities. Muslim culture is seen by Dutch autochthones as a hindrance to migrant women's emancipation (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 281). Thus, Muslim women must follow autochthonous rules of cultural presentation or remain part of the *allochtone gemeenschap*, where they are excluded from the mainstream Dutch population. Not only do these women experience social exclusion, but they encounter cultural exclusion as well. Cultural understandings surrounding women's emancipation have shifted from a male norm to a female autochthone norm. This means that Dutch women's emancipation was formerly determined with reference to Dutch men as a normative point; however, migrant women are the new reference group, with autochthonous Dutch women acting as the norm for emancipation (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 282). Women are further divided by this normative lens, leading to the view that Dutch autochthone women possess a cultural superiority due to their perceived emancipation, and allochthone women remain unemancipated and culturally inferior. In creating a division between autochthone and allochthone women, Dutch feminism is unable to recognize cultural diversity and is unable to mitigate the exclusion of migrant women of colour by far-right parties.

Far-Right Populism: Approaches to Migration

With the increasing popularity of far-right populism, migration is an important topic in political thought and discussion. Many far-right populist parties in Europe believe that nation-states should be exclusively inhabited by natives (as defined by individual nations), suggesting that individuals, ideas, or material objects that are interpreted as 'non-native' are threats to the ideal nation-state (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). These parties see non-Western countries as a threat, frequently focusing on regions with Islamic fundamentalism as the primary threat to Western culture (Akkerman, 2015, p. 57). Far-right populism exists in the Dutch political party, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), or Party for Freedom. Similar to other European far-right parties, the PVV forwards exclusive and nationalist ideas, anti-immigration agendas, and authoritarian values

(Akkerman, 2015, p. 38). The PVV offers a more radical anti-immigration and anti-Islam program as compared to most other far-right European parties (Akkerman, 2015, p. 41). This party adheres to a combination of nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes, supporting far-right ideas of closing borders to non-Western immigrants and enforcing compulsory assimilation (de Lange and Mügge, 2015, p. 64). The PVV is relatively new to the Dutch political landscape, having developed with the rise of far-right populism across Europe. Vietan (2016) argues that the rise of far-right populism has occurred because of moral panic surrounding non-European migrants and refugees and an increased frequency of terrorist attacks (p. 623). These two intersecting factors have led to the founding of the PVV, and other far-right parties across Europe, that focus on anti-immigration strategies.

Far-right populism in the Netherlands is critical of migration as a process but is also critical of migrants. Morgan and Pornting (2013) note that far-right populism is often involved in gendered anti-Muslim racism and culturalism that adds to Islamophobia. Although the PVV was not founded until after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, far-right anti-Muslim sentiment was present in the years leading up to its founding. Vietan conducted interviews with a number of women, gathering information regarding their experiences as Muslim migrants in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the tragedy. A woman named Fatma expressed "her deep shock that she was not seen as part of the 'mourning community' but instead addressed as someone close to the ideology of the perpetrators" (Vietan, 2016, p. 630). Vietan's interviews found that many other Muslim women felt as if an individual criminal act had become the responsibility of all Muslims and was blamed on all Muslims (Vietan, 2016, p. 630). The anti-Muslim racism present after September 2001 has also been visible following other disasters, including the political murder of a Dutch filmmaker, Theodoor van Gogh. Following van Gogh's death, one of Vietan's interview participants commented that "there was no position for us, because there was really a *bedreiging* [threat], we really are a *bedreiging* for the Dutch, a danger for the Dutch citizens" (Vietan, 2016, p. 630). The hostility that Muslim migrants have experienced in the Netherlands has actualized in the form of a party, the PVV. The PVV targets the 'backwardness' of non-Western cultures, specifically condemning discrimination and violence against women by immigrant groups (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40; Akkerman, 2015, p. 55). They see Islam as a culture that oppresses women; thus, the PVV uses a liberal approach to gain support. The PVV fights the oppression of women by supporting anti-Muslim immigration policy (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40). Wilders, leader of the PVV, has said: "Mass immigration has enormous consequences for all facets of our society… and it flushes decades of women's emancipation down the drain" (Wilders, 2010, p. 6; de Lange and Mügge, 2015, p. 70). Thus, the PVV uses 'gender equality' as a way to popularize anti-immigration ideology. Despite the PVV's focus on gender equality for immigrant and non-immigrant women, the only proposals the party presents are confining proposals that call for restrictions or bans on veils and headscarves (Akkerman, 2015, p. 53). The PVV distaste toward immigration, however, has had a profound impact on people of colour. A Muslim migrant was quoted in Vietan's research: "[We] are not regarded as human beings any longer; [Wilders] uses animal names and terms to address us" (Vietan, 2016, p. 631). Migrant women of colour have unique experiences that men of colour do not encounter.

Migrant women of colour are uniquely impacted by far-right populism due to the patriarchal expectations that surround women's roles and physical presentation. Turkish and Moroccan women, specifically Muslim women, are seen as having the most 'backward' positions as compared to Dutch women (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 283). Hass and Lutek (2018, p. 4) demonstrate Dutch opinions regarding Muslim women: "Dutch society often still perceives

Muslim women as passive victims in need of rescue." Thus, Muslim women are punished for their alleged passivity and backwardness, which allows the Dutch-ness of these migrant women of colour to be denied (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 283). One such form of punishment is the PVV's policy recommendation of a headscarf tax which would charge an annual fee to women who choose to wear a headscarf (Vietan, 2016). Furthermore, the PVV is critical of 'import brides,' women who marry and move to the Netherlands. They are disliked at even greater levels than Muslim women who have been in the Netherlands for a longer period of time due to their low levels of education, poor language skills, poor knowledge of cultural norms, and subsequent challenges in accessing the labour market. The PVV and Dutch supporters are fearful that these women will become dependent on the Dutch welfare state (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 283-284). The unique forms of exclusion experienced by women appear to be particularly severe for women who wear headscarves. Orla and Fatimah, two women who wear headscarves and participated in Vietan's (2016) research, expressed feeling upset and intimidated by far-right interpretations of their headscarves. Geert Wilders (leader of the PVV) proposed a 'headscarf tax' to express distaste toward the cultural differences of Muslim migrants, thus inciting the fear that Orla and Fatimah shared in their interviews. Wilders was taken to court over the proposed tax policy. However, the Dutch court ruled that he was only targeting Islam, and not targeting Muslim people (Vietan, 2016, p. 631). Despite the determinations of the ruling, women still experience intimidation through anti-headscarf rhetoric.

The Intersection of Identity and Policy

The PVV has a gendered understanding of migration, which is evident beyond anti-headscarf rhetoric, in their policies and party documentation. De Lange and Mügge (2015) engaged in a qualitative content analysis of far-right party manifestos in Europe, analyzing their differing ideological stances. The researchers found that the PVV is critical of immigration in general, but specifically targets Islam. The PVV believes that Islam as a religion does not respect women's equality; thus, Muslim women are prevented from emancipation (de Lange and Mügge, 2015, p. 76). In their content analysis, de Lange and Mügge find that PVV cites women's emancipation as being unattainable due to the veil, headscarf, genital mutilation, healthcare (i.e. not allowing male physicians to treat Muslim women), and segregation of women and men in public facilities (i.e. hospitals, libraries, theatres) (2015, p.77). In agreeance with the PVV vision of a homogenous nation within the nation-state, the PVV has shared policy ideas that would assimilate Muslim migrant women.

Across Europe, governments have proposed regulating Islamic face and head-coverings. Many of these governments have recommended restricting women's access to public institutions if they wear a headscarf or banning face coverings from the entirety of the public sphere (Korteweg, 2013, p. 759). The PVV, however, has presented a different idea: a headscarf tax (Korteweg, 2013, p. 760). Wilders, aiming for a solution to the problematized headscarf, introduced the idea of the headscarf tax in the Netherlands. This proposed tax recommends charging a fee for women's 'cultural pollution of public space' (Korteweg, 2013, p. 760). An income tax of 1,000 Euros would be applied to women who wear a headscarf, with that money to be donated to women's shelters (Korteweg, 2013, p. 760). The donation would entrench ideas of protecting Dutch [white, non-migrant] women from the cultural pollution of Dutch [non-white migrant] Muslim women. Wilders interprets the headscarf itself as a symbol of the negative material impact of Muslim migrants on the Dutch economy (Korteweg, 2013, p. 765), and specifically targets Muslim women by recommending an anti-headscarf policy. The PVV even requires a license for those migrants who choose to wear a headscarf, as outlined by Wilders:

> My first proposal: why not introduce a headscarf tax? I would like to call it a headrag tax. Just, once a year, get a license… it seems to me that 1,000 Euros would be a nice sum.

> Then we'll finally get some payback for that which has cost us so much already. I would say: the polluter pays. (Korteweg, 2014, p. 764)

This proposed tax aims to protect a homogenous Dutch nation state by specifically targeting Muslim migrants from full and free expression of their religion. The headscarf tax is unlikely to pass in the Dutch legal system due to constitutional protections for religious freedoms (Korteweg, 2013, p. 760). Although a headscarf tax is unlikely to become law, the symbolic impact of rejection from Dutch national belonging has serious implications for Muslim migrant women (Korteweg, 2013, p. 771). Korteweg conducted interviews with Muslim women to determine the impact of Wilders' headscarf tax proposal. Two women, one who wears a headscarf and one who does not, expressed that they feel Dutch, but "do not see that feeling reflected consistently… [and] upheld by members of [the] majority Dutch society" (Korteweg, 2013, p. 770). The women claim that Dutch individuals around them use derogatory language when speaking with them (Korteweg, 2013, p.770).

The headscarf proposal is particularly problematic because of the top-down impact political parties have on public opinion (Vrânceanu and Lachat, 2018). Elites, such as Wilders, can influence public opinion through the positions and policies they adopt in their discussions of immigration policy (Vrânceanu and Lachat, 2018, 16). Thus, the PVV has exercised influence of public opinion, creating negative attitudes toward immigration. These negative attitudes reinforce the aforementioned autochthone-allochthone dichotomy. Allochthone [Muslim] women are constantly avoiding coercion to an autochthonous cultural viewpoint as they search for a legal understanding, moreover a cultural acceptance, of their right to wear the headscarf (Korteweg, 2013, p. 768). Muslim women that have migrated to the Netherlands (most frequently from Turkey and Morocco) experience augmented levels of exclusion vis-à-vis the proposal of a headscarf tax which invades their right to choose to don religious wears.

Multilayered Identities, Multilayered Exclusion, Multilayered Feminist Approaches?

Feminist approaches to gender equality have varied understandings of which religious and cultural practices are liberating and which practices limit women's freedom. In the Netherlands, gender equality is considered a central Dutch value (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 272). This is a value that has been used by a variety of political actors to mobilize support for their policies through the instrumental use of gender equality. Political actors that have never been strong advocates for gender equality are co-opting the concept for political gain. By protecting women's equality, parties like the PVV are able to reassert national identity and place restrictive demands on migrants and minorities (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 272). Thus, the PVV has instrumentalised the fear of gender inequality to exclude Muslim migrant women from the Dutch population using policies such as the headscarf tax. The policy was successful in a symbolic rejection of Muslim women from the Dutch public because it cited the key Dutch value of gender equality while donating the tax to women's shelters (Korteweg, 2013, p. 764). The proposed tax demonstrates that 'Dutch women' in shelters deserve protection from the influence of a Muslim culture of 'gender inequality.' However, not all proponents of gender equality are in favour of a headscarf tax, leading to a division between feminists. This division has occurred because the multicultural desire of some feminists to respect all cultures is in conflict with the liberal values of freedom and gender equality. Some practices and values of cultural minorities (i.e. wearing a headscarf) are understood as reinforcing gender inequality and violating women's rights (Okin, 1999, p. 14).. The cultural antagonism that the PVV uses to divide feminists and women has replaced the economic antagonism that once separated migrants and natives. Whereas migrants were once seen as placing an economic burden on social programs, they are now interpreted as implementing regressive, cultural burdens (Yilmaz, 2015, p. 48). Therefore, Dutch feminist discourse has placed 'Dutch' autochthones against migrant allochthones.

This autochthone versus allochthone dissonance exists in part due to liberal feminist understandings of gender equality. The Netherlands is well-known as a clear example of a country with a policy shift in regard to gender equality (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 272). As previously mentioned, policy framing has shifted to view autochthone women as the 'norm' as compared to allochthone women. Because gender equality is a central Dutch value, allochthones are expected to integrate and understand the value of gender equality (Roggeband and Verloo 2007, p. 272). Thus, Van der Veer's 1996 book states that wearing a headscarf is seen as a complete rejection of the Dutch way of life (p. 120). These thought processes have not completely changed with the spread of intersectionality theory and its approach to feminism, which is evident given the return of liberal feminist values in the PVV. The PVV targets Islam by emphasizing their party's commitment to gender equality and condemning Islam for its supposed repressession of women (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40). The PVV uses liberal feminist terms of 'gender equality' without considering the unique intersections of Muslim culture (i.e., why particular practices exist and what they may mean to Muslim women). Further, gender equality is seen as an accomplishment that is threatened by Muslim practices (Korteweg and Yurdakul, 2009; Yurdakul and Korteweg, 2013). Thus, when the PVV forwards anti-headscarf rhetoric in Dutch public life, it masks the incompleteness of women's emancipation in the Netherlands (Bracke, 2011). Instead of focusing on intersectional interpretations of equality, feminist discourse must focus on undoing the supposed inequality of Muslim practices. The PVV, in forwarding regressive policies such as the headscarf tax that assume gender equality has been achieved, disrupt feminist approaches to achieving true gender equality.

Conclusion

The exclusion of migrant women of colour in the Netherlands is unique as compared to the experiences of migrant men of colour. The exclusion that allochthone women encounter in their lives has not been mitigated by Dutch feminism. In fact, the PVV has created a division in feminist efforts through their instrumentalization of 'gender equality.' The paper presented Muslim migrants as the key targets of the PVV's anti-immigration programme, which was demonstrated using an analysis of the headscarf tax. This tax, which targets women who choose to wear a headscarf, will be returned as a donation to Dutch women's shelters, augmenting an autochthone-allochthone divide. By operationalizing the headscarf as a threat to 'Dutch culture,' the PVV has been successful in dividing feminist discourse and empowering their anti-immigration sentiment. If the Netherlands is to overcome the autochthone/allochthone division, concerted efforts toward consciousness raising must take place. The PVV has enjoyed success by suggesting that migrants are problematic for Dutch culture. However, Dutch culture is never presented as problematic for migrants (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007, p. 281). If migrant women of colour are to have enriched participation in Dutch public life, both civil society groups and government must launch a multi-faceted approach to redesign the power structures that subordinate migrant women of colour in the Netherlands. Civil society groups can play a key role in changing general public discourse, while government can ensure that official policy embraces anti-discriminatory language and appropriate media campaigns follow. Working toward inclusion for migrant women of colour requires a consciousness raising of migrant exclusion by government and non-government actors alike. However, raising consciousness to recognize the level of exclusion experienced by migrant women of colour is only a first step in solving the problems of exclusion in the Netherlands, and must be explored further as popular political opinion continues to evolve.

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Kirsten Samson is an undergraduate student at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon. She is in her fourth year of a B.A. (Hons) in Political Studies with a minor in French and a certificate in global studies. Kirsten hopes to pursue a graduate program in the future.

Mass Migration:
German Political Parties' responses to the refugee question

Luise Goldi Schöneberg, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

Abstract

What was the response of Germany's political parties to the refugee question? I am to study this question by providing an overview and evaluation of the political statements and tactics of German political parties on the refugee issue during, and after, the German election campaign of 2017. This analysis is based on the political statements of the parties in their own publications (e.g. political programs) and in the general media (press, internet etc.) as well as on the critical echo in the public. I will also discuss the legal framework surrounding the refugee crisis, in order to better understand the varied responses to its administration. My analytical framework is inspired by the German sociologist Max Weber who distinguished between ethical approaches in politics: (1) an *"ethics of moral conviction,"* which means to take an ethical principle as an absolute command (e.g. to help refugees regardless of any adverse political consequences this might have); and (2) an *"ethics of responsibility,"* which means to weigh a given ethical principle against its adverse consequences (e.g. social tensions) with an effort to find a compromise.

Keywords: Parties, migration, refugees, vote, theory, public opinion, media, law

1. The refugee decision in 2015 & the years that followed.

In the summer of 2015, a "wave of refugees" hit Germany with the highest immigration rates ever experienced: 1.3 million applications for asylum in the European Union (EU), mainly in Germany (Benedikter & Karolewski, 2016; BAMF, 2015, p.27). This meant an increase of 110,6 % –compared with 2014 (BAMF, 2015, p.27). It was the biggest number since data collection the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) ever carried out (BANF, 2015, p.27). Chancellor Angela Merkel faced a dilemma: on the one hand, Germany did not have unlimited capacities to receive refugees, a fact confirmed by the excessive demands placed on the German government in 2015. For example, controversial German political author Thilo Sarrazin echoed this opinion when he described the German refugee and immigration policy in 2015 as crude and utopist (Sarrazin, 2016, p.11). On the other hand, public opinion and most of the media placed substantial moral pressure on government, based on a widespread feeling that helping the refugees was dictated by Christian and humanitarian reasons (Dostal, 2017, p. 593). Many charitable organisations and newspapers called for volunteers to help refugees and gave advice how to help them (Hassenkamp, 2015). The Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research in Berlin even reported that the number of volunteers for refugee helpers has risen sharply over the past three years (Karakayali and Kleist, 2015, p.5). A few years later the popular German newspaper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" reported "from a wide stream of misery a few drops shall reach the German ground" and the media showed tumultuous scenes at the German border and elsewhere (Carstens et. al. 2018; WELT, 2016; Spiegeltv, 2016).

The German federal government, in a quick and legally unclear decision, opened the German borders to refugees (Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019, p. 915). Chancellor Merkel tried to comfort and encourage the German population with the words "Wir schaffen das" meaning, "We can handle this" or "Yes we can" (Benedikter & Karolewski, 2016, p. 424; Hildebrandt & Ulrich, 2015). The country then began welcoming 13,000 refugees a day in 2015, "adding up to almost one million people in 2015" (Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019, p. 915). This was done under superficial border control (Aust, Bewarder, Büscher, Lutz and Malzahn, 2015). Merkel's decision was immediately criticised by Seehofer, leader of the federal State of Bavaria, normally a close political ally of Merkel, as "the greatest mistake in German post-war national policy" (Sarrazin, 2016, p.11). Later on, this 2015 decision was qualified in Germany and Austria as a "loss of control" not founded in either State law or European law (Georgi, 2016). Parts of the German media, however, continued to support the government's policy of a "friendly welcome" of refugees with emotional pictures and news stories (Kösemen, 2017; Dostal, 2017). For example, several television morning shows and newspapers regularly showed scenes of crying children and mothers at the borders or drowning young people in the sea, to strengthen the political importance of the issue and to appeal to the public's compassion (Stalinski, 2015; Euronews, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2015; BlogDeutschland, 2015). They showed the commitment of German citizens who helped and integrated refugees by reporting about social integration networks, collective cooperation to create jobs for refugees, efforts to create housing, provide food, and to create language and education courses (Balke, 2018; SZ.de, 2019; Diekman, Klovert, Kwasniewski & Reimann, 2015). They also showed several pictures and videos of German citizens who welcomed refugees at railway stations (Journalistenakademie, 2015).

The refugee question had important political considerations for Europe. Many other countries were confronted with refugees at their borders, in particular Hungary and Austria (the Balkan route), Italy, France and Spain with their Mediterranean borders, but also Great Britain. The refugee issue became a top political issue across many European nations. Most states were unwilling to follow the German example of a “friendly welcome” and disagreed with the German project of a European wide distribution system for refugees (Europäische Kommission, 2015). In the following years, the number of refugees that came to the European Union (EU) slowly decreased. In 2016, the EU-states had 1.26 million applications (-4,8%) and in 2017, 650,000 (BAMF, 2016, p.27). The decrease is due to three main political measures: first, the closing of the Hungarian border by the conservative Hungarian government of Orban, that cut the so-called “Balkan route” for refugees; second, a deal between German and Turkish governments that curbed Near-East refugee streams from Syria and third, Italy’s unwillingness to accept African rescued from the Mediterranean sea from ships that were deemed not seaworthy (Dostal, 2017, p. 592).

2. Max Weber and Ethics

In 2018, chancellor Angela Merkel described the refugee issue of 2015 as the "largest humanitarian emergency" that forced the German government to open the border, an emergency measure not to be repeated in the future (Müller, 2018; Sattar, 2018). Her statement sheds light on the ethical dimension of the refugee issue. Here, I draw on the work of Max Weber and his distinction between “ethics of moral conviction” (or: of moral belief) and “ethics of responsibility” as two basic forms of ethical action in politics (1992, p.70). Weber argues that all ethically oriented actions in politics are based on one of these two ethical attitudes.

“Ethic of moral conviction” means acting to protect a given ethical value or carry out an ethical command irrespective of any adverse and negative side effects that this attitude or action may have (Weber,1992, p.70). The “absolute” ethicist does not assume any responsibility for conflicts and adverse effects of its actions. He “disregards conflicting goals” (Weber, 1992). With regard to the refugee question, such a person is inclined to grant protection to all people who are in an emergency situation, regardless of limited resources needed to accomplish the good moral action, and without asking whether and under which conditions a western society can integrate people from other cultural contexts. The Merkel decision of 2015 on “welcome culture” was close to this attitude, and the German media preserved this attitude for a longer time than Merkel did (Dostal, 2017, p. 593).

The contrasting counterpart is a person guided by the ethics of responsibility. Such a person might start their moral reasoning in a given situation the same way, as does the “absolute” ethicist as described, considering the same ethical values to help refugees. But he does not stop here in the search for a good moral decision. Instead, he will go on to consider possible negative consequences and side effects that an “absolute” protection of the ethical value of “protecting and rescuing refugees” might have (Weber, 1992). The ethicist of responsibility knows that each citizen bears full responsibility for his actions, also with regard to the foreseeable side effects. The burden of negative consequences of his own actions should not be passed on to others. Therefore, those who follow this moral argumentation would ideally look to find a solution to the refugee crisis that would balance negative and positive consequences. However, we will see further in this article that few political parties engaged with the issue in such a nuanced way.

3. The legal regime governing the entrance of refugees to Europe

We can distinguish three modes of giving foreigners a right to stay permanently or for a long period of time in another state: (1) immigration of individual persons (although this is not the subject I explore here); (2) the right of political asylum; and, (3) giving refugees a limited right to stay.

The German constitution grants politically persecuted persons a right of asylum (Article 16a (1) GG). Such a right is also available to them under the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*. *The Geneva Refugee Convention* regulates the rights of asylum seekers. Refugees in case of war can be granted "subsidiary protection" according to an EU-guideline (2011/95/EU (Art.2. f and g)). Since 1999 the European Union is working on a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The aim is to give asylum seekers everywhere in Europe equal international protection.

In practice, the current system still leads to differential treatment of asylum seekers and different recognition rates between EU Member States. Secondary migration to neighbour states is the consequence of these differences. The uncontrolled arrival of numerous migrants and asylum seekers since 2015 has put a strain on the asylum systems of many Member States and the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Europäisches Parlament, 2017). The most important EU asylum legislations are the *Asylum Procedures Directive*, the *Reception Conditions Directive*, the *Dublin Regulation, the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) Regulation* and the *Schengen Agreement*.

The Schengen Agreement is the basis of the border legal regime. The basic idea is to control the external borders of the EU and to avoid internal borders controls within the EU. This system did not withstand the refugee crisis of 2015. Many EU countries returned temporarily to the control of their internal national borders, and so did Germany. The Dublin Convention is important for the lodging of applications for asylum; it determines which European State is responsible for the examination of an application for international protection. The excessive demands made by the large number of asylum seekers led to a reshaping of the Dublin Agreement. The EURODAC fingerprint identification system makes it possible to determine an immigrant's status under the Dublin Convention and whether he has a right of residence or a right of asylum.

The European Union and its member states reacted to the refugee crisis differently and often without a coordination. Germany reacted with a generous welcome culture and temporary loss of control (Fisher & Bennhold, 2018). Greece was destabilized and its "administrative capacity" was overwhelmed (Keridis, 2018, p. 70). Other countries, like Hungary, rapidly erected border fences to prevent migrants and refugees from entering (Kingsley, 2015).

4. The German federal election campaign 2017

During the German federal election campaign of 2017, German political parties were faced with the refugee question as an issue of stunning weight and complexity, because it was "by far the most frequently stated single concern in people's minds when thinking about their election choice" (Dostal, 2017, p. 591). Some parties followed an "ethic of responsibility" in various and often unclear grades, or they simply feared immigration. Others followed an "ethic of conviction" in various directions, i.e. to let all refugees in (left wing) or close all of them out, regardless of the consequences (right wing). Each party had to cope with a mix of opinions among their own followers.

During the election campaign for the federal elections in September 2017, as well as after the elections, the refugee question played an important role, but at the same time also a quite confusing, almost mysterious one. The refugee issue became the subject of controversial demands by the parties:

- The Right-wing party "Alternative für Deutschland" (AfD) proposed to close the border for all refugees (AfD, 2017, p.27 and sqq.);
- The Liberal party "Freie Demokratische Partei" (FDP) demanded a strong right of asylum with unclear details (FDP, 2017, p.69 and sqq.);
- The Christian Democrats "Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands" (CDU) promised an unclear future European solution (the distribution of refugees among all EU member countries); the Bavarian counterpart "Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern" (CSU)

insisted on an upper limit of 200,000 refugees per year and tried to discuss the problem in more depth (CDU/CSU, 2017, p.62 and sqq.; CSU, 2017, p.17);

- The Social Democratic Party “Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands” (SPD) and the Green Party “Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen” focussed on a smaller detail problem, calling for family reunification of refugees (SPD, 2017, p.74 and sqq.; Bündnis 90/ die Grünen, 2017, p.75 and sqq.); and,
- The Left-wing party “die Linke” called for a total equality of refugees with German citizens (die Linke, 2017, p.10 and sqq.)

Interestingly, despite its great importance in wider culture, the refugee question did not become the focus of the official and public political discussion (Dostal, 2017). It was not a leading topic of the election campaigns of the parties, with one exception. The Right-wing party’s (AfD) campaign focussed on it, and this was decisive for its relative success in the election (Otto & Steinhardt, 2017). Some of the radical and populist representatives of the AfD, like their leading candidates Alexander Gauland and Frauke Petry, exhibited racist behaviour such as Gauland saying, "We don't want a Boateng [German- Ghanaian professional footballer] to be our neighbour" and Petry naming refugees "the *lumpenproletariat* of the Afro-Arabic world" (Wehner and Lohse, 2016; FAZ.de, 2016).

Although the CSU (Bavarian counterpart of CDU) did not show behaviours like the AfD, they also focussed on the refugee issue; but its bigger brother, the CDU did not. This can be seen in an additional election program published by the CSU, called *Der Bayernplan*, which had the goal of directly addressing the topic of refugee migration (CSU, 2017). The public statements made by some party representatives from the CDU and the CSU showed a mixture of attempted calming strategies, agitation, disputes between the parties and avoidance of the question (Faasa &

Klingelhofer, 2019). The AfD employed polarization strategies by evoking anxiety and fear in their public discourses. The left-wing party “die Linke” drew attention through disputes within the party by sharp online criticism on twitter between Sarah Wagenknecht and her colleague Jan van Aken (van Aken, 2016) as well as the conservatives CDU/CSU by public criticism between Angela Merkel (CDU) and Horst Seehofer. Merkel showed no clear message about refugee admissions: for example, Merkel gave a New Year’s Speech on 31 December 2014 stating: “children of refugees can grow without fear in Germany” (Merkel, 2014) compared to Merkel in June, 2015: “Germany can not accept everyone” (Merkel, 2015b) and finally contrasted with Merkel’s decision to open the German borders for refugees on September 2015. CSU leader Horst Seehofers’s strong statements on creating on an upper limit of refugee admission caused criticism as well.

There was also a tendency to belittle the refugee problem or to hide it behind other, neutral topics like digitalisation and education. This can been seen in most of the election program. Already the positioning of the refugee topic in the last third of most election program makes a statement about the importance of the refugee issue: it appears on page 62 of 75 in the CDU/CSU program and on page 74 and sqq. of 116 pages in the SDP program (CDU/CSU, 2017, p.75 and sqq.; SPD, 2017, p.74 and sqq.). Already, we can see that the two current major parties placed the migration issue at the back of their party program. The FDP and the Greens placed it at the end of their programs as well. The FDP place the issue on page 68 and a few following pages and again on page 106 and sqq. of 158 pages overall (FDP, 2017, p.68 and sqq.; p. 106 and sqq.). The party Bündnis 90/ die Grünen place it on page 98 of 248 in their party program (Bündnis 90/ die Grünen, 2017, p.98 and sqq.). This shows that it was not presented as a primary issue in the published political discourse of the parties across the political spectrum.

5. Weber’s Classification

An attempt to classify the positions of the parties in the refugee debate according to Max Weber’s categories is difficult and reveals the failures of the parties to engage in an in-depth analysis. The leftist party “die Linke” had a position of *“ethical conviction”* when it propagated to accept an unlimited number of refugees and give them all equal rights with German citizen, regardless of negative consequences. On the extreme other side, the AfD’s position to shut the border to every refugee appeared as an easy answer to the concerns of many citizens (Olsen, 2018). The simple principle of “no refugees” disregarded the humanitarian problem entirely and reflects the extreme right-wing background of this party. Interestingly, the only party that seriously discussed morally convincing “*ethics of responsibility”* in the refugee question were the Bavarian Conservatives (CSU) (Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019). Bavaria is the federal State that shouldered the largest share of the burden accepting the highest number of refugees coming to them. However, the position of the Bavarian Conservatives made less of an impression on voters because it was obscured by their internal conflicts with the Conservatives of the CDU (Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019). The fact that only a few parties truly engaged with this question in a meaningful way, shows that it was a complex debate which many larger parties were trying to avoid.

6. After the elections in 2017

The elections brought a strong gain of votes for the right-wing party “AfD” based on their popular “no refugees” nationalistic campaign. It brought moderate losses for the Merkel conservatives CDU/CSU, gains for the liberals “FDP”, and disastrous losses for the Social Democrats “SPD”, mainly caused by their role as government coalition junior partner and partially by their totally unclear position in the ‘refugee question’. It also brought gains by the Greens “Bündnis 90/ die Grünen” that appeared as a more modern alternative to the Social Democrats and were preferred by voters despite their unclear position in the refugee issue (Dostal, 2017; Lees, 2018; Olsen, 2017; Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2017). After the Right-wing party AfD had been publicly declared unacceptable as a coalition partner by all other parties, the results of the election allowed the other parties two options: (1) a “Jamaica coalition” (Black-yellow-green i.e. CDU/CSU, FDP, Bündnis 90/ die Grünen), or (2) re-establishing the coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD).

The exploratory talks on the Jamaica coalition failed, for many reasons. Contrary to their election programs, the Liberals “FDP” and Greens “Bündnis 90/ die Grünen” changed their positions on the refugee issue during these talks, the Liberal in approach to the Conservative, the Greens on their own. Surprisingly, the liberals now insisted on a numerical limit of refugees to be accepted (CDU/CSU, FDP and Bündnis 90/ die Grünen, 2017), contrary to their own election program (FDP, 2017). This and the issue of family reunification formed seemingly insoluble conflicts for the coalition, according to the FDP (Lindner, 2017).

Germany then was confronted with the crucial alternatives of either new elections, a minority government, or a return to the former grand coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD). Urged by the Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the Social Democrats unwillingly accepted a new grand coalition that was only formed 171 days after the elections (Merkel, 2018). The coalition agreement did not really bring any innovative ideas. One could, however, notice efforts to adopt a somewhat stricter control of the inflow of new asylum seekers, including a debated numerical limitation that never was really tested because this inflow of refugees diminished anyway (CDU/SPD, 2018, p. 103). Despite a relatively self-contained coalition agreement on the refugee issue, behind which the parties CDU/CSU and SPD initially stood, the renewed coalition, in its first four months, suffered from some persisting personal disputes and different political views over, for example, the family reunification of Syrian refugees (Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019; Carstens, Lohse and Sattar, 2018). At the same time, there were differences of interpretation within the SPD. An example can be seen in the statement of Martin Schulz (SPD) about the upper limit on refugees, “We now have a regulation 1000+ per month” (SZ.de, 2018). However, Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) quickly contradicted this: "There are no new hardship regulations that would have meant more immigration” (SZ.de, 2018).

The opposition parties also criticized and questioned the government's agreement. For example, Christian Lindner, leader of the FDP, stated that the new coalition agreement is already obsolete (Lindner, 2018). Instead of suddenly commenting on the refugee crisis, as they did in the exploratory talks, the FDP expressed dissatisfaction with other issues in the first months after the coalition agreement, like the further development of the Economic and Monetary Union and the digital infrastructure. As far as asylum policy is concerned, only “success” was desired to the CSU by the FDP (Füffinger, 2018).

Although the question of refugees was addressed in the Greens’ “Bündnis 90/ die Grünen” election programme, their position became clearer throughout the election campaign and in later statements. In addition to climate protection, refugee policy became a decisive issue (Lees, 2018). The party regarded the decisions of the coalition agreement as a "discouraged continuation" (Bündnis 90/ Grüne, 2018) and the refugee policy as "inhumane" (Bündnis 90/ Grüne, 2018). Co-chair politician of “Bündnis 90/ die Grünen” Simone Peter described the planned admission quota of 1000 family members per month as "shamefully low and cynical" (Bündnis 90/ Grüne, 2018).

The present coalition agreement contains, according to the assessment of the left-wing fraction “die Linke”, "virtually no answers" to the refugee question (Akbulut, 2018). Integration would be short-circuited with sanctions, a right to stay would be equipped with high hurdles, and society would be practicing everyday racism, which would not be stopped (Akbulut, 2018). The statements of the left wing showed the great dissatisfaction with almost every project of the Grand Coalition. Even statements that agree with the position of the left, such as the inviolability of the fundamental right to asylum, were presented as "fair-weather lip service", which is described in the practice would not be implemented (Akbulut, 2018).

In contrast, after its aggressive rhetoric in the election campaign with statements such as "We will hunt Mrs. Merkel or whoever and we will take care of our country and our people" or “Get rid of Merkel,” the AfD tried new methods after the formation of the coalition (Spiegel.de, 2018; Faasa & Klingelhofer, 2019, p. 916). Thus they tried to present many of the decisions of the Grand Coalition as ideas of its own party. Besides dissatisfaction about the new coalition and the other parties they were looking at the same time for commonalities. "It is always remarkable how abruptly and haphazardly the CDU/CSU tries to rise in the favor of the citizens with central AfD demands," (AfD, 2018) stated Oliver Kirchner, member of the AfD. Moreover, towards the end of 2018, the refugee issue lost its dominant role in public political discussion. The situation of the coalition improved, and the stability of the government, was and still is, expected.

6. Conclusion

The current refugee issue in Europe, like similar problems in other parts of the world, demonstrates the typical ethical conflict for prospective host countries: it is the conflict between the humanitarian and Christian conviction to help those who need help (ethics of moral conviction), and the unavoidable task to define the necessary limits of such help dictated by the limited capacities and resources of the prospective host country (ethics of responsibility), in this case Germany, to enable integration. In general terms, this issue of political ethics is analyzed by Max Weber in his description of political ethics of responsibility as opposed to political ethics of conviction. A person who follows political ethics of responsibility will always try to carry out an ethical command (help for refugees) in a way that the limited resources and capacities of the prospective host State are taken into account.

An analysis of the political response of German parties on the refugee issue before and after the federal elections in 2017, reveals that the German political parties, in their majority, were unable to handle the complexity of the problem and to send, in their election programmes and statements, a clear message to their voters. The parties avoided a precise definition of their political position, out of fear that any clear message, whilst attracting perhaps some more voters from one side, at the same time could turn other voters away.

All in all, the refugee issue will continue to be of great importance in the future for prospective host States all over the world. The question is how the industrialized and wealthy Western States in Europe, North America and parts of Asia can help countries in Africa, South America and large parts of Asia, (1) to help refugees seeking asylum within the limits of their resources and capacities and, at the same time, (2) to protect their own countries in terms of security and freedom for their own citizens. From this follows the further question of how much security we need to make freedom possible and whether too much security could endanger freedom.

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Luise Goldi Schöneberg is an international research intern at the University of Alberta. She finished her bachelor's in social sciences at RWTH Aachen University in summer 2018. Her research is focused on international relations and migration. She will continue her studies with a master's in political science and wants to deepen her skills in migration research, constitutional law and human rights. She wishes to get the chance to do her PhD and work for a University.

What We Know About the Hmong Refugee Crisis of Decades Past and how it Relates to the Current Syrian Refugee Crisis

Sheila Yingwangkay[3], California State University -Fresno, Fresno, California, United States of America

Abstract

This comparative case study links the current Syria crisis to the historical conflict in Laos during the early 1960s until the late 1970s. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) involvement with the Free Syrian Army and the Hmong tribesmen is discussed to fill the gap in literature to understand the importance of their paralleled relationship with the agency and how the United States of America uses the CIA to conceal their involvement in foreign wars. Content analysis using coverage from the New York Times, along with media coverage of Hmong refugees from 1975 to 1990 and of Syrian refugees from 2012 to 2015 will illustrate that major patterns in the Hmong case are similar to Syria's current refugee crisis. Both Hmong and Syrian refugees experienced chemical warfare from regimes backed by the Russian military. They encounter persecutions when crossing international borders and waterways causing increased civilian mortality. In both cases, regime violence targeted key United States allies and collaborators. This paper argues that the crisis of the two countries is significant to understanding the devastating impact that developed nations have in developing countries and how its national interest in foreign affairs can lead poor nations to destruction, thus causing a global refugee influx. Most of which is done through proxy wars by recruiting vulnerable local villagers, tribesmen, and rebels to fight. The study therefore concludes that the Hmong case could be a useful benchmark in determining the outcome of Syrian refugees.

Keywords: Hmong, Hmong refugee, Secret War in Laos, Syrian, Syrians, Syrian refugees, refugee resettlement, Syrian War, Syrian Crisis, CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, Operation Momentum, Operation Timber Sycamore, Laos, International Relations, Comparative Politics

[3] For my grandfather, Curtis Kay Fang, who served as Captain to the CIA's Operation Momentum's Special Guerilla Unit (SGU) in Laos and to his soldiers. For my mother, Catherine, who sacrificed her education, so I can be educated in the USA as a First-Generation Hmong-American student. For my father, Sam, who delayed his education for my future. Lots of thanks to my peer mentor Tom Jamieson for all his support, patience, and advice in writing a peer-reviewed article.

Introduction

The purpose of this case study is to link the current Syrian crisis to the historical context of the conflict in Laos during the early 1960s. The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) involment with the Free Syrian Army and the Hmong tribesmen is discussed to fill the gap in literature to understand the importance of their paralleled relationship with the intelligence agency and how the United States of America (US) uses the CIA to conceal its involvement in foreign wars. Further, media analysis is studied to capture patterns between the Syrian refugees from 2011 to 2015 and the Hmong refugees from 1978 to 1988 in the New York Times archive. The analysis is based on the question, what comparisons does the national newspaper, The New York Times, capture between the Syrian refugees and Hmong refugees? This paper argues that the crisis of the two countries is significant to understanding the devastating impact that developed nations have in developing countries and how its national interest in foreign affairs can lead poor nations to destruction, thus causing a global refugee influx. Much of which is done through proxy wars. In addition, the Hmong case could be a useful benchmark in identifying the possible outcome for Syrian defectors and refugees since this study reveals that both the Hmong and Syrian refugees experienced chemical warfare from regimes backed by the Russian military. Both groups also encounter persecutions when crossing international borders and waterways. Overall, in both cases regime violence targeted key US allies and collaborators.

Literature Review

While studies have been published about the civil war in Syria, Syrian refugees, and Syrian defectors, not much research has connected the Syrian crisis to the conflict in Laos, the Hmong refugees, or the Hmong tribesmen. This area also calls for futher research investigating the global refugee influx resulting from the influences of wealthy foreign nations. By conducting a comparative study between the Hmong displacement during the post Vietnam War era and the current Syrian refugee displacement, this article will fill in the gap in understanding the devastating impact that developed nations have in developing countries and how their national interest in foreign affairs can lead poor nations to destruction.

The Syrian Crisis, Syrian Defectors and the Syrian Opposition Group's relationship with the CIA

Syria is a country divided by many actors acting according to their own interests. Nonetheless, Syrian emergency law continually remained intact for more than forty-five years. The Syrian Emergency Law of 1962 continued to give the government nearly unlimited authority to restrict individual freedoms and investigate and detain suspects when national security and public safety are deemed at risk (Hadid, 2009). This means that emergency law restricts "public gatherings and the free movement of individuals" (Abouzeid, 2011) and allows government to arrest suspected individuals or groups who threaten security. It also permits the state to monitor their citizens, their citizens' personal communications, and to implement media censorship. As a result of the censorship, humanitarian aid from foreign countries becomes difficult which coincidentally results in the oppression of human rights (Hadid, 2009).

After the Arab Spring, which was a pro-democracy movement that enveloped several large Muslim countries and spread across the Middle East in Spring 2011, Syria's presidential advisor, Buthaina Shaaban, told several journalists that the emergency law would be repealed (Hueller, 2017). During the Arab Spring, activists assembled in grassroot protests with the goal of increased democracy and cultural freedom. The revolt reflected a domino effect beginning in December 2010 with Tunisian vendor, Mohammmed Bouazzi's, protest against the arbitrary seizing of his vegetable stand, after he failed to obtain a permit, where Bouazzi set himself on fire (Hueller, 2017). In Syria on the other hand, many Syrians were oppressed by high unemployment, corruption and a lack of political freedom under the emergency law and Assad’s corruption (Hueller, 2017). Pro-democracy protests thus erupted in the southern city of Deraa, Syria in 2011, where people called for the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. Assad’s government then responded with deadly force and increased violence which escalated to a civil war.

During the civil war, the Syrian Opposition Group (SO) fought against ISIS to deter the threat ISIS posed to the people. The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was then formed in 2011 in response to the Syrian Armed Forces’ violence against civilians (Hueller, 2017). Subsequently, former military officials defected from the army with the ulterior goal of bringing down al-Assad’s government (Al-bahra, 2014). Moreover, considering the compactness of the the Middle East, many groups and countries are involved and have their own agendas in the area, which consequently makes the situation more complicated. However, President Assad’s greatest support was Russia and Iran, so Russia launched an air campaign in 2015 supporting President Assad which has been crucial in supporting his regime (Al-bahra, 2014).

Meanwhile, other rebels have been backed by the US and Turkey, and since 2014 Western countries have also formed a global coalition to carry out airstrikes against ISIS militants Al-bahra, 2014). Additionally, national security impetus were implemented for the US to support and arm the SO to halt and defeat ISIS’s campaign, which also substantiated the need for airstrikes in Syria to strike at the heart of ISIS. To defeat them, the Syrian Opposition Group and the Free Syrian Army needed US support, thus the two groups also became allies (Al-bahra, 2014). But, ISIS is a major threat because “ISIS is trying to aid the advances by pushing deeper into areas in the north that were liberated during the revolution against the regime” (Al-bahra, 2014, p. 13) and poses a direct threat to SO and US interest. As such, President Barack Obama proposed an investment of

$500,000,000 for military training and equipment for FSA and SO to defend homes, towns, and villages from air bombardment and military assault (Al-bahra, 2014, p. 13). The secret CIA operation Timber Sycamore then launched in 2013 to provide training, salaries, and weaponry to "vetted" rebels waging war on Assad and ISIS (Hueller, 2017). The program was intended to build a moderate rebel force that could apply serious military pressure on the regime, and force Assad to step aside as part of the political negotiation process (Hueller, 2017). Coincidentally, this also concurs with America's interest.

After President Donald Trump's election, he ordered the termination of an American covert program to arm and train Syrian rebels, mainly the FSA, who were fighting against the Assad regime (Hueller, 2017). It is believed that President Trump's decision is related to an interest in working collaboratively in Syria with President Vladimar Putin, as such this changed US interests in Syria (Hueller, 2017). Although, Hueller (2017) argues that, "These factions likely have enough cash and weapons stores to go for a few months, but not much longer. There is a possibility that these rebel groups may migrate to jihadist's support" (para. 27). Another issue arising is the removal of the CIA funded program for the FSA because there is a fear that the US' absence in Syria will motivate some actors to act destructively.

The Secret War in Laos and the Hmong tribesmen's relationship with the CIA

In the next case study, Post-World War II China built an alliance with Russia with the goal of conquering Asia and Southeast Asia. Subsequently, Laos was established as an independent and neutral state according to the 1954 Geneva Agreement. This occurred, according to Vang (2014), "On July 23, 1962 through a formal Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos… signed in Geneva… that provided for a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by October 7, 1962" (Vang, 2014, p.1). However, it became apparent that the North Vietnam Army

(NVA) had not left Laos, but instead expanded within the territory of Laos. So, it became clear that Communist Soviet Union did not follow their signatory part as the US (Vang, 2014).

To keep the US from violating the 1954 Geneva Accord that required the Royal Lao Monarchy to remain neutral and to prevent foreign governments from intervening, CIA officials sought assistance from the Royal Lao Army (RLA) official Vang Pao. So they funded Vang and his troops through the CIA's Special Guerilla Unit of the RLA, the Hmong. This initiative served the interest of the United States in preventing the Communist regime from infiltrating Laos (Pao & Lair, 2010).

Pao Vue (2015) mentions that the Hmong were first recruited in the early 1960s by the CIA as a guerilla unit to fight against the Pathet Lao Army (PLA) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to stop the communist regime from spreading. Then Vang Pao became the general for the Operation Momentum campaign with his forces armed, pay-rolled, and tasked by the US to defend their land. Through the CIA and the American Airforce, the US "provided training, money, and logistical support in a covert operation against the PLA" (Vang, 2014, p. 1) and its ally the NVA, thus resulting in a Secret War in Laos. From 1961 to 1973, the Hmong served under RLA and its Special Guerilla Unit (SGU), but were directly supported by the CIA. Due to the alliance between the US and the Hmong, there was an implicit agreement that the Hmong could resettle in the US if the Vietnam War went badly for the Hmong people (Waters, 1990).

However, after the peace treaty agreement between the US and the Pathet Lao, "the US withdrew all funding to the Royal Lao Monarchy and the RLA, of which the SGU had been a subset, and left the region …and its allies entirely on their own to defend for themselves" (Vang, 2014, p. 1). The American military evacuated on May 14, 1975 since a day prior communists took over Vietnam, and since the Communist PLA took over American territory. Furthermore, the PLA arrested the remainer of the RLA and the SGU’s high-ranking officials. The King and Queen of Laos were also sent to re-education camps (Pao & Lair, 2010). The Hmong who sided with the US and CIA were later branded as traitors, singled out for retaliation, and faced violence from the new communist government (Vue, 2015). Consequently, many people fled to Thailand for refuge.

A small number of soldiers from the losing side along with neutralists launched armed resistance against the newly formed Communist Pathet Lao country in 1975. The groups hid in jungles, and today the predominantly Hmong groups in jungles are either descendants or the remaining members of these factions. Starved and barely surviving, they no longer appear to be a threat to the government, but these destitute Hmong are still evading military persecution in the Laotian jungle. The Pathet Lao military continuously utilizes violence through rape, hunger, and massacre as a weapon against them (“Destitute Hmong Still Running”, 2007).

The Global Refugee Influx

After the Vietnam War, an influx of refugees and migrants sought refuge along the Thai border by the Mekong River where some refugee camps had been created. One of these groups was the Hmong tribesmen and their family members who became primary targets of persecution and massacre escaping the communist regime.

Thirty years after the Vietnam War, another global refugee influx emerged from Syria to neighboring refugee camps. Syrian refugees also face similar obstacles now that their Hmong counterparts did. Even more so with President Trump’s recent order to eliminate the CIA’s program to fund the FSA and other SOs, it becomes clearer that Syrian defectors face the same trials as the Hmong tribesmen. Moreover, like the Hmong, Syrian refugees face persecution when they attempt to cross international waters and land borders, and have even been attacked via chemical warfare by a Russian supported military.

Defining a Refugee

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention defines a refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fears” is unwilling to return (The Editors, 2016, para. 9). The UNHCR is in charge of providing relief to dislocated people, and thus classifies and protects them from refoulment and deportation to their countries of origin. Dawn Chatty (2010) states that the ‘conventional refugee’ is granted asylum meanwhile others who are found to be ‘economic migrants’ within the determination process are excluded from entry to Western states and sent back to their countries (Chatty, 2010). Therefore, refugee camps are created as a state of emergency and perceived as exceptional temporary measures to be taken before normalcy is restored. Turner (2010) describes the refugee camp as “an exceptional space that is put in place to deal with populations that disturb the national order of things” (p.139). A preferred means of containing people displaced by violence, war, or natural disaster, are camps established by a host state, NGOs, or UN agencies. Refugees are individuals displaced due to chaos and disasters that have been labelled as emergency measures because of exceptional, temporary, and often grey zone situations.

When investigating what really motivates peoples’ decisions to migrate or to stay in their home countries during situations of political violence and war, it is clear that their decisions rely heavily on consulting family and other close-knit communities. They then base these decisions on rational choices while evaluating their available options (Chatty, 2010). Even so, Hmong refugees were placed in Thai refugee camps where the UNHCR, humanitarian organizations, and faith-based organizations classified them as refugees. This categorization had been automatic because of the Laotian Pathet Lao Party's motive to exterminate the Hmong tribespeople who had sided with the US during the Vietnam War. Due to the policy change after the Indochina crisis, categorizing displaced persons as refugees has become the responsibility of the UNHCR. Thus, Syrian refugees have been categorized by the UNHCR. Amy Slaughter found that "leading up to the mid-1990s, resettlement was actively driven by a few resettlement countries for mixed humanitarian and foreign policy motives" (Slaughter, 2017, p. 32). Prior to the mid-1990s, NGOs worked closely with governments and were responsible for the bulk of refugee identifications and referrals. Before that, states had handled receiving refugees on their own with little involvement from the UNHCR. The shift towards the UNHCR's greater involvement in resettlement came in the mid-1990s following the Cold War (Slaughter, 2017). During and post-Vietnam War/Indochina crisis, the UNHCR's primary role was acting as a broker for receiving countries (Slaughter, 2017). In particular, the US changed its policy in 1995 to give priority to the UNHCR's referrals as opposed to their earlier process where a list of specific groups of refugees of a concern to the US could apply directly through an American NGO (Slaughter, 2017).

In the past, faith-based organizations and other humanitarian organizations had also been the first points of contact for refugees seeking asylum. However, due to the influx of economic migrants during the Indochina refugee crisis, a new system was created. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was instilled to refer the most vulnerable refugees to receiving nations. Additionally, a new comprehensive plan was put in place to differentiate between economic migrants and refugees in 1989, known as the Refugee Status Determination (RSD). Since then, the US has only considered refugees referred by the UNHCR.

From the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, refugee flows played an important role in Indo-China. Thailand was one of the main countries to first provide asylum to refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Thai refugee camps then exhausted their capacity to integrate refugees and suffered from overcrowded camps. But by the end of the 1980s, it became clear that the influx of refugee camps was primarily occupied by economic migrants seeking asylum to Western countries because of an attraction to the quasi-automatic resettlement that included government benefits.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has been the only international aid organization working on all fronts of the crisis through emergency relief and long-term support such as healthcare, protection of vulnerable groups like women and children, education, and economic recovery and development since the mid-1990s. Within the US, there are twenty-eight offices across the country for resettlement that provide “immediate aid to refugees, including food and shelter, as well as access to the tools of self-reliance: housing, job placement and employment skills, clothing, medical attention, education, English-language classes and community orientation” (Rescue.org, 2017, How the U.S. refugee vetting and resettlement process really works, para. 3). Although refugee status is determined by the UNHCR, the US accepts a limited quota of refugees per year.

While the Obama administration agreed to resettle 111,000 refugees, the current Trump administration has decided to resettle 45,000 refugees which is approximately half the former number of refugees (Rescue.org, 2017, How the U.S. refugee vetting and resettlement process really works, & Rescue.org, 2017, What is the travel ban? What does it mean for refugees?). The IRC has been working through legal complications under the order of President Trump’s refugee ban and slash refugee admissions in half (“How the U.S. Refugee Vetting”, 2018), yet the IRC stresses that the American resettlement system is the strongest in the world.

Research Methodology

Research Design

A comparative case study was the research method used to analyze data between the Hmong and Syrian refugees. Content was extracted from the Historical New York Times Archival online domain about both Hmong refugees and Syrian refugees to note similarities in both cases. Content analysis were then based on the following question: what comparisons does the national newspaper, The New York Times (NYT), capture between the Syrian refugees and Hmong refugees? The characteristics used to compare the two groups involved crossing land borders, crossing waterways, chemical warfare, and being attacked with violence from the military supported by the Soviet Union and Russia. These characteristics illustrate how US-supported defectors and mercenary arms are targets of mortality by Soviet, and now Russian, supported nations. Additionally, this demonstrates how the US identifies certain refugee groups as most vulnerable in comparison to other groups and how it affects refugee resettlement to the US. The scope of the data collected is limited by the years used to narrow the research. The Hmong case was investigated from 1970 to 1987. This totaled to 17 years after the Laos Secret War crisis of refugees escaping to Thai refugee camps. The Syrian case is limited to only four years from 2012 to 2015. The limited data available on the Syrian refugee crisis is due to the ongoing status of their refugee crisis. It began in 2012, and data is available up to 2015 when the case was investigated. By contrast, there is much more information through studies of the Hmong refugee crisis due to it occurring over 35 years ago, and for a much longer time period. The scope of the study is limited to NYT journalist's practices more than the crises itself since content analysis is from articles written for the NYT.

The Hmong case was studied first, so the years used to analyze Hmong refugees were between 1970 and 1987 with a search of the keyword Hmong refugees, in the singular and without quotes to maximize results. The years used to analyze Syrian refugees were between 2012 and 2015 with the keyword Syrian refugees in the singular, and without quotes, to maximize results. Due to how recent the Syrian civil war is, the scope was limited to four years compared to the post-Vietnam War chaos which was a decade ago. Sources for both the Hmong and Syrian refugees were examined in chronological order and then catalogued.

Cataloguing was done by summarizing the depiction of Hmong and Syrian refugees within the articles. Other measures included US allies of Hmong tribesmen and Syrian refugees or defectors targeted by violence from Russian allies like the Pathet Lao Army and Syrian armed forces. As such, regarding the Hmong case, the Pathet Lao Republic and Communist Vietnamese military were backed by the Soviet Union. In Syria's case, the Assad regime is heavily and publicly reliant on Russia's support. Therefore, Syria's case is investigated slight differently from the Hmong case because the defectors are officials and members who were formerly soldiers or military members of Assad's armed forces but later defected and became a part of troops supported by the United States such as the Free Syrian Army. To investigate how deeply involved the Soviet Union and Russia were in both cases, the terms Soviet and Russia were also recorded in chronological order by year.

In addition, a list of chemical agents was organized in chronological order by year to examine similarities between both cases. To establish patterns between the Hmong and Syrian refugees, findings were input onto a spreadsheet. Data from the spreadsheet was then analyzed to determine how the Hmong and Syrian cases compared. This will provide a quantitative measure for the two cases.

Last, to identify whether there is a difference in the way refugees are portrayed in the two crises, content was analyzed in coded articles by searching the terms persecute, persecuted, persecution, victim, victimized, massacre, massacred, attack, US, United States ally, and allies. The significance of this is to see how each group was sympathized in national articles.

Research Findings

Based on findings about the Hmong and Syrian refugees, both groups faced chemical warfare and genocide at the hands of Russian allied regimes. They also encountered obstacles when crossing international border and waterways, and these obstacles increased the mortality of civilians. In both cases, regime violence targeted key American allies and collaborators. The total number of articles analyzed for both groups is 80 with the Hmong case of 44 articles coded and 36 articles coded for the Syrian case. Chemical weapons and chemical warfare are mentioned in the Hmong case a total of 23 times where the word or words "chemical weapons" or "chemical warfare" were mentioned from 1978 to 1987 (See table 1). A total of 6 times "chemical weapons" or "chemical warfare" were mentioned for Syrian refugees between the years of 2012 and 2015 (See table 2).

Table 1: Hmong Chemical Warfare		**Table 2: Syrian Chemical Warfare**	
Year	**Number of Times**	**Year**	**Number of Times**
1978	1	2012	0
1979	4	2013	4
1980	4	2014	1
1981	1	2015	1
1982	5	**Total**	**6**
1983	3		
1984	2		
1985	1		
1986	1		
1987	1		
Total	**23**		

Crossing international borders was in the two subfields land border crossing and water border crossing. For land crossing, Hmong crossing totaled 13 times where "border + land" was mentioned between 1978 and 1987 (See table 3). Syrian refugees crossing land border totaled at 22 from 2012 to 2015 (See table 4). In water border crossing, Hmong refugees mentioned "border + water" crossing a total of 7 times between 1978 to 1987 (See table 5). Syrian refugees were mentioned a total of 22 times from 2012 to 2015 (See table 6).

Table 3: Hmong Land Crossing	
Year	**Number of Times**
1978	1
1979	1
1980	1
1981	0
1982	1
1983	0
1984	3
1985	2
1986	0
1987	4
Total	**13**

Table 4: Syrian Land Crossing	
Year	**Number of Times**
2012	12
2013	2
2014	5
2015	3
Total	**22**

Table 5: Hmong Water Crossing	
Year	**Number of Times**
1978	1
1979	1
1980	1
1981	0
1982	0
1983	0
1984	2
1985	2
1986	0
1987	0
Total	**7**

Table 6: Syrian Water Crossing	
Year	**Number of Times**
2012	12
2013	2
2014	5
2015	3
Total	**22**

Hmong US allies targeted with violence was mentioned 25 times between the years of 1978 and 1987 (See table 7). Syrian refugees and defectors targeted with violence due to defecting or allying with the US was mentioned 11 times (See table 8). The total number of times the Soviet Union or Russia were mentioned within the Hmong case was 11, with 6 times for the Syrian case (See table 9). Articles concerning Hmong refugees mentioned land mines once in 1982, and articles concerning Syrian refugees mentioned land mines a total of 6 times with 2013 being the greatest year Syrian refugees came across land mines.

Table 7: Hmong US Allies Targeted w/ Violence		**Table 8: Syrian US Allies Targeted w/ Violence**	
Year	**Number of Times**	**Year**	**Number of Times**
1978	1	2012	8
1979	5	2013	1
1980	5	2014	2
1981	0	2015	0
1982	3	**Total**	**11**
1983	1		
1984	3		
1985	0		
1986	2		
1987	5		
Total	**25**		

The Hmong refugees were attacked with approximately 16 different chemical and biological agents. Meanwhile, Syrian refugees were struck by approximately 6 different types of chemical or biological agents. Within both cases, nerve agents, chlorine, and mustard gas were used. This illustrates the high use of illegal chemical and biological agents that has thus contributed to an increased mortality rate.

Table 9: Number of Times Soviet Union or Russia mentioned			
Hmong Refugees		**Syrian Refugees**	
Year	**Number of Times**	**Year**	**Number of Times**
1978	0	2012	0
1979	2	2013	4
1980	3	2014	1
1981	0	2015	1
1982	4	**Total**	**6**
1983	1		
1984	0		
1985	1		
1986	0		
1987	0		
Total	**11**		

Lastly, a deeper investigation into the differences of how refugees are portrayed between the two cases were examined. It appears that the United States showed greater sympathy towards the Hmong refugees versus Syrian refugees (See table 10). For the Hmong case, persecute, persecuted, or persecution were mentioned 4 times in coded articles, while victim or victimized were mentioned 11 times, and massacre or massacred were mentioned twice. Furthermore, attack was mentioned 23 times and US or United States ally was mentioned once. In the Syrian case, persecute, persecuted, or persecution and US or United States ally were not mentioned in coded articles. But victim or victimized was mentioned 3 times and attack was mentioned 23 times.

Table 10: How Hmong and Syrian Refugees were portrayed in Articles			
Hmong Refugees		**Syrian Refugees**	
Persecute/persecuted	4	Persecute/persecuted	0
Victim/victimized	11	Victim/victimized	3
Massacre	2	Massacre	1
Attack	23	Attack	8
US/United States Ally	1	US/ United States Ally	0
Total	**41**	**Total**	**12**

Discussion

This study found that major patterns in the Hmong case are similar to Syria's current crisis. This is because the refugees studied faced similar experiences when crossing international borders, crossing waterways, and when confronted with violence from militias supported by the Soviet Union and Russia. Further, the case of the Hmong tribesmen's relationship to the US is parallel with Free Syrian Army's relationship with the US. Both groups were funded by the US in a covert operation through the CIA to interrupt the interest of the Soviet Union and Russia, and to support US interests. The FSA are former military officials and former members who defected from Assad's Syrian Armed Forces and waged combat against government forces and ISIS militants. Vang's Operation Momentum Army remain members of the Royal Lao Army and serve as a subset of the SGU. Likewise, the Hmong tribesmen remained loyal to their Royal Lao monarch in the post-Vietnam War period. However, the Hmong tribesmen did not defect, but instead fought to defeat Communism from entering the independent Laotian state. The Pathet Lao Army is like ISIS, in that its motive is to gain governance of a weak ruling state. Nonetheless, the Hmong and the Syrian cases lost US and CIA support after US interest towards the war changed. During the Vietnam War, Hmong refugees were portrayed as vulnerable, under attack, and allies to the US. Journalists depicted Hmong refugees as a group of great concern regarding receiving asylum to the US. State officials met continuously in the 1980s to resolve the issue of Hmong tribesmen being massacred when crossing the Mekong River. The Hmong people, like the Syrian refugees did not pose a threat to the US.

Moreover, this study found that while Hmong refugees and Syrian refugees face the same persecutions when escaping violence and war, US collaborators are hit hardest with violence and persecution due to the opposing militias' relationship with Russia. Syria and PLA are backed by

Russia and the Soviet Union. Consequently, mercenary arms funded by the US are at a loss to begin with due to the impediment of US's unreliable continuous support for mercenaries.

Additionally, Hmong refugees remained in refugee camps for approximately thirty years since the fall of Saigon and Vientiane, the capital of Laos. Given the continuous flow of refugees from Syria to neighboring countries and Europe, the refugee camps put in place for Syrian refugees may remain quasi-permanent like the refugee camps in Thailand. Further research about refugee camps alongside Syria and its refugees' relationship with the US will assist with immigration policy internationally and nationally. The US had a strong relationship with the Hmong tribesmen. Media sources demonstrate US officials' motivation to assist the Hmong tribesmen from persecution. The great length of measures taken by US legislators and experts illustrates that Hmong refugees are a group of great concern to America and so are highly considered for Asylum.

As for Syrian refugees, the intensified ISIS terrorist attacks throughout Europe and Syria have greatly affected the view of middle eastern refugees. The fear of another terrorist attack infiltrating the US has prevented Syrian refugee from being on the list of concerned groups to be considered for asylum in America. Even more, considering President Trump's decision to reduce the number of refugees in 2018 (Rescue.org, n.d.). As such, the concern for Syrian refuges has deflected due to a fear of refugees in America.

With the continuous fear of Syrian refugees resettling in the US, understanding the Hmong tribesmen and Syrian defectors' relationship with the CIA will help identify possible outcomes for Syrian refugees. In the past, the CIA safeguarded the US from intervening in the war in Laos by arming the Hmong people to do the fighting. Recently, the CIA has done the same in Syria by providing funds to the FSA and other SOs. The Hmong people were eventually left to fight for themselves after the US withdrew in 1975. Similarly, the FSA and other SOs are affected by

President Trump's 2017 decision to withdraw the CIA's secret programs (Hueller, 2017). The correlation between the two cases illustrates the purpose of the CIA's secret programs to safeguard the US from entering a conventional war by funding mercenary arms as a safety measure from political conflict in international affairs. It also reveals that mercenary arms have worked in the past with the intention of setting refugee camps along its neighboring countries as a means of escaping US funded militia groups. Connecting the two cases will allow officials to determine ways in which to provide alternative aid for US supported mercenary arms following CIA withdrawal in foreign wars.

Conclusion

Given the drastic change in the refugee identification and resettlement process, the Secret War in Laos is a good predictor for the current Syria's crisis. The crises of the two countries is significant in understanding the devastating impact that developed nations such as the US, the Soviet Union, and Russia have in developing countries and how their national interest in foreign affairs can lead a poor nation to crumbling chaos and destitution. Much of which is done through proxy wars between the US fighting against the Soviet Union and Russia thus creating a great influx of refugees dislocated within these regions. The Secret War in Laos was America's response to the fear of Russian communists' domino effect in Southeast Asia. Despite the 1954 Geneva Accord for the newly established neutral agreement in Laos, the PLA and the NVA continued to fight for a communist regime. In contrary, Syria has been under extreme oppression by its current Assad government identified as restricting the human rights of its people and censoring communication with the outside world. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring's pro-democratic domino effect led to a civil war in Syria.

Further, the US continues to project a neutral appearance to the public press as not involved in Syria's conflict. However, the US covertly support militants targeted by Russian support troops such as the FSA and SO through CIA's secret programs. The CIA pay-rolled, trained, and provided logistic supplies to the militants. Similarly, it happened in Laos during the early 1960s where the US covertly fought the Soviet Union through the CIA's secret program that had Hmong tribesmen doing the fighting. While the FSA and SO want to bring down President al-Assad in the current Syria crisis, the Hmong tribesmen fought to protect their former Royal Lao Monarchy during the Secret War in Laos. Regardless, the US' intentions remained the same. After signing a peace treaty between the US and Pathet Lao Communist party, the US withdrew its support and left the Hmong tribesmen to seek refuge in Thai refugee camps. Recently, President Trump's decision to shut down the CIA's secret programs in Syria in order to make amends with President Putin left the FSA and SO to seek refuge in neighboring refugee camps or continue fighting aligning with Syrian rebel groups. After the Secret War in Laos, a faction of soldiers and neutralists launched armed resistance in the northern jungles of Laos. Today, they are still resisting the Communist Pathet Lao regime and continue to face persecution. As for the FSA and SO, it is believed that the FSA have joined the jihadist faction. A destitution creating displaced refugees and migrants. Nonetheless, both refugee groups experienced similar persecutions from military backed by Russia.

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Sheila Yingwangkay has an undergraduate degree in Political Science and is about to start her first year in graduate studies focusing on Rehabilitation Counseling. Sheila is passionate about researching issues involving the refugee displacement, world migration and diaspora. Her passion is inspired by her grandfather's service to the CIA's Operation Momentum in Laos and the Hmong people's experience as refugees. After completing her master's in sciences degree, Sheila hopes to attend a PhD program in Rehabilitation Sciences and continue contributing her research findings to scholarly archive literature. Sheila can be contacted through email at sheilaying26@gmail.com

The Effect of Chinese Foreign Aid on Civil Conflict in Sub Saharan Africa: A Study at the Subnational Level

Sabrina He, New York University, New York, United States of America

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand what role Chinese foreign aid has on civil conflict in Sub Saharan Africa at the subnational level. By comparing how state-as-a-prize theory and opportunity cost theory explains how increased foreign aid correlates with rising conflicts, this paper seeks to understand the debate between why conflict intensity and occurrences either increase or decrease due to various types of shocks. Using birth region as a proxy for Chinese foreign aid, it finds that the addition of such aid does have a significant impact on the discourse surrounding conflict, which has traditionally been related to external demand shocks proxied by agricultural commodity shocks and exposure to banking crises. Specifically, it shows that conflict probability is higher in regions where conflict intensity is lower, and lower in regions where conflict intensity is higher.

Keywords: Chinese foreign aid, Conflict occurrences and intensity, State-as-a-prize, Opportunity cost

Introduction

At the level of nation-states, results concerning influencing factors on intensity and instances of civil conflict are mixed and tend to be explained through two theories, though acting in opposite directions. On one hand, opportunity cost theory holds that increased resources caused by positive income shocks decrease conflict due to diminished opportunity and benefit of insurrection or resulted in increasing the state's capacity to suppress conflict. On the other hand, the state-as-a-prize theory claims that better resources would increase stakes and incentivize people to revolt against their governments. Traditionally, income shocks on the country-level, instrumented by various variables, are used to measure for increased resources. Also, in existing research on the county level, external demand shocks are often proxied by agricultural commodity shocks and exposure to banking crises to measure fluctuation in resource availability of counties across countries. The goal of this paper is to introduce a new variable, Chinese foreign aid, as a new contributor to such fluctuations. The results will illuminate the external validity of previous research, which has tried to set a definitive direction on the effects of various shocks. Since Chinese foreign aid, agricultural commodity shocks, and exposure to foreign banking crises are all aspects of international trade patterns, this research identifies meaningful further trends in international trade.

Initially assuming that Chinese foreign aid would increase conflict in Sub Saharan Africa on the subnational level, the paper finds complications to this assertion. In terms of aid, conflict intensity levels are seriously impacted due to the direction of the Chinese foreign aid coefficient. Either way, introducing Chinese foreign aid to civil conflict reviews previous assumptions on agricultural commodity shocks and banking crises. As further explained in the "results" section, Chinese foreign aid does not only influence civil conflict on its own but also alters the impact of agricultural commodity shocks and that of exposure to banking crises effects on civil conflict.

Literature Review

Explaining Civil Conflict with Income Shocks

Most research explaining civil conflict uses commodity price variations as a proxy for exogenous external income shocks, theorized to influence conflict at the country level. However, results are mixed. While Besley and Persson (2008) find a positive relationship between income shocks and civil war incidence Brucker and Ciccone (2010) find the opposite. At the core of this contention are two a priori ambiguous models of conflict that contradict each other. On one hand, larger incomes reduce conflict by reducing individuals' opportunity cost of insurrection as the state's capacity to prevent rebellion increases, as described by Fearon and Laitin (2003). On the other hand, larger incomes resulting from positive income shocks increase the probability of conflict by enhancing the value of resources to fight over. This is widely known as the "state-as-a-prize" mechanism. The inability to identify the precise influence that income shocks exert on conflict at the country level could partly be explained by the problematic channel of transmission of said foreign aid, which is at the crux of this research method.

Contextualizing the Micro level of Analysis

More recently, Bazzi and Blattman (2014) argue that a significant relationship between commodity prices and conflict incidence can only be ascertained within a very specific context at the micro-level, where disaggregated versus aggregated data is employed. However, there are few studies done at the micro level, apart from Dube and Vargas (2013), who collected geographically disaggregated data but only for a single country, Colombia. Results demonstrated evidence in favor of both the opportunity cost (or state-capacity) and state-as-a-prize theories. More precisely, they discover that positive commodity price shocks decrease conflict probability in the case of labor-intensive commodities such as coffee but increase conflict probability in the case of a capital-intensive commodity such as oil. Due to the one country nature of Dube and Vergas' research, their results cannot be applied to other countries on the subnational level. Their work, nevertheless, shows that negative shocks to agricultural production and crops prices are closely associated with conflict. Such revelation makes agricultural commodity shocks a good proxy to evaluate the effect of external demand shocks on civil conflict at the subnational level. Another example would be Jia (2011), who finds that droughts in China increased the probability of peasants' revolts over the 1470-1990 period. Following the same logic, Hidalgo et al. (2010) collect data on Brazilian municipalities to conclude that favorable economic shocks, instrumented by rainfall, which is closely associated with agricultural production, reduce the number of land invasions within municipalities. The same phenomenon is found to be true for Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) on Hindu-Muslim riots in India.

Notwithstanding the special case of Dube and Vergas, country-specific research can identify causes of conflict using individualistic behaviors. However, from a statistical viewpoint, country-specific research is subject to external validity concerns and thus cannot be used as generalizations to explain civil conflict overall. For this reason, stand-alone, country-specific studies on conflict should be complemented by data from a range of countries on the micro level. Doing so connects macro, cross-country results, with micro, country-specific ones, as both variations within and between countries are considered. On this note, Berman and Couttenier (2013) use georeferenced data on the location of violent events from multiple countries in Sub Saharan Africa to evaluate effects of agricultural commodity shocks and exposure to banking crises, on the incidence, onset, and ending of conflict. They find that the incidence, onset, and ending of conflict are negatively correlated with external demand shocks at the county level, but this relationship is weaker the more remote the location is. Their research, therefore, supports the opportunity cost (or state capacity) theory.

Such method differentiates Berman and Couttenier from the others as their level of analysis is simultaneously macro and micro, and their scope, includes various types of shocks previously unexplored. The usual measure of commodity shocks is improved by a region-specific measure of agricultural specialization. Using the world demand for particular agricultural commodities produced by regions within countries reduces generalization of homogenous specialization across cells. If agricultural commodity shocks serve as a proxy for short term external demand, Berman and Couttenier account for long term shocks through the number of banking crises involving the country's trading partners. Finally, they would combine these shocks with cell-specific data on the natural level of trade openness, proxied by the distance to the nearest seaport, in order to account for the fact that more remote locations are naturally less affected by international trade patterns. A combination of long term and short term variables ensures that both the geography and intensity of conflict within countries are captured.

Using Foreign Aid to Understand Conflict

Since Berman and Couttenier mainly find that external demand shocks are negatively related to civil conflict, their research supports the opportunity cost theory of insurrection. However, that does not rule out the state capacity effect, since conflict might equally decrease in times of good financial shocks, should most of the revenue go into fueling the state, which would then gain means to strengthen control and subdue opposition. They prove against the state capacity effect in regressing an interaction term between distance to capital city and shock, which they find to be insignificant. Such statistical insignificance convinces them that distance to the capital city does not particularly matter to effects on shocks. But the state-as-a-prize mechanism theory cannot be dismissed solely on the basis that Berman and Couttenier find a negative correlation between external demand shock and civil conflict. Conflict could very well increase under good economic conditions given more resources to fight over. Moreover, albeit excellent measures, agricultural commodity shocks and banking crises cannot account for all types of income shocks that influence conflict. Large changes in income driven by resource blooms, for example, may also directly affect state revenue.

With this in mind, relating Chinese foreign aid and civil conflict contextualizes the effect of external demand shocks on conflict. Bluhm et al. (2016) find that countries receiving bilateral aid are more likely to escalate from small to armed conflict. In other words, bilateral foreign aid not only affects conflict incidence, but also conflict intensity as more conflicts burst out in areas already plagued with conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that aid may alter the opportunity cost of fighting, while Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that aid increases state capacity and/or the likelihood of the state-as-a-prize mechanism. If aid improves the provision of public goods, it directly decreases civilians' incentive to engage in violent activities. However, if an increase in foreign aid is seen as a "resource bloom," it may either increase state capacity, thereby decreasing conflict, or increase state-as-a-prize incentives, thereby increasing conflict. This associates bilateral foreign aid with the same explanation that binds income shocks. By regressing civil conflict, on Chinese foreign aid clarifies the relationship between both variables as well as their individual impact on conflict.

Theory

If foreign aid, in general, complicates the opportunity cost (or state capacity) versus state-as-a-prize debate, then Chinese foreign aid serves this niche while also accounting for potential endogeneity if birth region is used as an instrument for Chinese foreign aid. Birth region is an effective instrument because Chinese foreign aid disproportionately flows to places where political leaders are born.

Birth region also makes for a good instrument because it fits under the exclusion restriction required for an instrumental variable to be valid. The instrument Z cannot affect Y when the main independent variable X is held constant. In this logic, birth region of political leaders does not and cannot directly affect conflict in a subnational region because birth region would not be relevant if not for Chinese foreign aid. Just because a certain leader is born in a certain region does not automatically make that region more subject to civil conflicts. A leader’s birth region means very little if he/she does not act upon it by disproportionately sending aid into that region. Therefore, birth region is a good instrument for Chinese foreign aid because the former cannot directly affect conflict, reducing endogeneity effects in the latter.

Drehel et al. (2016) find that when leaders hold power, their birth regions receive substantially more distribution of the funding from Chinese foreign aid than other subnational regions. A similar effect is found in regions populated by individuals who share the same ethnicity as the political leader in power. However, this paper will prioritize birth region given the effect with birth region is much stronger than that with ethnicity of political leaders. Drehel et al. find that the amount of Chinese aid sent to a country, once the leader assumes power the funds are distributed to the birth region of said leader at triple the rate than other regions. Such characteristic is unique to Chinese aid, as Drehel et al. find that World Bank aid does not flow disproportionally to birth regions of political leaders the way that Chinese aid does. Long story short, Chinese aid lets the recipient country decide what to do with the external funding, whereas World Bank aid is subject to stringent rules and are consequently, much more difficult to manipulate. Well known for a principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient countries, Chinese aid may be easily exploited by those who espouse patronage politics, as described by Tull (2006). Therefore, using birth region to instrument Chinese aid not only eliminates endogeneity but also explains any effect on shocks caused by political favoritism. This paper reinforces Berman and Couttenier in disengaging the effect of income shocks on conflict from a region's proximity to a political center.

Another advantage of using birth region is that this instrument is by default subnational. It would not be possible to pinpoint the effects of birth region without disaggregated geocoded data for many recipient countries over a long period. Should data be aggregated on the country level, the birth region effect would get washed out. Therefore, birth region aligns with the eventual regression. Since existing literature, using subnationally geocoded aid data, tends to focus on a single country, as in Franken et al. (2012) Dreher and al. (2016) stand out for incorporating a large number of recipient countries. Berman and Couttenier also believe that singular findings cannot be used to make statistically significant generalizations.

Through China's activities in Africa, we can see that the choice to only improve subnational development o in birth regions of political leaders inadvertently widens spatial inequalities in neighboring and in their own counties. Consequently, conflict increases with more resources to fight over. Positive results between Chinese foreign aid and civil conflict in Sub Saharan Africa, therefore, account for the state-as-a-prize mechanism and reinforce Berman and Couttenier's claim that the opportunity cost mechanism is responsible for the effect of income shocks on conflicts. As Chinese development projects target politically privileged regions, it is likely to incite marginalized regions to react with social unrests. Where the results are a negative correlation with Chinese foreign aid's impact on conflict, it is likely the state capacity mechanism is at play, congruent with the birth region instrument since both empower the political leader in charge.

Hypothesis and Methods

The model considers the main independent variables of Berman and Couttenier's research. These include external demand shock variables like world demand for agricultural commodities produced in the region and exposure to banking crises. Furthermore, remoteness is used as an inverse measure natural trade openness. This variable is the log of distance between cell *c* and the nearest seaport. The remaining controls in Berman and Couttenier's research would also be replicated. These include time dummies *t* and cell-specific characteristics *c*, which captures time-invariant traits that affect conflict probability in a given cell. This measure includes distance to the closest port or capital, natural resources, and the region's roughness. The dependent variable is conflict incidence for the most part, except for the last panel, conflict onset and ending are considered. The regressions examine agricultural commodity shocks and banking crises as separate proxies for external demand for goods produced by cell *c*. This paper adds Chinese foreign aid to the equation and interacts it with various controls:

$$\mathbf{Conflict}_{c,t} = \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{1(Aid)}_{\mathbf{c,z,t}} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{2(shock)}_{\mathbf{c,t}} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{2(aid)}_{c,t} \times \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{3(remoteness)}_{c} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{4TimeDummy}_{t} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{5(TimeInvariantCharacteristics)}_{\mathbf{c}} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{C,t}$$

The dependent variable, $\mathbf{Conflict}_{c,t}$, captures the incidence, onset, or ending of a conflict in any given cell during any given year. The independent variable $\boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{1(Aid)}_{\mathbf{c,C,t}}$ is the natural logarithm of Chinese official finance allocated to region *c* in country *C* and year *t* in constant U.S. dollars. It is instrumented by the birth region of political leaders $\mathbf{Birthregion}_{i,C,t}$, a binary variable that takes 1 if the political leader of country *C* in year *t* was born in administrative cell *c*, and 0 otherwise.

The original hypothesis is that as the amount of Chinese foreign aid increases, so will the number of conflict events. Such relationship supports the state-as-a-prize mechanism, which reinforces Berman and Couttenier that positive external demand shocks decrease conflict in a region—since Chinese foreign aid accounts for the opposite effect. Using OLS panel regression with country-year units, I would test the following hypotheses:

H1: An increase in amount of Chinese foreign aid to a subnational region in Sub Saharan Africa will have a significantly positive effect on conflict incidence in that region. $\beta 1 > 0$
H2: An increase in amount of Chinese foreign aid to a subnational region in Sub Saharan Africa will have a significantly positive effect on conflict onset in that region. $\beta 1 > 0$
H3: An increase in amount of Chinese foreign aid to a subnational region in Sub Saharan Africa will have a significantly positive effect on conflict ending in that region. $\beta 1 > 0$

The main independent variable, Chinese foreign aid, is instrumented by birth region of that region's political leader. This dummy variable takes a value of one if the region receiving aid is also the birth region of that region's leader, zero otherwise. Accounting for endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables, it ensures that Chinese foreign aid is indeed a meaningful addition to existing regressions on conflicts.

Data

Three datasets are used which contain the geolocation of conflict events in Sub Saharan Africa. The first two are different versions of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) and the UCDP-Georeferenced event dataset (UCDP-GED). The purpose of using three sets of conflict data is to cover as many countries and time periods as possible. The first ACLED dataset (ACLED I) covers twelve countries that experienced civil war episodes over the period of study. The forte of this dataset is that it covers a wide range of time, from 1960-2005. The second ACLED dataset (ACLED II) covers all African countries and even a small number of non-African countries, but it is limited in time, only starting in 1997. The final UCDP-GED dataset covers more African nations than ACLED I but less than ACLED II, from 1989 to 2010. The three datasets differ most in how to determine whether an event should be included. While ACLED I and UCDP-

GED only consider conflict events that reach at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, ACLED II includes conflicts under 25 deaths in addition to above. ACLED II records all political violence, including riots and protests within and outside a civil conflict without specifying a battle-related deaths threshold, so that violent events without deaths are very well be included. The problem with the ACLED II dataset is that the broader definition of conflict makes it more difficult to sync with country level analysis. Given how they qualify conflict events, UCDP GED and ACLED I have a higher conflict intensity threshold than ACLED II. To be straightforward, the regressions assume that UCDP GED and ACLED I represent high conflict intensity, and ACLED II represent low conflict intensity.

Sample	UCDP-GED	ACLED I	ACLED II
Number of counties	44	12	44
Period	1997-2006	1997-2005	1997-2006
# of grid cells	8,367	2,700	8,367
Total # of events	8,661	2,384	15,687

Table 1. Basic Statistics on Each Sample

Name	Number	Mean	SD	25 Percentile	Median	75 Percentile
Dataset: UCDP-GED	83695	0.030	0.170	0	0	0
# events, UCDP dataset	80295	0.108	1.283	0	0	0
# events (if >0)	2482	3.490	6.442	1	2	3
Distance to closest port (km)	83695	769.740	436.485	403.713	743.501	1111.793
Distance to border (km)	81375	152.381	127.260	51	118	221
Distance to capital (km)	83695	611.224	393.624	303	513	875
Distance to nat. res. (km)	83695	295.065	212.675	126.193	245	410.104

Rel. distance to closest port	83695	0.585	0.242	0.4071	0.624	0.778
Rel. distance to border	81375	0.351	0.253	0.137	0.301	0.534
Rel. distance to cap. city	83695	0.468	0.242	0.269	0.455	0.654
Rel. distance to nat. res.	83695	0.450	0.251	0.241	0.426	0.650
Chinese Foreign Aid (amount in USD)	1602	17.271	2.484	16.045	17.852	18.656
Ln agri. com. shock	72475	10.231	0.906	9.861	10.325	10.756
Exposure to crises	82655	0.069	0.118	0.000	0.024	0.064
Dataset: ACLED I	24300	0.0321	0.1771	0	0	0
# events for ACLED I	24300	0.098	1.014	0	0	0
# events (if >0)	789	3.022	4.782	1	2	3
Distance to closest port (km)	24300	908.992	476.387	505.045	956.558	1296.767
Distance to border (km)	24300	179.369	149.065	56	137	275
Distance to capital (km)	24300	709.117	415.993	358.5	665	1001
Distance to nat. res (km)	24300	289.953	244.730	106.446	210.482	394.024
Rel. distance to closest port	24300	0.5792	0.240	0.403	0.620	0.763
Rel. distance to border	24300	0.366	0.261	0.1464	0.3224745	0.558
Rel. distance to cap. city	24300	0.504	0.234	0.316	0.5102	0.686
Rel. distance to nat. res	24300	0.409	0.251	0.201	0.3603	0.599
Chinese Foreign Aid (amount in USD)	463	16.755	3.433	15.029	17.389	18.656
Ln agri. com. shock	21735	10.0974	0.9555	9.818	10.192	10.489

Exposure to crises	24300	0.116	0.172	0.007	0.038	0.138
Dataset: ACLED II	83695	0.043	0.202	0	0	0
# Events, ACLED II	83695	0.187	2.364	0	0	0
# Events (if >0)	3575	4.385	10.605	1	2	4
Distance to closest port (km)	83695	769.739	436.485	403.711	743.5014	1111.793
Distance to border (km)	81375	152.381	127.260	51	118	221
Distance to capital (km)	83695	611.225	393.625	303	513	875
Distance to natural resources (km)	83695	295.065	212.676	126.193	249.099	410.101
Rel. distance to closest port	83695	0.586	0.242	0.4074	0.624	0.779
Rel. distance to border	81375	0.351	0.253	0.137	0.301	0.533
Rel. distance to cap. city	83695	0.467	0.242	0.266	0.455	0.654
Rel. distance to nat. res.	83695	0.450	0.250	0.241	0.4269	0.6509
Chinese Foreign Aid (Amount in USD)	1602	17.271	2.484	16.045	17.852	18.656
Ln agri. com. shock	72475	10.231	0.906	9.861	10.325	10.756
Exposure to crises	82655	0.069	0.118	0.000	0.024	0.064

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
***Note: "Relative distance" is relative to the maximum distance, computed by country**

The observation for all datasets is intensity of conflict events and conflict occurrences. The data is gathered from press accounts, humanitarian agencies, to research publications. The latitude and longitude of each event define a geographical location on the subnational level. All three datasets contain data on the precision of event georeference, and geoprecision is at least at the municipality level in 80% of cases (more than 95% in ACLED's datasets). In 65% of the cases, observations are even finer (at the village level). Otherwise, the geoprecision would be at the provincial level, and observations in UCDP-GED where the event cannot be localized at a finer level than the country (less than 2%), are dropped. For each data point, data is aggregated by year in a 0.5 x 0.5 degree cell (55 x 55 kilometers at the equator). While month, week and day are specified for most events, some events in UCDP-GED only include year. Since the goal is to aggregate data over time at a yearly frequency, this limitation has no tangible impact on the results. The unit of observation stays the cell-year across the entire paper. Since the level of geographical aggregation is the same as the one used in PRIO-GRID, PRIO-GRID data on distances to the capital city, national borders and socioeconomic factors are included as controls.

For each conflict event, my dependent variable equals 1 if at least one conflict happened in that cell during the year. This is a cell-specific conflict incidence. To account for country-year fixed effects, cell-specific conflict onset and end are also included. Finally, most events range from 1980-2006 because it is difficult to compute financial data after the 2008 financial crisis. The effect of the 2008 depression on international trade and commodity prices are yet to be fully understood. Since the goal is to investigate the effects of Chinese foreign aid in the context of external demand shocks, it is best to stay congruent with events descriptive of the financial scenario. For any given year the average number of events by cell is between three and four depending on the dataset. Since the majority of cells experience no conflict over the entire period, I run robustness checks with cells in which at least one conflict occurs. These ‘high conflict risk cells’ show a bigger quantitative effect of Chinese aid on conflicts. The USD deflation variable is logged to approximately resemble normal distribution.

The paper merges conflict data on the longitude and latitude of events with Chinese foreign aid data from AidData 1.1 China in Africa dataset for subnational units of 47 African countries over the 2001-2011 period. Subnational units at the ADM1 and ADM2 administrative regions are matched with conflict data by longitude and latitude such that the eventual product corresponds to the 0.5 x 0.5 cell measurement in the dependent variable. In total, there are 5,835 AMD2 regions in 47 African countries. Once Chinese aid and conflict data are matched, 5,749 of the 222,206 original data points in the Berman and Couttenier paper are retained. A little less than 100 observations from the Chinese aid data are dropped as a result of missing data on longitude and latitude. A series of regressions that include major agricultural/crisis shock and distance data in the context of added Chinese aid follows.

The most important controls adopted from Berman and Couttenier are external demand shock proxies, the first being agricultural demand shocks (short lasting) and the second being exposure to banking crises (long-lasting) in donor countries. Shock variables are based on variations in the foreign demand for goods produced by the region in which the cell belongs. Interacting the share of a certain agricultural commodity *p* in a cell *c* with the world import value of commodity *p* in year *t* minus the imports of country *i,* the value that agricultural shocks takes is produced. The region-specific data on agricultural specialization is obtained from Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Agromaps. Financial crises, on the other hand, make a good long-term measure because they are exogenous to trading partners' economic and political situations. Weighting the average share of the destination country's total imports from the exporting African country, the crisis dummy equals 1 if the destination does experience a banking crisis in a given year. This trade data comes from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the crisis data from Reinhard and Rogoff (2011). Finally, the remoteness variable is correlated with non-shock related cell-specific characteristics such as economic activity or closeness to natural resources.

Results

The results complicate previously stated theories. While the intended results are that Chinese foreign aid increases civil conflict in Sub Saharan Africa, this is only the case for some of the actual results. Each panel contains estimations are supposed to stay consistent across regions: columns 1 and 2 use UCDP-GED conflict data, columns 3 and 4 ACLED I, and columns 5 and 6 ACLED II, but that is not the case. To increase robustness, odd-numbered columns contain fixed effects logit estimations and even-numbered linear probability model ones. All remaining tables follow this format except for table 7.

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	0.081 (0.087)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.333 (0.223)	-0.025*** (0.007)	0.272** (0.138)	0.014 (0.011)
Agri. shock	-7.465*** (2.817)	-0.360* (0.198)	-6.190 (5.173)	-0.465 (0.337)	-2.019 (1.898)	-0.206 (0.168)
# of observations	451	1492	202	418	631	1492
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	ACLED I	ACLED I	ACLED II	ACLED II
R-squared		0.019		0.109		0.011

Table 3. Panel A. Dependent variable: conflict incidence, regressed against main independent variable Chinese foreign aid and main control variable agricultural shocks

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	-0.176 (0.216)	-0.025 (0.034)	-0.746*** (0.263)	-0.039*** (0.013)	8,846*** (1.828)	0.078*** (0.018)
Agri. shock	-7.551*** (2.888)	-0.365* (0.201)	-6.316 (5.274)	-0.466 (0.338)	-2.028 (1.901)	-0.198 (0.167)

Chinese aid x remoteness	0.049*** (0.040)	0.008 (0.008)	0.114** (0.046)	0.003 (0.002)	-4.126*** (0.879)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	ACLED I	ACLED I	ACLED II	ACLED II
# of observations	451	1492	202	418	631	1492
R-squared		0.020		0.109		0.013

Table 3. Panel B. Dependent variable: conflict incidence, regressed against main independent variable Chinese foreign aid, agricultural commodity shock, and the interaction variable aid x remoteness (distance to the closest seaport)

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	-0.544 (0.474)	-0.071 (0.087)	-1.677*** (0.631)	-0.064* (0.032)	1.013*** (0.161)	0.139** (0.059)
Agricultural shock	-7.497*** (2.855)	-0.360* (0.199)	-6.316 (5.274)	-0.466 (0.338)	-2.028 (1.901)	-0.206 (0.168)
Chinese aid x remoteness	0.113 (0.082)	0.015 (0.015)	0.296** (0.119)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.145*** (0.031)	-0.023** (0.011)
# of observations	451	1492	515	782	631	1492
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	ACLED I	ACLED I	ACLED II	ACLED II
R-squared		0.020		0.109		0.012

Table 3. Panel C. Dependent variable: conflict incidence, regressed against Chinese foreign aid, agricultural commodity shocks and the interaction variable aid x remoteness (distance to closest seaport relative to maximum distance, computed by country)

In Panel A of Table 3, the only two variables included are the main independent variable (Chinese foreign aid) and one of the main controls (agricultural commodity shocks). Results for Chinese aid are statistically significant in columns 3-6 with 3 and 4 pointing in opposite directions to 5 and 6. Underneath such a seeming contradiction is that the ACLED I only include twelve

African countries while ACLED II includes all Sub Saharan African countries. Furthermore, countries included in ACLED I have all experienced civil war in the time frame studied, while ACLED II accounts for a much larger selection of conflicts, including those without battle-related deaths. In countries that already experience civil wars (those in ACLED I), Chinese foreign aid tends to increase state capacity and decrease conflict. Countries included in ACLED II are much more diverse and experience lower level conflicts. According to the results, these countries are subject to the state-as-a-prize theory, where Chinese foreign aid incentivizes people to protest and revolt against their political leadership. As previously stated, ACLED II's more generous definition of conflict tailors it to low-intensity conflicts. UCDP GED and ACLED I, on the other hand, tailor to high-intensity conflicts due to a stricter definition of conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths). Therefore, the results also show that Chinese aid leads to more low-intensity conflicts and less high-intensity conflicts. Another interesting observation is that the addition of Chinese foreign aid complicates the story so much so that agricultural demand coefficients in Panel A are no longer significant in columns 3-6, regardless of whether the remoteness interaction term is added.

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	-1.388*** (0.278)	-0.218*** (0.012)	-0.313 (0.263)	-0.039*** (0.013)	0.624 (.)	0.167*** (0.014)
Agricultural Shock	7.500*** (2.856)	-0.380* (0.205)	-6.271 (5.270)	-0.466 (0.338)	-2.028 (1.901)	-0.209 (0.174)
Principal Component 1	5.734*** (1.083)	0.024*** (0.049)	-1.479 (.)	0.000 (.)	-1.460** (0.694)	-0.343*** (0.054)
Principal Component 2	-4.363*** (0.470)	-0.907*** (0.026)	-0.895 (.)	0.000 (.)	-3.233 (.)	0.149*** (0.040)

# of observations	451	1472	202	418	631	1472
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	ACLED I	ACLED I	ACLED II	ACLED II
R-squared		0.025		0.109		0.013

Table 4: Robustness check. Dependent variable: Conflict incidence, regressed against Chinese foreign aid, agricultural commodity shock and two principal components accounting for five interaction terms 1) aid x remoteness, 2) aid x ln distance to capital, 3) aid x ln distance to border, 4) aid x ln distance to natural resources and 5) aid x ln GDP area

In Table 4, more interaction terms are added as controls, including 1) aid x remoteness, 2) aid x 1n distance to the capital, 3) aid x 1n distance to the border, 4) aid x 1n distance to natural resources and 5) aid x 1n GDP area. However, since the five interaction terms are so highly correlated with each other, the logistic regression model could not converge normally. As a result, the main effect of Chinese aid is initially not significant. To solve this problem, a principal components analysis reduces the five highly correlated interaction variables to two, each related to a subset of the five. To derive meaning from the principal components, it is necessary to see what variables are most highly related to each. Component one loads heavily on the interaction terms 2) aid x 1n distance to the capital, 3) aid x 1n distance to the border and 4) aid x 1n distance to natural resources. Component two loads heavily on the interaction between 3) aid x 1n distance to border and 5) aid x 1n GDP area.

These results complicate previous expectation that Chinese foreign aid will reinforce external demand shock alignment with the opportunity cost theory since most significant aid coefficients are negative. In this light, Chinese foreign aid is just as negatively correlated with conflict as various forms of shocks, such that Chinese foreign aid partially explains the opportunity cost theory. Meanwhile, the same pattern in Table 3 holds for Chinese foreign aid, which is negative for ACLED I and positive for ACLED II. After controlling for the above interaction terms, results for the UCDP GED dataset become significant as well (both negative in columns 1 and 2). It makes sense that results from UCDP GED flow in the same direction as ACLED I versus ACLED II because both UCDP GED and ACLED I account for events of higher conflict intensity. Contrarily, ACLED II accounts for events of lower intensity since it has a more generous definition of conflict. As a result, the state-as-a-prize theory affects low rather than high-intensity conflicts, ascertained by positive results in ACLED II. On the other hand, the state capacity and opportunity costs theories affect high rather than low-intensity conflicts, given that results for UCDP GED and ACLED I am both negative.

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	0.084 (0.081)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.294* (0.170)	-0.023*** (0.006)	0.281** (0.120)	0.014 (0.011)
Exposure to banking crises	0.542 (2.554)	0.124 (0.225)	-2.907 (5.493)	-0.496*** (0.149)	-1.034 (1.609)	-0.093 (0.161)
# of obs.	481	1602	202	463	661	1602
R-sq		0.016		0.110		0.010
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	UCLED I	UCLED I	UCLED II	UCLED II

Table 5. Panel A. Dependent variable: Conflict incidence, regressed against main independent variable, Chinese foreign aid and second main control variable, exposure to banking crises

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	-0.053 (0.187)	-0.020 (0.035)	-0.621*** (0.215)	-0.031** (0.012)	7.919*** (1.748)	0.081*** (0.015)
Exposure to banking crises	0.557 (2.558)	0.125 (0.225)	-2.898 (5.531)	-0.496*** (0.149)	-1.042 (1.610)	-0.095 (0.161)

Chinese Aid x remoteness	0.027 (0.035)	0.007 (0.008)	0.093** (0.042)	0.002 (0.002)	-3.669*** (0.841)	-0.014*** (0.003)
# of obs.	481	1602	202	463	661	1602
R-sq		0.016		0.110		0.012
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	UCLED I	UCLED I	UCLED II	UCLED II

Table 5. Panel B. Dependent variable: Conflict incidence, regressed against main independent variable, Chinese foreign aid, second main control variable, exposure to banking crises and interaction variable aid x remoteness (closest distance to seaport)

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	2. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	3. Conflict Incidence (FE Logit)	4. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)	5. Conflict Incidence (FE-Logit)	6. Conflict Incidence (FE-LPM)
Chinese Aid	-0.396 (0.386)	-0.071 (0.084)	-1.376** (0.545)	-0.045 (0.030)	0.953*** (0.152)	0.133** (0.064)
Exposure to banking crises	0.562 (2.557)	0.124 (0.225)	-2.898 (5.531)	-0.496*** (0.149)	-1.042 (1.610)	-0.093 (0.161)
Chinese aid x remoteness	0.087 (0.066)	0.015 (0.014)	0.240** (0.108)	0.004 (0.006)	-0.129*** (0.030)	-0021* (0.012)
# of obs.	481	1602	202	463	661	1602
R-sq		0.016		0.110		0.011
Dataset	UCDP GED	UCDP GED	UCLED I	UCLED I	UCLED II	UCLED II

Table 5. Panel C. Dependent variable: Conflict incidence, regressed against main independent variable, Chinese foreign aid, second main control variable, exposure to banking crises, and interaction variable aid x remoteness (closest distance to closest seaport relative to maximum distance, computed by country

In Table 5, exposure to banking crises is the main control instead of agricultural commodity shocks. In Panel A, the only two variables are the main independent variable, Chinese foreign aid, and main control variable, exposure to banking crises. Results are significant for columns 3-5 and follow the same pattern: negative for ACLED I and positive for ACLED II. In Panel B, the addition of the interaction term aid x remoteness improves results to make column 6 significant. In Panel C, the interaction term aid x remoteness makes column 4 insignificant, while 3, 5 and 6 remain significant. Overall, the three panels follow the same pattern where results are not significant for UCDP GED (probably because this dataset is less precise with georeference), significant but negative for ACLED I and significant but positive for ACLED II.

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Onset (FE Logit); agri. shock	2. Conflict Onset (FE-LPM) agri. shock	3. Conflict Onset (FE Logit) crises	4. Conflict Onset (FE-LPM) crises	5. Conflict Ending (FE-Logit) agri. shock	6. Conflict Ending (FE-LPM agri. shock	7. Conflict Ending (FE-Logit) crises	8. Conflict Ending (FE-LPM) crises
Chinese Aid	0.337 (0.205)	0.047** (0.021)	0.357* (0.189)	0.049** (0.020)	-0.252*** (0.097)	-0.039 (0.023)	-0.267*** (0.098)	-0.042 (0.026)
shock	-5.056** (2.358)	-0.187 (0.120)	2.339 (2.366)	0.164 (0.155)	5.558 (4.292)	0.927 (1.001)	-9.038*** (2.727)	-1.344*** (0.363)
# of obs.	367	1393	392	1498	206	232	219	246
R-sq		0.021		0.021		0.77		0.108

Table 6. Panel A. Dependent Variables: Conflict onset and conflict ending, regressed against main independent variable Chinese foreign aid and two control variables (agricultural commodity shocks and banking crises)

Dependent Variable	1. Conflict Onset (FE Logit); agri. shock	2. Conflict Onset (FE-LPM) agri. shock	3. Conflict Onset (FE Logit) crises	4. Conflict Onset (FE-LPM) crises	5. Conflict Ending (FE-Logit) agri. shock	6. Conflict Ending (FE-LPM agri. shock	7. Conflict Ending (FE-Logit) crises	8. Conflict Ending (FE-LPM) crises
Chinese Aid	-0.577*** (0.173)	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.502*** (0.163)	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.637** (0.281)	-0.228*** (0.073)	-0.744*** (0.210)	-0.247*** (0.055)
shock	-5.175** (2.416)	-0.199 (0.122)	2.338 (2.371)	0.164 (0.154)	5.318 (4.365)	0.815 (0.969)	-8.930*** (2.738)	-1.315*** (0.358)
aid x remoteness	0.314*** (0.063)	0.021 (0.003)	0.307*** (0.068)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.068 (0.055)	0.032** (0.014)	0.085** (0.043)	0.035* (0.011)

# of obs.	367	1393	392	1498	206	232	219	246
R-sq		0.021		0.021		0.77		0.108

Table 6. Panel B. Dependent Variables: Conflict onset and conflict ending, regressed against main independent variable Chinese foreign aid, two control variables (agricultural commodity shocks and banking crises) and the interaction variable aid x remoteness

In Table 6, results from UCDP-GED data on conflict onset and ending, instead of conflict incidence, are used. In Panel A, all results are significant except for column 6. In Panel B where the aid variable interacts with remoteness, all results become significant and negative, whereas some are positive in Panel A. In the absence of the interactive variable, Chinese foreign aid has a positive effect on conflict onset and negative effect on conflict ending, but this observation is no longer true once the interaction control term is added. This finding shows that the level of global openness of a specific region has impacts how Chinese foreign aid affects conflicts. Since Chinese foreign aid does not flow to remote locations that the political leader is not concerned with, those regions have less to fight over. In more interconnected areas, however, people are more tangibly affected by the disproportionate distribution of Chinese aid, incentivizing them to act against the government.

Conclusion

While this paper did not reinforce Berman and Couttenier that external demand shocks fit into the opportunity cost mechanism of civil conflicts, it did reinforce contradictory findings in existing literature. The opportunity cost mechanism upholds that increased external demand shocks decrease the opportunity cost of insurrection and reduce conflict, but the same phenomenon can also be explained by the increased state capacity if resources flow strictly to the political leader’s region of birth. However, the state-as-a-prize mechanism holds that increased income shocks increase resources and the probability of conflict. This paper finds that more Chinese aid increases the incidence of smaller conflicts, as with ACLED II, and decreases civil wars, as with ACLED I. These results show that Chinese foreign aid fits in the state-as-a-prize mechanism in cases of lower conflict intensity, and the opportunity cost/state capacity mechanism in cases of higher conflict intensity.

In demonstrating that the distance to the capital city has little impact on the relationship between shock and conflict, Berman and Couttenier provide evidence that correlates shock with the opportunity cost theory. With Chinese aid, the story is the opposite. The birth region proxy variable is precisely valid thanks to observable instances of political favoritism. Since political leaders could dictate where aid flows, this shows that they control the distribution of foreign assistance, making it easier to fuel such aid into increasing the state's capacity, should an insurrection occur. Therefore, even though the negative results confound Berman and Couttenier at face value, they are intrinsically still in line with the latter for the most part.

In their ambiguity, the results reconcile micro-level with macro-level analysis: the causes and direction of factors affecting civil conflicts are yet to be determined with precision. Because of the nature of the sample (number of countries, type of countries, time frame, and rubric in identifying conflicts) does have an impact on results, micro-level results complement macro-level contradictions in identifying another statistically significant variable that affects conflicts. While results are mixed, Chinese foreign aid is undoubtedly an excellent addition to the civil conflict study because it at once accounts for endogeneity, instrumented by birth region of political leaders, and is quantitatively adequate to work with large and telling samples. Further research should re-evaluate the effect of Chinese aid on conflicts after the 2008 financial crisis, since the way by which income shocks impact conflict might differ greatly given the restructuring of the global financial markets.

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Exportation of the Carceral State

James V. Gibson, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada

Abstract

This article inquires the extent to which United States (US) security aid in Central America serves US interests and worsens humanitarian crises. Employing Foucauldian political theory, the author asserts that as a consequence of US foreign policy, a "carceral state" has appeared in a number of Central American countries. The carceral state is exemplified by *mano dura* ("heavy hand", or, also, zero-tolerance) crime policies, which are manifested in the extrajudicial killings of suspected gang members. Such a form of Central American governmentality provides the US with an opportunity to externalize some of the costs of drug trafficking. Scholars hypothesize that such policies exacerbate existing problems by raising the price of illicit substances on underground markets, and prevent the rehabilitation of gang members. Moreover, expansive military and police spending in Central American countries is compounded upon by security aid transfers from the US and other multilateral entities; as per the quantitative analysis of researchers cited in this paper. Thus, aforementioned trends create an equilibrium whereby many Central American states continue to pursue *mano dura* policies, which ultimately exacerbates violence occurring in the region and empowers corruption regimes.

Introduction

The quality of human livelihoods in the present day are highly unequal across the world. In this sense, the variability of life yields differences in biophysical health across borders. Often, the root causes of such human degradation are political, and scholars understand the security of states, primarily according to its citizens' vulnerability to physical harm. In regards to biophysical vulnerability, states' actions are often a cause of and a response to, humanitarian crises. Responses to crises are borne from internal as well as external state actors. In an ever-globalized world, it has become increasingly difficult to disentangle the influence of such actors from one another.

Such is the case in Central America, where many countries are recipients of United States (US) security aid. The geographical location of Central America renders it vulnerable in regards to drug trafficking, as supply routes often both originate and run through Central America en route to the US. The influence of street gangs and organized crime grew pervasive throughout Central America during recent decades. As such, Central America has become an ideal testing ground for new securitized humanitarian agendas, which posit that the stability of states can be improved through the external provision of weapons, as well as the funding and training of both military and police forces.

Following the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy shifted as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre (hereafter called "9/11"). During the Cold War, international security threats were characterized as disequilibrium between bipolar state-alliances. In contrast, the 21st century, saw the rise of security threats becoming characterized as decentralized violence within states. I seek to address which global powers wield the influence to make such characterizations, and how US security aid has affected recipient countries in Central America.

First, I will provide a contextual background as to the political and social conditions in Central America. Second, I will explore how security aid corresponds with a liberal humanitarian order. Third, I will then counter the liberal view in favour of a realist outlook on aid securitisation in Central America. Fourth, I will explain how security aid has impacted state development in Central America. Lastly, I will provide an overview of how security aid encourages the dehumanisation of many of the intended beneficiaries. The central thesis of this paper is that US security aid in Central America serves the interests of the US national security agenda, at the same time as it exacerbates violence occurring in Central America and empowers corrupt regimes.

Contextual description of Central America

Following the end of multiple civil wars in the 1990s , many Central American countries began to formally transition to democratic rule. Up until this point, most of the countries were governed by military rule. Cruz (2015b) argues that, due to the relative youth of these democracies, Central American militaries have remained influential in regards to governance. In the Honduran case prior to 1998, the military remained an entirely autonomous and unaccountable institution (Cruz, 2015b, p. 44).

To the dismay of many Central Americans who ventured back to their home countries following the end of these civil wars, their countries failed to attain impressive rates of economic growth, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (as cited in Cruz, 2015b, p. 44). An array of neoliberal economic policies implemented in Central America focused on privatizing state enterprises, liberalizing trade barriers and labour laws, and implementing a value-added consumption tax (Cruz, 2015b, p. 45). These policies disproportionately affected the working classes in Central America, as the deregulation of labour laws resulted in an influx of growth in low-productivity sectors yielding low wages. Moreover, cuts to public spending limited the benefits and total sum of jobs offered by former public industries which were now preyed upon by the private sector. In particular, youth became incapable of securing employment (Cruz, 2015b, p. 45).

Cruz also notes that the introduction of a value-added sales tax led to a regressive taxation scheme, given that the poor spend most of what they earn, whereas the rich save a greater proportion of their earnings. According to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report (as cited in Bruneau, 2014), “stark wealth disparities provide criminals with both a justification (addressing social injustice) and an opportunity (wealth to steal) for their activities” (Bruneau, 2014, p. 155). As such, street gangs and organized crime networks offer young men opportunities for, albeit limited, social mobility. Every week, gang members earn up to $1000 in protection rackets, seized through the extortion of neighbourhoods (Cruz, 2015b, p. 46). The scope of influence of organized crime in Central America is difficult to capture. For instance, in El Salvador, findings indicate that street gangs are active in 50 percent of neighbourhoods (Bruneau, 2014, p. 157) and are responsible for 40 percent of all violent deaths (Cruz, 2015b, p. 46). The homicide rates of Central American countries are among some of the highest in the world, as, during 2010, they ranged from 13 in 100 000 in Nicaragua, to 81 in 100 000 in Honduras (Bruneau, 2014, p. 159). By comparison, during the year 2010, the homicide rate in Canada was 1.64 per 100 000 (Statistics Canada, n.d.).

The precarity borne from such rampant violence and neighborhood intimidation often hollows out opportunities for individuals to prosper which, in turn, feeds the desperation that motivates so many Central Americans to turn to a life of crime. The following section will examine the discourse of liberal humanitarianism, and explore the extent to which liberalism is ill-equipped to counter stark desperation.

Problematizing aid securitisation as liberal humanitarianism

The relevance of liberalism can be expressed by the ideas of John Stuart Mill (1999), a prominent political philosopher who believed that: "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others" (Mill, 1999, p. 133). In other words, liberalism can be understood as the belief in a political order which prioritizes individual liberty in most cases except its pragmatic use, in the few instances where the collective provision of liberty is threatened.

Reid-Henry (2014) draws a narrative as to how the development of the European state transitioned from an imperial to a liberal order through the influence of humanitarianism. Reid-Henry notes that the influence of such humanitarian organizations as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) informed state development in the late nineteenth century, attributing credit to humanitarian advocates for the protection of prisoners of war, as reflected in the Hague and Geneva Conventions (Reid-Henry, 2014, p. 423). Reid-Henry argues that "by the early 20th century, humanitarian endeavour was quite clearly a part of liberal political rationality more broadly, wherein it served as both an enabler and a limit on state powers" (Reid-Henry, 2014, p. 423).

However, Reid-Henry also notes that some scholars attribute the intensification of market discipline embedded within liberal thought, and not altruism, as to what lead to such humanitarian achievements. Reid-Henry makes the argument that the English abolitionist movement was motivated towards reconciling the suffering caused by slavery, but rather towards establishing a conception of the citizen as an autonomous and rational self-maximizer. These outwardly-altruistic initiatives epitomized:

> "[a] turn towards the public allocation of moral responsibility … [which was] essential if individual men were to become self-governing subjects in a new social order. But they were also central in ensuring that, as with states, these new forms of moral reasoning became both a driver for, and a limit upon, market relations" (Reid-Henry, 2014, p. 424).

With regard to institutions of liberal humanitarianism, Joachim and Schneiker (2012) examine the extent to which private military and security companies (PMSCs) appropriate liberal humanitarian rhetoric as marketing tools. According to representatives of the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), PMSCs self-stylize as humanitarian agents to "[distinguish] a company in a market that is growing and diversifying" (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012, p. 370). In a survey of the websites for 200 PSMCs, Joachim and Schneiker found that 25 percent of PSMCs either referred to themselves as humanitarian organizations or emphasized their humanitarian attributes (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012, p. 377).

To substantiate such a claim, many PMSCs have even taken to partnering with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral entities. For example, companies such as Cubic, Edinburgh International, Aegis, and Allied Security pride and advertise themselves for having won contracts with the UN (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012, p. 383). José L. Gómez del Prado of the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (as cited in Joachim & Schneiker, 2012) notes, with regard to the US-based PMSC Blackwater, that "one of the main objectives of the corporation, as indicated by its founder Erik Prince, would be to obtain for his own private military force a substantial piece of the current UN peacekeeping $6–10 billion budget" (Joachim & Schneiker, 2012, p. 380). Intrinsic to the structure of private firms markets, Blackwater and other PMSCs are certain to prioritize the capture of such multilateral entities' budgets and the expansion of their clientele, which ensures a dependable stream of revenues.

In this section, I do not aim to condemn profit-motivated PMSCs as intrinsically immoral. However, the profit motive, as opposed to an altruistic one, yields unfavourable developmental results. Jesperson (2015) makes such a case as she asserts that the typical punitive approach to gang violence, as promoted by PMSCs, does little to decentivize organized crime, given that "[w]hen arrests are made, a long line of unemployed people [are] waiting to take their place" (Jesperson, 2015, p. 27).

Although many PMSCs and NGOs compare the impacts of organized crime to those of armed conflict, Jesperson asserts that each operates according to distinct motives and dynamics. Unlike the dynamics inherent to warring factions, the author claims that organized crime more so "[follow] efficient business principles and [are] driven by a desire for profit; [they seek] the path of least resistance and [aim] to make business transactions as simple and reliable as possible" (Jesperson, 2012, p. 26). As the costs of drug trafficking are heightened by barriers posed by the counternarcotic police forces, so too is the market price for said drugs (Jesperson, 2012). From this vantage point, we can better understand what Reid-Henry means when he refers to the English abolition of slavery, by claiming that "with respect to the market, humanitarianism worked back against some of the worst excesses of market exploitation, at the same time as it fed into the reproduction of a system that created suffering in the first place" (Reid-Henry, 2014, p. 425).

Realist conceptions of aid securitisation

As opposed to the ideals of liberal humanitarianism posited earlier, the following section suggests a different set of motivations driving US involvement in Central America. The realist school of thought, as defined by Park, forwards a view of the international system where "states may cooperate to achieve their interests, namely to ensure their own survival and power, [but] [o]nce the conditions favouring cooperation have changed, each state [will revert] to acting in its own interest" (Park, 2018, p. 21). Along these lines, I posit that the US and its allies provide security aid to benefit, first and foremost, their own security needs.

As noted in the introduction, Central America exists between what the UNODC (as cited in Bruneau, 2014) calls "drug supply and drug demand" (Bruneau, 2014, p. 155). In an attempt to counter the demand for illicit drugs in the US, numerous politicians have declared a "War on Drugs" in order to use police operations to destroy organized crime networks. An example of this policy on a domestic level is the rooting out of the intensely violent Californian street gang, "MS-13". Specific laws were passed with the goal of incarcerating and deporting gang members and these laws included, but were not limited to, the 1994 three-strikes law and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Following this, deportations from the US increased by 400 percent since 1996 (Bruneau, 2014, p. 158). These actions correspond with Adi Ophir's conception (as cited in Reid-Henry, 2014) of the primary functions of the state, claiming that:

> "[f]or centuries, … the main task of political authorities in the West in times of calamity was to contain the disaster; not to let it spread into the safer areas where the court and members of the elite found shelter … [and eventually tasks would also include] the efficient management of the social space and the physical environment, the reduction of damages and injuries, and the political control and manipulation of the distribution of risks and losses" (Reid-Henry, 2014, p. 422).

Similarly, in his seminal work, *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault (1977) compares the sphere of state functions to a 17th century French procedure on quarantining towns infected by the plague. Therein, Foucault details the hierarchical order resulting from rigorous processes of surveillance and documentation of infected households. The state, in a similar manner, is said to exercise a 'disciplinary mechanism' to constrain and isolate such "contagions" as crime and rebellion. With regard to this penetrating effect of this mechanism, Foucault says:

> "Rather than the massive, binary division between one set of people and another, [the disciplinary mechanism] call[s] for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an

> organization in depth of surveillance and control, [and also] an intensification and a ramification of power" (Foucault, 1977, p. 198).

I assert that under these pretenses, the incredible magnitude of US security aid appears as a proportionate response to the immense task of containing violence outside of its borders. Bruneau notes that US interest is further borne from the fact that federal law enforcement exists in many Central American states, which can more effectively combat organized crime than the US; a country that lacks any federal law enforcement entity, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Second, Bruneau notes that some Central American states, such as Honduras, supplant law enforcement with the military itself, and are capable of applying aggressive force against organized crimes (Bruneau, 2014, p. 167). In 2011 the United States, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank collectively committed $1 billion in security aid to Central America (Bruneau, 2014, p. 166). Moreover, by mid-2013, the US allocated an additional $1.2 billion in security aid towards their Central America Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI (Bruneau, 2014, p. 168).

In addition to shifting the violent elements of drug trafficking southwards and across its border, the US has also armed Central American policing efforts attempting to counter increasingly frequent and horrific crime. Is some instances, Central American armaments yielded profits for private US firms. At the beginning of the organized crime surge of the 1990s, "the [US] government delivered $376,000 in small arms to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, while in the same period more than $66 million in authorized private sales from the [US] flowed to the same countries" (Stohl & Tuttle, 2008, p. 16). Moreover, the US is often a dissenting voice against stronger international arms controls, such as was the case with an Organization of American States (OAS) treaty called the Firearms Convention, which would have required signatories to “establish procedures for importing, exporting, and tracing small arms, light weapons, and ammunition, and as well as mechanisms for enforcement (Stohl & Tuttle, 2008, pp. 18).

Moreover, multilateral security aid allocations further align with the interests of the US and its allies. Lazell and Petrikova (2017) conducted a quantitative analysis of aid flows from the United Nations Development Programme, the European Union’s European Commission, and the World Bank’s International Development Association. In particular, Lazell and Petrikova considered the extent to which Western concerns of terrorism affected the allocation of democratizing aid as compared to security aid. In their study, the authors conceptualize democratizing aid as conditional aid transfers allocated towards initiatives promoting democratic participation and civil society, women’s rights, and free media. Security aid is conceptualized as conditional aid transfers allocated towards surveillance technology, arms, military, or law enforcement. The authors posit that all of these organizations claim to, through the provision of aid, build “a solid, inclusive social contract [in recipient states], underpinned by democratic governance [that] can help maintain an equilibrium between competing interests and reduce fragility and the likelihood of organized violence” (Lazell & Petrikova, 2017, p. 496). The authors concluded that, running counter to such entities’ rhetoric, there was no correlation between the quantity of democratizing aid allocated and whether recipients were vulnerable, conflict-affected states (Lazell & Petrikova, 2017, p. 507). Crucially, the authors also discovered statistically significant positive relationships between the quantity of security aid allocated and the level of concern of Western donors. The level of concern of such donors was measured by refugee flows and frequency terrorist casualties occurring in recipient countries (Lazell & Petrikova, 2017, p.

508). In the following section, the effects of security aid on Central American state formation will be examined.

Perverse state formation in Central America

The carceral state

To guide the following discussion, I will employ Michel Foucault's theory of the carceral state. As mentioned prior, Foucault's seminal work, *Discipline and Punish*, provides the foundation for the concept of the carceral state. Therein, Foucault compares the functioning of the modern state as akin to the physical structure of a Panopticon. The Panopticon, considered first by Jeremy Bentham, is a prison model whereby a guard tower sits in the centre of a circular wall of cells, and whereby guards can see prisoners, but the prisoners cannot see inside of the tower. The effectiveness of the Panopticon resides in its omnipresence and the continuous possibility of surveillance in the minds of the prisoners (Foucault, 1977, p. 201). The carceral state adopts this model, and other aforementioned Foucauldian theories of state function, to atomize constituents and expand the potential for state force, as well as the threat of state force, as widely as possible. Displays of violence and other methods of coercion are meant to incubate self-regulation among the populous, and render them docile subjects.

In more precise terms, Jiwani (2011) describes the application of Foucault's carceral state theory as:

> "exemplified by a 'law and order' approach in which crime is the lens through which governance is exercised. This form of governmentality … employs not only a wide array of disciplinary technologies to subject and produce docile subjects but also, through the deployment of juridical power and biopower, serves to manage, contain and/or annihilate those who are perceived to be threats to society" (Jiwani, 2011, p. 15).

As mentioned in the section prior, Bruneau argues that the US is motivated towards providing security aid in Central America due to the wide-reaching mandate of many countries' police forces. I argue that the provision of US security aid has allowed for the proliferation of the Foucauldian carceral state in Central America.

To this end, the stated aims of the CARSI are to "support development of strong and accountable governments, raise the effective presence of states in communities at risk, and foster enhanced levels of security and rule of law" (Bruneau, 2014, p. 168). It is not unreasonable to assume that the priorities of such vast quantities of security aid would also guide the priorities of Central American government agendas more generally. This claim becomes all the more likely when one accounts for the fact that the United Nations Development Programme (as cited in Stohl & Tuttle, 2008) reports that El Salvador spends 11.5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on the effects of violence (Stohl & Tuttle, 2008, p. 16). The burden of violence on many such Central American states likely makes external revenues, even those packaged as US security aid, a crucial influence upon the prioritization of law enforcement and security initiatives over other areas of government expenditure.

Influenced largely by the crime policies of New York City, many Central American political leaders advocated for, and implemented, *mano dura* ("heavy hand" or also, zero-tolerance) crime policies (Bruneau, 2014, p. 157). Such *mano dura* policies are commonly characterized, across countries, for their deregulation of policing and expanding the grounds for legal conviction and detention on the grounds of gang affiliation. For example in El Salvador, the "Ley Antimaras" Act of 2003 allowed police to "use the presence of tattoos, hand signals, some dress codes, and physical appearance as evidence of gang membership" (Bruneau, 2014, p. 161). Brenneman (2014) details how, by focusing on the problem of gang violence, "Central American politicians have been able to scapegoat the gangs and direct attention away from the more complex social and political sources of violence" (Brenneman, 2014, p. 114). As such, Brenneman cites survey data suggesting that 60 percent of Hondurans support the extrajudicial killing of gang members in a campaign of "social cleansing" (Brenneman, 2014, p. 114). To illustrate the breadth of such police misconduct, Cruz notes that, in 2012, a Guatemalan police chief was arrested for her involvement in a series of extrajudicial killings (Cruz, 2015b, pp. 251-252). Even among rehabilitated gang members, full reintegration to society is nearly impossible due to the omnipresent threat that their tattoos, as well as other visible signifiers, will elicit legal persecution or physical mutilation by the police (Brenneman, 2014).

State corruption and the non-monopolization of violence

Pearce (2010) describes Latin American state formation as being "perverse" (Pearce, 2010, p. 286). As such, the author compares the experience of European state formation with that of Latin America. Pearce refers to a series of other authors, including Charles Tilly and Manuel Elsner, to assert the claim that European state formation was characterized by the monopolization of violence. Moreover, Pearce refers to the notion of the "man of honour" a cultural archetype which, during the 18th and 19th centuries, encouraged European elites to endorse liberal outlooks on governance focused upon rules-based procedures and benevolence (Pearce, 2010, pp. 297-298). Pearce contrasts this with the Latin American context, wherein states "are [still] unable to persuade their elites to pay taxes" (Pearce, 2010, p. 298).

Similarly, Foucault's conception of power:

> "has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; [but rather] in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught. … [Thus,] it does not matter who exercises

> power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine" (Foucault, 1977, p. 202).

Pearce suggests that the legitimacy of Latin American states are not dependent on the monopolization of violence, but instead, the non-monopolization of violence by the state. For example, returning to the Guatemalan case, the country's police chief and head of the anti-narcotics unit was arrested in 2010 due to his involvement in drug trafficking (Cruz, 2015a, p. 251). Pearce notes that, five years prior, a former Guatemalan police chief was also arrested on similar grounds (Pearce, 2010, p. 299). As such, he suggests that the rampant corruption and alliances between Central American states and various elites, criminal organizations, and other stakeholders provides evidence that the goal of these states was never to monopolize violence. Pearce states: "[r]ather than [finding] solutions to [gang violence], the state gains huge political capital from its ongoing confrontations at the same time as it allies with pathological and corrupt violent actors outside the state in order to gain temporary victories" (Pearce, 2010, p. 299). He understands that internal conflicts consolidate, rather than weaken, the legitimacy of Central American states.

The diversification of state functions, rather than their consolidation, is most absurdly illustrated by reports of gangs in El Salvador, who force women unaffiliated with the gangs to take care of their members' children. These 'makeshift mothers' are oftentimes threatened with violence if they refuse to follow their demands. In a sense, gangs are increasingly adopting the social welfare functions of the state by providing childcare services through unconventional and threatening measures (Avelar, 2018).

The findings of Cruz (2015a) partially corroborate Pearce's claim in regards to political capital. In a qualitative study of survey data, Cruz found that in Honduras, there is a positive yet statistically insignificant, relationship between survey participants' crime victimization (defined as whether a participant was victim to crime in the 12 months prior to the survey) and support for both the regime and government (Cruz, 2015a, p. 266). Cruz explains that phenomenon with the suggestion that "relentlessly high levels of crime and increasing political turmoil in Honduras may have rendered the public more cynical and more accustomed to tolerating insecurity and criminality as features of their daily social life" (Cruz, 2015a, p. 279). In the following section, I will continue to examine the extent to which securitized agendas in Central America bolster the state's legitimacy, as well as the US' image as a global humanitarian force.

Legitimacy and dehumanization

With regard to the ascent of the carceral state in many Central American countries, I have illustrated how scapegoating and 'cleansing' operations of the state serves to further its legitimacy. Pearce notes that the functional purpose of *mano dura* policies are to foster a conception of democracy within which exists citizens, those worthy of state-provided public goods, and "'non-citizens', … who can be subjected to the pure violence of the state" (Pearce, 2010, p. 299). I claim that the US model of spatially containing security threats has been most explicitly transmitted to Nicaragua, which has observed a proliferation of gated communities, thus segregating the upper socioeconomic class from the rest of society. Such communities act as "newly designed geographical securitization measures which separate citizens and non-citizens and simultaneously securitize democracy by controlling who participates in it" (Pearce, 2010, p. 300).

It ought to be recognized that in recent years within Nicaragua, the US military has developed a presence deploying medical aid to vulnerable communities. Bryan (2015) describes how the USS *Kearsarge* was employed with a humanitarian mandate through Operation Continuing Promise, to provide for individuals' 'basic needs' along the Latin American coastline. Bryan notes that the mission of the *Kearsarge* sought to provide essential aid to those in need, thus primarily serving US national interests as it aims to foster goodwill among the citizens of states deemed unstable or insecure, and to project an image of US benevolence on the world stage. The campaign has endured criticism as Bryan depicts:

> "[t]he controversy sparked by the *Kearsarge* ... captures the paradox of military humanitarianism. Its emphasis on protecting life obscures underlying strategic questions about which lives are worth saving. Rather than demonstrating a universal commitment to life, that question is answered in terms of U.S. national security. ... It reflects a general paradox of humanitarianism as caught between a desire to "do good" and its propensity to ignore and even reinforce the inequalities that make some populations more likely to need aid, and others more capable of delivering it" (Bryan, 2015, p. 34).

In addition to ignoring its role causing insecurity in states, the US, inadvertently or not, also takes a position as to who deserves to live or die through the provision of humanitarian aid. As the US acts to affirm its role as a humanitarian force for good, it, as a matter of course, dehumanizes and excludes. In the case of Central America, the recipients of aid must be geographically distant enough from the US such that the major burdens associated with crisis and insecurity are contained outside of its borders. In contrast to the humanitarian efforts in Nicaragua, Green (2011) notes that, as soon as citizens of Central American countries arrive in the US as migrants, refugees, or asylum-seekers, "federal and state laws are used to transform migrants into illegal human beings" (Green, 2011, p. 377). Green conducted a series of 150 interviews with citizens of Tucson, Arizona, of which the "majority felt that a key factor in their support for denying migrants any rights, including in some cases humanitarian aid, was their illegality" (Green, 2011, p. 378).

Conclusion

The problems of drug trafficking pose detrimental threats to both the US and Central America. However, the US response to the drug trade, has largely been to shift the greatest costs of narcotic trafficking across its southern border. Rather than working to decriminalize illegal substances, the US has chosen to proliferate violence through the use of the force of state. Recognizing the social and economic costs of this approach, the US engaged in a widespread practice of deporting gang members throughout the 1990s. Following 9/11, the global community increased its concern and focus upon decentralized violence in conflict-affected and post-conflict states. The United States then chose to orchestrate an humanitarian response to these anxieties which aimed to strengthen the rule of law in Central American states ravaged by the effects of organized crime and gang violence. However, the US failed to resolve the extent to which this violence was caused by the enforcement and implementation of American zero-tolerance crime and drug policies themselves, as well as policies in Central America.

The influence of PMSCs and arms manufacturers play a role in continuing the 'War on Drugs,' as these firms frame themselves as the arms of a larger global humanitarian arsenal. The market forces and respect for law that the liberal world order sought to encourage across the world through humanitarianism ultimately served to entrench and intensify destabilization in Central America. With or without the understanding that elites are incentivized to perpetuate violence in order to legitimate the status quo (as well as for the purpose of personal gain), the US has regardless empowered corrupt governments to lead to a dehumanization campaign against many their own citizens and, decidedly, has exported the carceral state. Rather than providing a greater array of public goods and services, Central American states have focused upon policing neighbourhoods, while gangs, strangely, have increasingly provided welfare for their members.

The phenomenon of the US to use through migration controls and deportation in order to exclude individuals seen as 'contagions' alludes to Foucault's allegory of the plague-ridden town, and thus, constitutes a trans-continental degree of separation and isolation. The extent to which such individuals are seen as subhuman among the US population is a result of political calculus on the part of American legislators, and tangibly benefits the US by reducing its own policing costs and providing revenue to PSMCs, many of which reside in the US. If the current regimes of aid securitisation are to continue, then improving the stability of states and reducing vulnerabilities will be unlikely because, as Noam Chomsky (as cited in Polychroniou, 2015) says: “[w]hen all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”

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Egypt vs. Saudi Arabia: Alternative Paths to the Arab Spring

Kaleigh Calvao, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Vermont, United States of America

Abstract

Why did Egypt experience an Arab Spring that led to regime change, while Saudi Arabia had limited protests and maintained stability? This research paper will test the theory that Egypt experienced protests in 2011, primarily due to the country's history during the 1950-1970s under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The materials consulted in writing this research paper consist of fourteen peer-reviewed scholarly articles and nine books, all focusing on either Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the dynamics of historical political regimes within the Middle East, or basic political theory. The research findings based on the literature show how Nasser's leadership instilled ideas of Pan-Arabism, secularism, and social justice. This would cause Egypt's historical trajectory to be caught between fighting against repression and fighting for democracy, eventually culminating in the 2011 Arab Spring and failed democratic uprising. Egypt's Arab Spring is contrasted against Saudi Arabia's stable experience to further illustrate the effect that differing historical trajectories play in catalyzing regional protest. This paper will also examine how the countries' economies, the influence of oil and the impact of international actors (namely the United States) were not the pivotal variables that explain Egypt's Arab Spring. I found that Egypt experienced an Arab Spring while Saudi Arabia did not, due to Egypt's history under the leadership of Nasser, which created a unique institutionalized framework that simultaneously liberated and repressed civil society, allowing tensions to easily build and ignite during the wave of pro-democracy Arab Spring protests in 2011.

Keywords*:* Pan-Arabism, secularism, social justice, pluralism, authoritarianism, modernization, traditionalism, Arab Spring

Literature Review

Prior literature regarding the Arab Spring in Egypt focused on inter-political dynamics of the country and intra-political relationships throughout the region of the Middle East and North Africa. The two traditional schools of thought that have been used to examine Middle East relations and conflict within the past decades are orientalism and exceptionalism. Edward Said's *Orientalism* and Benard Lewis's *What Went Wrong? : The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* encompass these contrasting arguments (1978; 2002). This paper attempts to take neither an orientalist nor an exceptionalism stance, but uses these models as context for examining the specific effect of history on the countries of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (ibid).

Books such as *Cook's False Dawn*, Lynch's *The Arab Uprisings Explained*, and Brownlee, Jason, Masoud, Tarek and Reynolds' *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*, present the most contemporary arguments that examine the political and economic factors that could explain the outbreak of an Arab Spring in Egypt and the lack thereof in Saudi Arabia (2007; 2014; 2015). Most recent literature within the past decade focuses on weak economies, the impact of oil wealth, and the influence of international intervention as the main factors of instability within the region. Additionally, the literature discusses how these factors catalyzed an Arab Spring in Egypt while being able to stop protests in Saudi Arabia (ibid).

Articles by Diamond, Gause and Spiers, including the aforementioned books, argue that these factors are some of the primary reasons for the differences in Arab Spring's throughout the region (2010; 2010; 2004). I argue, however, that these factors are not the most important indicators to explain the differences in Arab Spring's between countries throughout the region compared to a country's history using the contrasting experiences between Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the primary case study. Articles by Bellin, Farid, Kenney, Mansfield and Selim show how Egypt's distinct history under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser created a foundation of political instability (2004; 1996; 2012; 1973; 2016). This literature presents a stark contrast to Saudi Arabia's history. Articles by Axelgard, Bellin, Choueiri, Mann, Menaldo and Özev examine the effect of Saudi Arabia's authoritarian, traditional monarchy and argues the country's robust authoritarianism has aided the political establishment in silencing public dissent significantly (2001; 2004; 2002; 2012; 2012; 2017). This paper goes beyond the traditional dichotomous arguments of orientalism vs. exceptionalism and expands upon previous findings regarding the countries differing histories, by relating history to contemporary politics. I argue that the causes of the Arab Spring in Egypt goes beyond the traditional and contemporary explanations of conflict within the Middle East, to show that Egypt's history under Nasser was the pivotal factor in creating the environment necessary for an Arab Spring to occur.

Egypt under Nasser: Ideology of Pan-Arabism, Secularism, and Social Justice

Pan-Arabism

Nasser's rule instilled modern ideas such as Pan-Arabism, secularism, and social justice which allowed for democratic principles, such as political representation, to enter Egyptian society. This would create a repressed, yet pluralized autocracy. Through Nasser's leadership in overthrowing colonial and monarchical rule and establishing Egypt's first (though authoritarian) Republic in the *coup* of 1952, he emerged as a charismatic national and regional leader. One of the key tenets in "Nasserism" was Pan-Arabism, which advocated for Arabs to unify across borders and nations against imperial powers and Israel. While Pan-Arabism could be seen as a force "from another era...Gamal Abdel Nasser inspiring the masses across the region", it was nonetheless formative and pertinent (Humphreys, 2005, 51). Pan-Arabism inspired Egypt for decades even after Nasser's rule, and directly influenced the protests in 2011 as Humphreys shows that a "latent sense of Pan Arabism helped produce the communal wave of protests across the region" (Humphreys, 2005, 51-52). It is therefore a logical conclusion that Egypt would be the *most* inspired by this "renewed sense of Pan-Arabism" in the Middle East, which prompted the public to collectively mobilize for reform (Humphreys, 2005, 81). Additionally, Egypt would be more predisposed to protest repressive regimes compared to Saudi Arabia "given both its rich history of political protests and strikes especially in the few years leading up to 2011 and the strength of its civil society and labor movement" (Lynch, 2014, 64). As a result, in 2011, secular, Islamist, labor, and communist groups all protesting for democratic reform could unite under the commonality of Pan-Arabism that echoed the triumphs of their country's history.

Secularism

Nasser promoted secularism that was implemented through an authoritarian Republic that advocated for state control over religion. Nasser's secularism was unique to Egypt's history, and can be defined as a type of "national-secularist dictatorship" in which government and politics operated without influence from other political or religious groups, specifically Islamic fundamentalists and traditionalists (Nettler and Marquand, 2000, 61). Nasser's secularist policies manifested themselves through the repression of various religious groups, leading many popular Egyptian Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to be politically repressed for decades (Cleveland, 2016, 286-325). Despite this repression, The Brotherhood was one of the largest and most politically active groups during Nasser's leadership. Egyptians saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a representative of their nationhood within the context of their religious and cultural heritage, causing an increasingly informed civil society to advocate for this group's representation on behalf of the citizen's interest (Cleveland, 2016; Kenney, 2012; Mansfield, 1973). Due to this historical foundation, the Muslim Brother was the largest group advocating for political representation and reform once protests broke out in the 2011 Arab Spring.

Despite being institutionally repressed through the framework of Nasser's secularist policies, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to reorient itself in the 21st century as a representative of the strong Islamist current in Egyptian civil society (Kenney, 2012, 430-442). The Muslim Brotherhood was successful in filling the political vacuum that occurred after the initial wave of protests in 2011 since they "offered Egyptians what they had been demanding for the better part of a century - economic development, social justice, representative government, and dignity" (Cook, 2017, 105). This was possible only because Egyptian civil society was historically strong due to Nasser's attempts of giving the Parliament more power from the Executive in 1967, causing secular and Islamist groups to call for political representation.

As civil unrest continued, the demand for political reform grew, eventually forcing Anwar Sadat to expand upon Nasser's policies through a limited opening up of political life in the 1970s to stabilize society. These reforms were too limited to enact any real change, but enough to provide a glimmer of hope for the possibility of growing political involvement, leading to a civil society that would be continually bounded by limited pluralism. Several groups were unable to gain stable political control in 2011, because of the prevalence of repressive political institutions that prevented their ability to organize and mobilize (Brownlee, 2015, 40-60). Yet, while Nasser was simultaneously an advocate for secularism and Pan-Arabism, he could not reject the cultural importance of Islam. These two contradictory ideas greatly influenced Egyptian civil society during his rule. This complicated dynamic, combined with the influx of more modern principles like political representation within an autocracy, led to domestic unrest and instability that would culminate for decades until the Arab Spring protests.

Social Justice

This dynamic was further complicated through Nasser's policy of social justice that enabled Egyptian society to be open to modern political pluralism. This emerging political pluralism was rooted in Nasser's contrasting 'modern' policies of Pan-Arabism and secularism. One of the focuses during his leadership was to advocate for social justice through the implementation of Arab socialism. Social justice can be defined as providing an equal distribution of wealth, access to social empowerment and social mobility (Al-Shalabi, 2003, 230-214). For example, policies that held these aspects of socialism and social justice included the redistribution of land from the elites to peasant classes subsequently empowering all of Egyptian society (Al-Shalabi, 2003; Choueir, 2002, 650-656). Through these policies, Egyptians capitalized on modern principles like social mobility, wealth equality, and economic development.

The definition of "modernity" is often associated with Western values regarding progress and political ideology, often implicitly indicating a type of orientalism, when comparing the modernization of the Middle East to the West (Selim, 2015, 180-185; Lewis, 2002, 150-160; Said, 1978, 330-345; Habib, 2005). However, within the context of this paper, modernization is separated from "Westernization", or the practice of adopting Western values. For this paper, modernization is defined as the creation of an industrialized market economy, government that operates within a sovereign nation state, and the inclusion of an educated and involved civil society that can be represented through political pluralism (Al-Shalabi, 2003, 303-322; Thomas, 2011; Habib, 2005). Therefore Nasser's modernization of Egyptian society created a well-educated, complex, and mobilized public. Nasser's policies such as nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, and giving greater Parliamentary independence from the Executive in 1967, illustrated a slight shift from political repression to liberalization (Mansfield, 1973, 680-688). These policies also represented how Nasser's ideas of socialism could be the means of reaching the ends of social justice (Mansfield, 1973, 680-688; Cleveland, 2016, 286-305). These policies helped create a sense of nationalism that would instill confidence and unity throughout civil society, and a demand for political participation that would only grow up until the Arab Spring as the demands were continually left unanswered (Mansfield, 1973, 688). These institutional shifts, combined with a more well-informed and nationalized Egyptian public, would be the foundation for Egyptians wanting more liberalized policies in future decades.

Historical Challenges with Nasser's Leadership

Many of these small, politically liberalizing reforms offered by Nasser were largely unfulfilled or only slightly expanded upon through the coming decades. The promise of political representation would continue throughout Egypt's history, only to cause small incremental reforms. As a result, Egyptian politics and civil society liberalized and differing political Islamist and secular ideologies gained popular support, though they never gained full political representation. The establishment of an autocratic Republic in 1952 had institutionalized political repression and militarism, keeping these political undercurrents repressed. Several political and Islamist groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) demanded representation for decades, only to be met with small domestic reforms such as allowing limited political liberalization, a slight decrease in censorship, and opening up Egypt's single party, the National Democratic Party, under Sadat's presidency (Farid, 1996; Kenney, 2012, 427-440). Ultimately, these reforms were limited and unsubstantial as most Egyptians were still excluded from the political process.

Egypt's Republic therefore became a type of 'liberalized autocracy' by continually allowing for some representation, only to resort to brutal repression enforced by Egypt's military structure, thus creating a fragmented and unstable type of authoritarianism (Cook, 2017, 47). It became evident in 2011 that the “cohesion of repressive forces were pivotal in determining whether regimes cracked down or broke down”, and Egypt’s fractured authoritarian rule would ultimately break down the regime (Brownlee, 2015, 15). Egypt’s historical predisposition to radical regime change comes from a romanticization of Nasser’s rise to power that is associated with Egypt’s establishment as a sovereign state. Egypt’s repressed pluralized autocracy, military structure, and precedent for radical regime created an institutionalized foundation of principles that would act as a powder keg for the Arab Spring. Public demand for political representation would culminate over decades of repression to a breaking point in the protests of 2011 (Lynch, 2014).

Authoritarian Pluralism

The influx of modern principles, like having an educated and involved civil society, usually leads to democracy because political pluralism causes new groups to demand representation and involvement in government in order to represent citizens’ interests (Thomas, 2011). Subsequently, Nasser’s policies inspired the public to advocate for modern principles such as political representation. However, throughout the 1950s-60s Nasser also implemented stringent authoritarian militarism (Cleveland, 2016, 286-325). This complicated dynamic caused Egypt to experience a contradictory political environment that was torn between allowing for political pluralism and maintaining stability through authoritarianism.

This would be the framework in which subsequent “leaders [in these countries] [would] permit more open politics in which political parties operated relatively freely” (Cook, 2017, 45). This created a “counterintuitive idea of liberalized autocracy in which Middle Eastern authoritarians skillfully manage political challenge through political openings” (Cook, 2017, 47). So while Nasser’s regime did indeed start decades of repressive authoritarianism, the modern principles of Pan-Arabism, secularism, and social justice created a unique political environment that was repressive yet occasionally open to limited political pluralism. This dichotomy explains how Egypt's trajectory after Nasser struggled between these norms of strict authoritarian rule and restrained representation.

Military-Security Structure

Nasser's leadership also created a powerful politically involved, military-security-apparatus that was instrumental in both enforcing authoritarianism and also consolidating political rule. Egypt's formative years of self-governance in the 1950s was defined not only by the precedent of radical regime change, but also the important responsibility of the military in enabling that regime change. The historical role of the military is evident in the fact that Nasser rose to power through a military-led *coup,* and the establishment of the Republic in 1953 was led by a Revolutionary Command Council in which martial law was established. These events set a precedent that encouraged the military to be instrumental in controlling Egyptian politics for decades. The prominence of the military in Egyptian society is demonstrated by the fact that "10.8% of Egypt's population is engaged in various branches of the security apparatus…high by world standards" (Bellin, 2004, 147). Since Nasser's institutionalization of militarism, the military-security-apparatus' power grew over decades and was responsible for crushing opposition, dissent, and protest through brutal domestic crackdowns that involved mass arrests, surveillance and torture. As a result "the state's coercive capacity and will has led to harsh repression of civil society; consequently, many popular forces have been reluctant to mobilize politically," (Bellin, 2004, 146). The military-apparatus' continual repressive force combined with insignificant political reforms, built up public dissent for decades, eventually catalyzing Egyptians to call for representation and an end to institutionalized repression in 2011.

The role of the military-security-apparatus in Egypt had always been to protect the regime and assert a Republican autocracy. The historical prominence of the military-security-apparatus in helping regime change in 1952 meant the military was predisposed to political involvement (Belin, 2004, 142-145; Cleveland 2016, 286-325). Subsequently, the military *coup* in 1952 would seemingly foreshadow the aftermath of the protests in 2011 as "the military took the reins of power withdrawing from Mubarak, while Islamists and their non-Islamist rivals failed to construct a durable coalition that would enshrine the principle of civilian sovereignty in a country long bereft of it" (Brownlee, 2015, 11). Once it became apparent that the several secular, Islamist, and various political groups after the 2011 protests were unable to consolidate rule, a power vacuum was created in which the military was the primary suitable force able to impose regulations to a more representative democracy, such as through establishing deadlines for elections. However, the very resilience and brutality of the military-security apparatus that had helped cause the protests, also allowed the military to centralize political power and assert a military dictatorship in 2013 under General Sisi, continuing authoritarian repression in Egypt once again. Therefore, Egypt's repressive Republic and military-security-apparatus was more suited for protest and regime change due to institutionalized norms and precedents established in the country's historical past.

Precedent of Radical Regime Change

The rise and leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser also gave Egypt a predisposition to radical regime change and set a precedent for future political reform. Nasser came to power through forming the Association of Free Officers in 1949, which was made up of military members, communists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Wafdists. The Free Officers seized power in July of 1952 through a *coup d'etat*, forced King Faruq to abdicate, and established a Republic and martial law in 1953. The Egyptian monarchy was abolished, political parties were outlawed, and Nasser thereafter consolidated authoritarian rule that utilized militarism (Farid, 1996; Cleveland, 2016, 286-325). Egypt's path out of colonial oppression and into sovereign self-rule was defined by these characteristics. After 1952, radical regime change and *coups* were embedded as social norms in Egyptian society, and therefore viable options for political change. Since human behavior is based on existing institutional and cultural norms, it can be extrapolated that 1952 served as a model for Egyptian politics for decades, up until the 2011 Arab Spring and 2013 military *coup*, since these events parallel Egypt's history (Mansfield, 1973, 670-680). Nasser's rule further institutionalized these norms as the events took place during a formative and impressionable time in Egypt's early history as a sovereign state.

Contrasting Saudi Arabia's Suppressive yet Stable Authoritarianism

In understanding why Egypt experienced protests in 2011 that overthrew President Mubarak, it must be asked why did Saudi Arabia, a similarly repressive but conservative totalitarian monarchy, remain stable throughout the region's protests. Saudi Arabia's leaders during the 1950s-1970s were King Saud followed by King Faisal, who utilized monarchical rule, close control over the military and centralized leadership guided by conservative theological principles, ultimately creating a repressed but stable society. The first reason that explains why Saudi Arabia did not have mass protest while Egypt did is because Saudi Arabia's totalitarian monarchy was more suited to continued repression and stability than Egypt's Republican autocracy. One of the common patterns found throughout the Middle East regarding the Arab Spring, is that "all of the Arab republics except Lebanon have experienced protests...whereas the monarchies have been much more stable" (Lynch, 2014, 71). Monarchies have a predisposition to stability more than newly established or weak Republics due to their ability to draw on traditional legitimacy, oppress an already usually weak civil society and centralize authority through one leader or family (Weber, 1946; Menaldo, 2012, 707-

709; Özev, 2017). The Al-Saud family has governed most of the Arabian Peninsula for almost a full century. Saudi Arabia's leaders during the 1950s-1970s were King Saud and Faisal, who both enforced totalitarian monarchical regimes (Axelgard, 2001, 169-175; Özev, 2017, 999-1009). Saudi Arabia's conservative government was better suited to suppress protest than Egypt's since "a liberalized autocracy...backed by a military-security apparatus has clear disadvantages over many monarchies" (Lynch, 2014, 48). Egypt is a prime example of a liberalized autocracy with a strong influence of militarism that crumbled under the pressure of several opposition movements that united across religious or ideological lines to oppose the regime. Egypt's history of Nasserism and radical regime change created a type of liberalized Republican autocracy that set a precedent for repression, but also political pluralism. Adversely, Saudi Arabia's rulers did not allow for any sort of political or ideological pluralism, and there was no "opening up" of Saudi Arabia's civil society compared to Egypt's. Therefore, liberalized autocratic Republics are inherently more unstable and prone to political divisions and revolt, while repressive authoritarian monarchies are more successful in crushing public dissent and protest.

The second reason as to why Saudi Arabia did not experience an Arab Spring is due to the fact that the monarchy maintains all power and holds close control over its military, while the military was an independent politicized force in Egypt. Egypt's military was not only instrumental in furthering the repression that led to the protests, but was also an autonomous force that helped protestors overthrow Mubarak, and then consolidated political rule in 2013. The royal family in Saudi Arabia has a much stronger hold over the country's military than Egypt's Republic over the large military-security apparatus. While this is partially because the Saudi Arabia's monarchy is more successful in consolidating repressive rule, the Saudi military has not had the same influential role in regime change and political life as the Egyptian military (Cook, 2017, 40-68; Axelgard, 2001). Saudi Arabia's military does not have the political autonomy or experience in instigating radical regime change through a *coup* compared to Egypt. As a result, the military is more closely aligned with the monarchy and able to suppress opposition, while Egyptians targeted both the regime and military as instigators of repression.

Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian army has been described as a "family affair" rife with patrimonialism, while the military in Egypt is "highly institutionalized" (Bellin, 2004, 149). Egypt's institutionalized military was also highly politicized since it came to power along with Nasser's authoritarian system of government, and it "was backed by strong security forces and Egypt had many of the aspects of a police state" (Mansfield, 1973, 686). While both militaries served as a check on suppressing opposing political groups, the more autonomous the military the more likely military elites are able to assert power and eventually obtain possible leadership positions. This explains why the Egyptian military stopped firing on protestors in 2011 and was the pivotal player in removing Mubarak from power, once siding with the protestors. It also illustrates how the military was able to successfully consolidate power by forming an authoritarian military regime in 2013, after overturning the elected Muslim Brotherhood (Cook, 2017, 201-236). Contrarily, since Saudi Arabia's military lacks this political autonomy, their military is more likely to align with the monarchy's choices and be more effective in crushing political opposition in support of the current regime and retain the status quo.

The third reason as to why Saudi Arabia was able to curtail an Arab Spring was due to leadership being guided by strict conservative, theological principles which promoted a repressed but homogeneous and stable society. Nasser's principles of Pan-Arabism and secularism inspired political pluralism, developing a strong civil society that created different political groups and ideological viewpoints (Mansfield, 1973, 678). Saudi Arabia has always portrayed itself as the representatives of the origins of Islam, and the country holds two of the religion's most holy cities, Mecca and Medina. As a result, Islam, namely Sharia Law and Wahhabism, is the guiding principle for the totalitarian monarchy and encompasses all of society: "Islam permeates the society in a web-like fashion. It is the dominant feature of the common ground between Saudi society and the ruling family" (Axelgard, 2001, 173). Egypt was experiencing a slight liberalization of politics through the promotion of secularism that simultaneously conflicted with Islamism, while Saudi Arabia remained steadfast in its sole promotion of Sharia Law. Furthermore, King Faisal's leadership in the 1960s further institutionalized conservative theological principles by using Nasser's socialist Republic and secular policies as a negative foil to Saudi Arabia, furthering centralizing the Saudis' conservative rule and the public's obedience (Mann, 2012, 749-755). While Egypt's history was greatly defined by Nasser's rule that created a paradoxical but pluralistic liberalized autocracy and heterogeneous civil society that fostered an environment for protest, Saudi Arabia had a homogenous political society that was able to prevent the evolution of an Arab Spring.

Alternative Explanations

Poor Economic Development

There are several attempts to explain why two similar countries in the Middle East experienced alternative paths to 2011. One of the common alternative explanations for why Egypt experienced an Arab Spring while Saudi Arabia did not was due to Egypt's low economic development and successive instability. This argument is faulty for several reasons. Firstly, while the country undoubtedly had economic struggles and vast amounts of the population experienced unemployment and poverty which only contributed to domestic unrest, the economy is not as pivotal in explaining Egypt's Arab Spring compared to its history. While Egypt did have a struggling economy, it certainly wasn’t as dire as other countries across the world: “with regard to fiscal health…few face economic collapse of sub-Saharan proportions” (Bellin, 2004, 147). Since Sub-Saharan Africa did not experience mass protests yet has far worse economies and unemployment rates, for example, and so this reasoning falls short for explaining Egypt’s protests. The population’s in Sub-Saharan Africa also have a negative perception of their country’s economic standing, while the Egyptian populous’ understanding of their nation’s economic status had been improving in the years leading up to the Arab Spring (Bellin, 2004, 147-150; Cook 2017).

Secondly, it’s additionally important to note a trend in the decade leading up to 2011 that showed Arab youths in Egypt and across the Middle East were “more satisfied with the current economic conditions of their countries and more optimistic that conditions will improve in the coming years” than previous decades or generations (Lynch, 2014, 283). While the years preceding 2011 did experience a rise in global food prices, it’s not probable that youth mobilization regarding this issue would alter that quickly and dramatically, thus ultimately being the catalyst for mass protest. Even more so, “Egypt’s [GDP] continued to grow at 4.7 and 5.2 percent in the two years before the uprising of January 25, 2011” (Cook, 2017, 65). Therefore, even despite the rising public dissent towards increased food prices, the Egyptian economy as a whole was not in as dire conditions as is often portrayed and the majority of the Egyptian population's perception of their nation’s economic success was increasing positively right before the Arab Spring.

Thirdly, Egypt has received substantial financial aid from countries such as the US, in an effort to assert stability and prevent the country’s economy from spiraling out of control. For example, “since 1948 the US has transferred almost $80 billion in the form of military assistance and economic aid to Egypt” including food aid in the 1940s, and economic assistance in the 1970s, so as to prevent drastic domestic economic instability (Cook, 2017, 42 & 226). In response one could argue that international economic aid only hurt the Egyptian government's ability to assert effective economic autonomy. Yet it was evident that "Egypt...does tax its citizens to varying degrees of effectiveness", nullifying this counter argument (Cook, 2017, 41). Therefore, despite apparent economic disparities and struggles, Egypt's economy held a suitable degree of autonomy, and was not disastrous enough to be a pivotal factor in causing mass unrest and political protest.

Influence of Oil

The second alternative explanation for why Egypt experienced an Arab Spring while Saudi Arabia did not is related to the economic conditions of the countries directly correlated to the influence of oil. Many scholars argue that Saudi Arabia is successful in asserting their repressive monarchy and keeping dissent quiet (Diamond, 2010; Gause, 2010, 25-35), due to the fact that "the most resilient regimes were those that held oil wealth" (Brownlee, 2015, 214). It is argued that oil allows the country to operate as a rentier state "in the sense that they depend heavily on oil and gas rents to keep their states afloat," and as a result "most are so awash in cash that they do not need to tax their own citizens...they fail to develop the organic expectations of accountability that emerge when states make citizens pay taxes" (Diamond, 2010, 97-98). However, this argument cannot serve as a truly encompassing valid explanation for why Egypt experienced protests since the country has its own oil and natural gas deposits.

Of course, however, these deposits are substantially smaller compared to Saudi Arabia's deposits. Yet, if oil was the central reason as to why unrest and protests occurred then why did Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco - three states with the lowest oil and natural gas incomes per capita - experience fewer protests than states with modest per capita incomes from hydrocarbon resources, such as Egypt (Lynch, 2014, 70)? If the amount of oil a country held was the central characteristic that determined whether a regime was able to buy off protestors and successfully oppress opposition, there would have been a vastly different pattern of protests across the region. For example Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco would have experienced vastly more protests as a result of the fact oil wealth did not help their economy and could not silent popular dissent. It must be concluded, then, that oil is not as instrumental in curtailing public opposition or dissent compared to the historical impact of monarchical oppression versus liberalized autocracy.

International Actors' Intervention

The third alternative explanation for why Egypt may have experienced an Arab Spring is due to the influence of international actors, specifically the US, affecting the country's domestic politics. For example, Cook states how leading up to the 2011 protests, "the Muslim Brotherhood believed that the close ties between Washington and Cairo had weakened Egypt and compromised its regional leadership role" (2016, 203). This neocolonial argument presents a narrative in which the United States' interventionist policies were in support of the authoritarian and repressive autocracies in Egypt in return for stability (Bellin, 2004, 143-148). It is argued this caused Egyptians to feel that their countries regional leadership was undermined, and Egyptians did not trust their own government because they viewed US economic intervention as a threat to their sovereignty (Bellin, 2004, 143-148). However, this narrative is biased because it equates US economic aid with political intervention. It is true that the United States favored the brutal regime of Hosni Mubarak, believing an authoritarian Republic was more beneficial to US interests in the Middle East compared to an Islamist regime. Yet, the United States' influence on Egypt was mainly through economic aid and diplomatic support, not through meddling in elections, influencing policy, or overthrowing regimes (Cook, 2017, 42 & 226). While the U.S. certainly has its fair share of dark stains in history through its interventionist policies in Middle Eastern governments and politics, the United States has never directly intervened in Egypt's political elections or government compared to other colonial powers such as Britain (Spiers, 2004; Scott 1996). This is further corroborated by the fact that once Mubarak's government was overthrown, the US took a "hands off" approach and strongly encouraged free elections in Egypt to take place, despite the country's fear that the Muslim Brotherhood may come into power (Cook, 2017, 201-236).

So if the Egyptian public perceived that their regional leadership was undermined, it was primarily due to the political fragmentation that was occurring as a contradictory liberalized autocracy struggled to consolidate legitimate rule through repressive means. Furthermore, the period of Nasser's leadership were defining years of Egypt's political trajectory and was also when colonialism's effects in the country, and US intervention, were drastically weakened (Mansfield, 1973, 676-680). Therefore, the United States' international political involvement in Egypt was not only mainly through economic aid and never through direct political involvement. Additionally, this economic intervention was also after the country's most important developmental period (Mansfield, 1973 675-682). Additionally, the United States' gave similar, if not more, diplomatic support to Saudi Arabia's theocratic monarchy throughout recent decades, which did not experience an Arab Spring. To conclude, America's political intervention is not a sufficient alternative to explain the differences in Arab Spring's, because the US was more politically involved with Saudi Arabia and never directly affected Egyptian politics or autonomy.

Conclusion

A country's history greatly defines and influences a nation's people, what they stand for, and who they will become in the future. Egypt's formative years of post-colonial, sovereign, self-governed rule, was greatly influenced by Nasser and his policies. Through his leadership that modernized Egypt, his policies involving secularism and Pan-Arabism inspired the country for decades, his leadership institutionalized a norm and precedent for radical regime change, and his institutions created a repressive politicized military-security-apparatus. His actions created a paradoxical environment in which Egyptians faced both the prospect of a Republic that held the promise of political representation, while also instituting repressive autocracy strife with brutal institutionalized militarism. This created a foundation that was well suited for protest and regime change, as Egypt's relationship between balancing pluralism and authoritarianism continued for decades, and unsurprisingly came to a boiling point in 2011. Contrastingly, Saudi Arabia has never faltered in its theocratic, monarchical totalitarianism that is successful in suppressing dissidents through its promotion of a homogenous political society. There is immense truth to the saying that to understand the present one has to look to the past. Egypt experienced an Arab Spring while Saudi Arabia did not due to Egypt's experiences under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser that created a framework which simultaneously liberated and repressed civil society. It was Egypt's history, shaped by Nasser's leadership that cultivated the environment that served as a political matchbox, empowering civil society to take a stand and become the match.

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Somalia and the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States: Gender Equality as the Key to Peace-building and State-building Success

Tabitha Mirza, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Abstract

The current methods which development agencies use to engage with fragile and conflict-affected states are in need of serious improvement. Transitioning out of fragility is a decades-long political process that requires a significant investment from multiple global partners. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, or the "New Deal," is a landmark global policy agreement that seeks to change traditional development cooperation from a donor-to-recipient transfer model to that of an equal partnership between governments and development partners, thereby seeking to reinforce country-owned and country-led strategies out of fragility. The Federal Republic of Somalia is one of several self-identified fragile and conflicted-affected member states participating in the g7+ New Deal Pilot Program. Since the 1960s, Somali conceptions of gender identity have undergone substantial changes as a result of conflict and peace-making processes. Having made a substantial commitment to the prioritization of women and girls' inclusion in the nation's peace-building and state-building objectives, Somalia's effort has been praised for its promotion of gender equality. There is significant literature on the *United Nations Security Council Landmark Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security* and which supports gender equality in peace-building and state-building processes. However, this article will use evidence from Somalia to showcase how liberal feminist and standpoint feminist programs are privileged over post-structural and institutional feminist perspectives that would otherwise drastically transform the New Deal's implementation and its potential for success.

Keywords: Somalia, New Deal, fragile states, feminist theory, gender, post-conflict reconstruction, international aid, peace-building, state-building, sexual and gender-based violence

Introduction

The *United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda* sets out a reinvigorated framework for international development aid agencies, governments, and local actors, marking a new era for development. Among the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs), *SDG16: Peace, Justice, and Institutions* calls for the international community to change how they engage with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS) in upcoming peace-building and state-building (PBSB) efforts (Cordaid 2015). The new agenda for bringing peace to the world's most conflict-affected areas is emboldened by the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (New Deal), a landmark global policy agreement which calls upon international development and aid actors to align and coordinate PBSB projects in FCAS with nationally identified needs and aspirations (IDPS, 2012). The New Deal is characterized by its foundational *Five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals* (PSGs) and enforces the idea that pathways out of fragility must be country-led and country-owned (IDPS, 2012). For this reason, many scholars assert that the New Deal represents a fresh and notable reorientation and rebalancing of power between the Global North and Global South (Kumuyi, 2017; Horst, 2017; Hearn, 2016; Goodwin, 2014).

Noting this disruption to the orthodox approaches of development in FCAS, there is greater anticipation that feminist precedence enshrined in international law and policy documentation will be a defining component of local, national, and global PBSB projects, potentially demonstrating an authentic dedication to meaningfully engaging women and girls – who have otherwise been ignored – into development practice. However, following the debatable success of the *2000-2015 United Nations Millennium Development Goals*, feminist scholars caution that these political, economic, and social transformation processes may not only continue to exclude women and girls, but are also likely to miss "one of the most significant systems shaping power relations worldwide

– gender" (El-Bushra, 2012; Goodwin, 2014; EARF, 2017, p. 8). Though international development institutions often rhetorically acknowledge the ways in which traditional development efforts rely on and reproduce gendered power relations, these institutions still fail to identify, analyze, and adapt to countries' contexts in their attempt to influence these inequalities – a critical factor when programming for inclusive PBSB in FCAS (Cordaid, 2015; EARF, 2017).

The Federal Republic of Somalia represents one of seven self-identified FCAS that are part of the g7+ pilot program, which have all made several commitments toward completing their New Deal mandate (IDPS, 2012). In this forward-looking paper, I explore whether Somalia's promise to engage women and girls alongside men and boys is a critical component in all aspects of their PBSB objectives, and how Somalia will comprehensively apply the conception of gender equality into its research, policy, and project initiatives (Horst, 2017). Though gender approaches were once ridiculed or thought inconsequential to sustainable development, the convergence of global perceptions of gender as it relates to security, governance, and economics as a determining factor in alleviating violent conflict, reducing widespread abject poverty and remedying state instability signifies a unique transformation and characterization of the next era for sustainable PBSB outcomes in FCAS (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Given this notable shift in attitudes toward gender and development, it is vital to triangulate relevant scholarly debates with data and policy specific to Somalia in order to study the likeliness for significant outcomes in PBSB. In the first section, this work will introduce the New Deal, and will then list relevant feminist theoretical positions as they relate conflict and peacebuilding to the conception of gender in Somali history and identity. Next, it will examine the implementation of two of the five PSGs in Somalia: PSG1: *legitimate politics* and PSG2: *strengthening people's security*. Lastly, recommendations for SDG16 and New Deal success will be provided in the discussion and conclusion section.

What is The New Deal and Why Somalia?

The New Deal was negotiated by the *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding* (IDPS). The IDPS is the singular "international multi-constituency platform" for PBSB and is composed of the g7+ group of self-identified countries in fragile, conflicted-affected situations (Hearn, 2017, p. 10). Functionally, the New Deal uniquely calls for FCAS and their development partners to follow the principles and methodologies of *F.O.C.U.S.* (strategies for country-led pathways out of fragility) and *T.R.U.S.T.* (instruments to ensure aid effectiveness), as well as for the PSGs to "broaden the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance" (IDPS, 2012; UN, 2015, p. 1). Along with SDG16, these principles serve as a guide towards strengthening the FCAS' national institutions by linking international cooperation with local organizations whose work seeks to prevent violence, promote democracy and champion inclusive policy-making (UN, 2015).

Somalia collapsed in 1991, falling in and out of civil war for more than two decades. Mobilized by inter-clan dynamics and conflicts, war in Somalia continues today, reinforcing a complicated nexus of severe and deeply rooted implications for Somali women and men (Bradbury, 2009). In addition to infrastructural, institutional and social destruction, the experience of the Somali people has been devastating – people have been robbed, killed, abandoned, genitally mutilated, raped, forcibly married, and/or coerced into sexual slavery (Horst, 2017). Despite its pledge to the MDGs, the *2015 UNDP Human Development Report* ranked Somalia among the lowest countries globally on the *Gender Inequality Index*, with a rating of 0.776 (Walker, 2017). However, the case of Somalia in the context of the New Deal is still significant because it is the only g7+ pilot country that has aligned its national priorities and budget with the PSGs (Donais et al., 2016). Therefore, although Somalia is considered to be failed state, there is wide consensus by the *International Network on Conflict and Fragility* and g7+ members that Somalia is successfully navigating through New Deal processes thus far (Donais et al., 2016). Since Somalia is proving to be a model for g7+ countries, it is important to analyze the degree to which gender considerations have been actualized in the nation's New Deal implementation in the pursuit of PBSB.

Theoretical Debates

Although conflict is logically understood as "the opposite of development," where "war is development in reverse," constructivist thinkers argue that conflict is inherent to development (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2016, p. 415). Indeed, when inquiring into war historically and sociologically, violence can be a double-edged sword. In the same way that the causes of conflict catalyze the breakdown of society and state, in an era of rapid globalization, conflict exposes the social, political, and economic relations from which a foundation for a contextualized PBSB strategy can be appropriately formed (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012; Kaldor, 2006). This is not to say constructivists prefer conflict, but rather that the customary realist blueprint for PBSB – which prioritizes fiscal liberalization and urgent democratic reform in FCAS – can be avoided.

Since the adoption of the *United Nations Security Council Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security* (S/RES/1325), PBSB carries a new energy, in that it seeks to secure peace and institutional growth by means of gender mainstreaming (Baranyi, 2008). The consensus among feminist scholarship has not proven unanimous, however, with distinct perspectives emanating from liberal feminism, standpoint feminism, post-structural and institutional feminism. The friction arising from these feminist camps often reveals itself in the midst of debate critiquing Northern governments, donors, and international development agencies' traditional imposition over Southern states when engaging in 'development' (El-Bushra, 2012). Thematically, the aforementioned categories of gender and feminist theory as they relate to PBSB programming are briefly described below.

The majority of liberal feminist scholarship aims to address women's invisibility in PBSB by removing legal obstacles to women's inequality (Hudson, 2005). It has been criticized for its "gender-blindness" because it fits into the mold of realism by merely calling for the enlarged participation of women in PBSB processes by achieving targets or meeting quotas (El-Bushra, 2012, p. 4; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Moreover, it can be convincingly argued that liberal feminism lacks the radical potential to challenge and change oppressive top-down PBSB systems because it uncritically integrates women into mainstream security approaches without "questioning the dominant assumptions" of realism (Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 55). By masquerading as being in the "pursuit of a norm equality," liberal feminism reproduces "existing meanings of what constitutes human kind" and further homogenizes the role of women in development (Donais et al., 2016, p. 292; Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012; Hudson, 2005). Indeed, the likeliness for significantly different gendered impacts and outcomes in PBSB under a liberal feminist framework are limited in scope or not possible at all (Hudson, 2005; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Mosedale, 2014).

Standpoint feminism challenges the essentialism of liberal feminism by calling for gender (as opposed to women) as a category for analysis in and of itself (Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014). However, reductionist interpretations of women's experiences in PBSB through standpoint feminist perspectives still prevail. Such that standpoint feminism regards "gender as constitutive," the perspective places undue emphasis on women's contribution "to political security and thinking" as naturally at odds or in complete disagreement with the position of men (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 53-55; Hudson, 2005; Mosedale, 2014). Additionally, standpoint feminism reductively circumscribes “what counts as feminist” by insisting that women theorize from the “standpoint of their experiences of gender, race, class, and other oppressions” as though femininity is inherently inconsistent with masculinity (Mosedale, 2014, p. 1118). Indeed, standpoint feminism is most visible in models that follow S/RES/1325, in which liberal feminist notions of women as ‘more vulnerable’ or ‘more peaceful’ than men are reproduced (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Furthermore, the presentation of women’s suffering as part of a homogenous global ‘sisterhood’ or ‘group’ under patriarchy further reinforces a “dichotomized universalism” which romanticizes the victimhood of women, reinforces men’s stereotypical domination, and subjugates or erases the overlapping security needs of people in the Global South generally (Hudson, 2005, p. 159; Mosedale, 2014).

Post-structural and institutional feminism are “gender-relational” approaches which call for a “radical decentering of biological explanations of social relations” and ask in what ways gender is made a meaningful point of reference when evaluating the vertices of state, security, and social relations (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014, p. 55; El-Bushra, 2012). In this way, false dichotomies of men as aggressors and women as victims can be avoided, or at least critically approached. Post-structural and institutional feminist perspectives have persistently rallied against these “so-called master narratives” by connecting diverse identities with individual experiences “in a particular location to wider regional and global structures and processes” (Hudson, 2005, p. 155-159). Post-structural and institutional feminism posits that implementing a feminist approach to PBSB is not “merely a matter of adding women,” but rather an opportunity to rethink “the way in which power functions to shape the world around us” (McLeod, 2015, p. 49). An emphasis on gender difference that is historically and spatially contextualized allows feminists in the Global South to investigate, recover, and produce knowledge on their own memories, conceptualizations, and interpretations of conflict without Northern interference (Hudson, 2005; McLeod, 2015). Indeed, by emphasizing that people experience overlapping and contextually based realities in conflict, post-structural and institutional feminism challenge the "prescriptive nature" of feminist political commitment by questioning the degree to which traditional feminist frameworks reproduce "universalizing" and "exclusionary tendencies" in PBSB (Hudson, 2005, p. 159).

Where realists have been criticized for top-down approaches that fixate on state building, securitization, and economic reform, post-structural and institutional feminism better reflect the inclusivity agenda which calls to "reshape what peacebuilding is and how it is practiced" by procedurally including a broader spectrum of actors into PBSB processes (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Donais et al., 2016, p. 291). Though it can be argued that each feminist approach normalizes gender mainstreaming in development by varying degrees, post-structural and institutional feminism strengthen the rise of the inclusivity norm within PBSB debates by requiring that national and international actors first consult with the population, especially marginalized and vulnerable groups, in order to mitigate harm and achieve sustainable, peaceful outcomes (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Horst, 2017). Although the central exclusion of women and vulnerable populations is accordingly noted, an evaluation of the feminist paradigm commonly threading Somalia's New Deal programming together has yet to be undertaken until now.

Feminist Perspectives and Somali Identity

It is important to note that although men and women may experience degrees of violence and peace in differing ways, liberal and standpoint gender analyses of conflict will often make cultural assumptions about the role of femininity and masculinity in relation to violence and peace: men as perpetrators of violence, and women as victims; women as peaceful mediators, and men as blockers; and so on (Okoth & Gardner, 2013; Oker, 2010).

Somali women and men embody a complex sense of identity, characteristically defined by clan affiliation, art and culture, and a relationship with their agricultural livelihoods. Somali women are often portrayed as one-dimensional victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), famine, and war. They are even portrayed as possible intermediary peace brokers between rivalling clan members with whom they share relations, such as their husbands and fathers (Jama, 2010). A lack of evidence showcasing Somali women's historical contributions to peace-making may have intense implications for understanding the current context of women's political engagement in Somalia. For this reason, the *Peace Research Institute Oslo* (PRIO), through their *2015 Gender in Politics in Somalia* (GENSOM) project, recorded the past experiences of Somali women in civic engagement, as well as their perspectives on their senses of identity today (EARF, 2017; Tryggestad et al., 2015). The research found that many women often described the *1969-1991 Barre Regime* as the "Golden Age" for Somali women, since during that time women enjoyed increased formal political rights with the introduction of the "highly controversial" *1975 Family Law*, which afforded them legal rights to inheritance and land (Mohamud, 2015, p. 3). However, clarifying that Barre's regime before the onset of war in 1991 only benefitted some women, another group of Somali women found that young women today have access to a greater wealth of resources in the international fora, such as opportunities to attain higher education, start a business, or be involved in high-level political engagement (Mohamud, 2015). These narratives underscore the relations between power, discourse, political institutions, and structural violence within a specific time and space (Hudson, 2015). Indeed, they reiterate a post-structural feminist drive to resist privileging particular representations of identity, and instead give more energy to the socioeconomic mapping of the "international political economy of insecurity, violence, and peacebuilding" (Suhrke & Wimpelmann, 2012, p. 147; Hudson, 2015). Moreover, understanding gender norms – the attitudes and influence emanating from and being created by them – is central to any programming that seeks to achieve reconciliation in PBSB.

In this way, masculinity cannot be described as the root of "any particular conflict;" rather, it "interacts with other factors to produce conflict and violence," where conflict is often "fueled by a legitimate sense of anger at oppression or exclusion" (Wright, 2014, p. 37). Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge and address these factors independently. *Feminist Security Studies* (FSS) would highlight that just as measuring gendered grievances of conflict is a critical factor in PBSB, it is equally important to understand how "protection is distributed between men and women" (Olsson, 2009, p. 45). Even when disregarding the notion that all groups will be protected equally from the "threats that affect their security," there is still a central problem in assuming that men and women always "experience different degrees of quality of the same peace" (Olsson, 2009). For example, as Hudson evidences, "privatized security infrastructure such as high walls and compounds to protect aid workers shift from being metaphors for separation," becoming instead "real infrastructure of rule with gendered impacts" which exacerbate North-South inequalities (2015, p. 416-417). To this effect, ongoing PBSB efforts that seek to strengthen gender awareness, reduce violence, and improve the protection of women and men need to avoid reinforcing structural divides between people, which inevitably fuel conflict. Certainly, a practical and in-depth perspective of the forms of peace that the international community "actually contributes" when "assisting with a resolution process" should be undertaken (Olsson, 2009, p. 54).

For the reasons above, the given success of a model following a post-structural and institutional feminist framework, where gender is a relational concept, could see productive PBSB initiatives in Somalia. Although it remains underutilized, as examined in the sections below, consideration for and technical approaches to this model are gaining popularity (Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Somalia, The New Deal and Gender

A number of national initiatives exhibit Somalia's drive to further include gender in PBSB processes in New Deal implementation. The *2017-2019 Somalia National Development Plan* (NDP) is rooted in feedback from citizens attained via cross-country and e-survey consultations with assistance from the *United Nations Development Programme*. Separate and distinct consultations were held with youth and women's groups in 2016, and recognition of their interests are specifically mentioned (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). The NDP cites the *1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) and S/RES/1325 as priority documentation guiding Somalia's PBSB goals, listing specific targets to reduce the incidence of SGBV by 20% by 2019 and increase women's political leadership up to 30% by 2019 (Gardner & El-Bushra, 2017; Federal Government of Somalia, 2017). However, many feminist thinkers argue that Somalia's New Deal implementation is frequently in line with liberal feminist perspectives, as indicated by its narrow commitment to improving women's socio-political experience through the achievement of targets and quotas (Kumuyi, 2017; Horst, 2017; Donais et al., 2016; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

The NDP notably features allotments of funding disbursement from aid donors, demonstrating that although "more aid for development was disbursed in the period 2013-2015 than in 2005-2012 combined" (US$1.81 bil. for the former, versus US$1.78 bil. for the latter), PSG5 (revenues and services) received the highest funding at 45%, whereas PSG1 (inclusive and legitimate politics) and PSG2 (strengthen people's security) received among the least, at 5% and

9% respectively (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017, p. 201). Although Somalia's *Compact* – the "roadmap for reconstruction" – promises to "recognize gender as a cross-cutting issue, bringing tangible results to its citizens," few or no tangible projects and indicators are provided to motivate donors' interests in the attainment to this goal (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014, p.11-12). Moreover, the federal government and international donors are not the only actors with gender near the bottom of their agendas. Produced in partnership with the UNDP, the *2016 E-Consultations Report* and the *2016 Gender Progress Report* captured the voice of Somalis on PSG-related opinions and values to inform the creation of the NDP in preparation for Somalia's *Fragility Assessments* (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Perceptions of the importance of women's equality were relatively low: respondents prioritized the goal to 'strengthen national financial and human resources systems,' while 'achieving gender equality' was ranked as the least important goal by 90% and 65% of respondents respectively (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Importantly, several feminist development practitioners and scholars have raised the issue that the NDP, Somali Compact, and Fragility Assessments were produced to curry favour among donors rather than to change state-society relations (Donais et al., 2016).

It is clear that the value perception of Somali women in social and political life needs to improve such that they are able to adequately participate in state formation and reconciliation processes (Horst, 2017; Fed. Rep. of Somalia, 2017). Somalia's inclusion of gender in the New Deal needs to go beyond a liberal feminist approach that prioritizes the "mere attendance of women at consultations" and should instead strengthen the capacity of its justice system to address the historical and ongoing grievances experienced in conflict by its peoples generally (Kumuyi, 2017, p. 101). These grievances include, but are not limited to, SGBV, such that it is in line with an inclusive post-structural and institutional feminism approach (Kumuyi, 2017).

PSG1 Legitimate Politics: Changing Gendered Attitudes

Since 1991, the Somali people have encountered more than 90 local peace initiatives and reconciliation conferences, many of which have used traditional conflict mediation practices under the leadership of clan elders, Islamic scholars, and other key stakeholders (Oker, 2010). As evidenced by ongoing civil war, grievances among Somali individuals and clans still remain (Oker, 2010). Despite the reasons for the failure of reconciliation leading to sustainable peace – which are commonly a consequence of the political elite, warlords, and the business class problematizing concessions in order to maintain their own financial or political power – there have been instances where reconciliation processes have produced fruitful results (Oker, 2010; Kaldor, 1999/2006).

Standing apart from other reconciliation conferences, the *2000 Arta Conference* held in Djibouti sought to achieve "country-ownership" by engaging a collaborative effort to end the civil war (Oker, 2010, p. 7). For the first time, warring factions, businesspeople, Islamic groups and the political elite were brought together to foster reconciliation and make key decisions for the future of the country (Jama, 2010). Although women were not initially invited, since they were not seen as significant civil society members, Somali feminist civil society activists were able to successfully convince then Djiboutian President, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, to secure seats for women in the conference as observers and voting members such that the conference coincided with the adoption of S/RES/1325 (Jama, 2010). The Arta Conference also witnessed a "political breakthrough" where members agreed to establish an interim government, the *Transitional National Government* (TNG), as well as to adopt the "4.5 Formula" which secured proportional representation of Somali clans in government and reserved 25% of seats in the Upper and Lower Parliaments for women (Bradbury, 2009; Bradbury et al., 2010, p. 17). Due to these efforts, the number of women represented in parliament saw a 47% increase between 2012-2016 (EARF, 2017). Consequentially, in May 2016, the Federal Government of Somalia agreed on the introduction of a 30% quota of seats legally reserved for women in both houses of the Federal Parliament (EARF, 2017). Despite these gains in high-level political office, there is still much to be understood about the majority of citizens' access to political participation in the achievement of the inclusivity goal as per the New Deal. Although quotas and reserved seating in parliament may have benefits for some women or minority clan members, the extent to which their prescence is translated into meaningful influence and power remains contested (Horst, 2017). According to the E-Consultations, the majority of Somali men and women feel excluded: out of the 60% of respondents who stated that the political system does not allow or insufficiently allows public participation, 50% were women and 63% were men (EARF, 2017; Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016).

To that end, the NDP lists priorities featuring commitments to bringing peace through inclusive governance by means of deepening its partnerships with a variety of development actors (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Specifically, these partnerships include the first phase of the *2017 Joint Programme on Women's Political Participation, Leadership, and Empowerment,* implemented by the UNDP, the *Somali Multi Partnertrust Fund*, and the *United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia* (UNSOM), under the leadership of Somalia's *Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development* (UNDP, 2017). The project qualified to what extent the representation of Somali women in leadership positions was translated into meaningful influence, and also attempted to uncover the difficulties men and women face when trying to make a difference in a political environment, as discussed below (EARF, 2017).

Across literature, it is evident that women's rights activists and women working in government are viewed as separate entities who do not share a common goal, and that there is perhaps a culture of competition between them (EARF, 2017). Though Somali women lobbied for quotas encouraging women's representation in government, the Joint Programme recognized that training everyday women to navigate through informal political structures could expand opportunities for them to connect across sectors and have positive outcomes for their general political participation (UNDP, 2017). Throughout Somalia, activities concerning women's political participation were scaled up; civil society organizations such as the *Quota Task Force*, *Nagaad Network*, and the Somali *Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs* (MOLSA) held three meetings per month for four months, attended by 123 participants from Members of Parliament and Cabinet Members as well as traditional elders and religious leaders who were sensitized on the importance of upholding the minimum quota for women's representation in electoral and political processes (UNDP, 2017). Similarly, MOLSA trained 25 aspiring women diplomats on leadership skills and effective campaigning strategies in the city of Hargeisa, a number of whom later registered as candidates for parliamentary election (UNDP, 2017). In order to ensure the financial sustainability of the projects, an imperative requirement listed in the New Deal, the Joint Programme also reviewed the aid architecture between various donor and government channels to ensure the longevity of efforts that empowered women's political engagement (Somalia UN MPTF, 2017). To achieve its objective, the Joint Programme used "different approaches from multiple fronts," thereby reinforcing the notion within scholarship that donors and partners a) are able to make important contributions to changing constraining gendered attitudes and behaviours among the elite (male) class; b) can connect diverse groups of women together to expand their collective power and influence; and c) can provide relevant technical and managerial capacity-building training to ensure the longevity of such programs (EARF, 2017; Somalia UN MPTF, 2017, p. 10).

The Joint Programme set an unprecedented example, showing how women and men across varying sectors, class groups, and ethnic identities could connect, share resources, and expand their networks to realize sustainable political change with real results for reconciliation, inclusive governance and legitimate politics (UNDP, 2017). Although this project falls somewhat in line with liberal feminist frameworks that seek to increase the number of women in political office as a mechanism to increase their representational soft power, significant elements of this project point to standpoint feminism prevailing against liberal feminism and post-structural and institutional feminism in the broader sense of Somalia’s New Deal implementation. On one hand, the project assured the genuine empowerment of Somali women in politics and governance across community, regional, and national systems, as opposed to merely fixating on meeting arbitrary quotas in formal, high-level government. On the other hand, a deeper consideration could have been made to address the significant percentage of Somali men who feel excluded from political participation (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2016). Indeed, a post-structural and institutional feminist framework would have treated the barriers being faced by Somali men in their effort to engage politically as those that occur along the same lines or in similar structures as the systemic barriers experienced by Somali women in conflict situations. The Joint Programme may have yielded different and gender-inclusive results had it comprehensively programmed for this reality. A deeper consideration for the unique experience of Somali men being affected by conflict is discussed in the next section.

PSG2 Strengthening People’s Security: Somali Men and SGBV

The *Interagency Standing Committee* (IASC) *2015 Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Action* defines gender-based violence (GBV) as “any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will” during times of “conflict, displacement, and settlement, in new communities and countries, and in the home by an intimate partner or other family member" (Glass et al., 2018, p. 2). Somalia's New Deal Compact provides direct commitments to address challenges in regard to SGBV. Under their PSG initiatives, "the Somali Government commits to fulfilling its duty to prevent GBV," and it has made the commitment to being "responsible for the delivery of security in line […] with a zero-tolerance on GBV, particularly sexual violence and exploitation" (Federal Republic of Somalia, 2014, p. 6; Goodwin, 2014). Complementary to these promises made by Somalia's Federal Government, donors have shown a keen interest and active engagement with SGBV in Somalia, and there is also recognition of the critical need for "guidance and recommendations on best practices for conducting research to rigorously evaluate these programs" (LOGICA, 2013; Glass et al., 2018, p. 2). For instance, several donors including the European Union, the *Swedish International Development Agency*, and *Denmark's Development Cooperative* have actively funded several SGBV initiatives in Somalia through UN partnerships or other implementing organizations, but many "are still in the process of clarifying or re-orientating their gender priorities" so that the programming adds practical, realistic, and sustainable value to local Somali contexts (LOGICA, 2013, p. 10; Bradbury, 2009). Given the significant risk to SGBV experienced by women and girls in conflict situations, global and local organizations often collaborate to develop and implement interventions in response to SGBV and its prevention as it relates to femininity, often excluding men and boys (Kumiyi, 2017; Glass et al., 2018).

In FCAS, men and boys have been targets of systematic and extensive SGBV. They are threatened with death and torture, coerced to participate in militia groups, and have also been forced to "perpetrate and witness rape and other sexual violations against women and girls," including their own female relatives (Okoth & Gardner, 2013, p. 2; Kaldor, 1999/2006). For instance, in the context of ongoing conflict in Somalia, rape and sexual violence has been deployed by hostile clans as a specific tool utilized to destabilize and disempower rivalling local communities in order to exact power and control over them (LOGICA, 2013). In this way, SGBV is a multi-faceted family issue; in one specific example, hostile combatants raped women and girls related to husbands or fathers who themselves may have been the indirect or intended targets of conflict (Okoth & Gardner, 2013). Furthermore, women are raped in front of their husbands to "underscore the inability of men to fulfil their traditional role as protectors," a tactic which exploits conceptions of masculinity and femininity that call attention to the economic and political circumstances which have made it difficult for many men to fulfil their traditional role as providers for their families (LOGICA, 2013, p. 9; Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Although gendered discourse about SGBV should encompass a human security perspective with respect to the harm it brings to social vitality (i.e. political, economic, and social damage) and deep material loss (i.e. death and human suffering), women's organizations gravitate towards asserting the "brutal and extensive nature" of SGBV as it serves to reinforce women's victimhood (Hudson, 2015, p. 416). Moreover, the standard of excluding men and boys in SGBV programming is in line with the exclusive and essentialist nature of liberal feminism (Hudson, 2015). In the face of crisis and insecurity, however, gender roles have shifted as men and women adopt different coping strategies to increase individual, household and community resilience. With a focus on women and girls, little is understood about how normative roles and expectations of Somali men have changed, and there is limited knowledge about how they have suffered in times of war (Okoth & Gardner, 2013).

Unique among indices in its incorporation of a global quantitative analysis of gender, development, peace, and security, the *Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security*

(GIWPS) and *PRIO* published the inaugural *2017/2018 Women, Peace, and Security Index* (WPSI), which reinforces the concept of gender equality as a critical factor for achieving positive outcomes in peace, social vitality, economic improvement, and state reconstruction (Klugman & Gaye, 2017). Although the WPSI makes note of conflict-sexual related violence as a crucial factor in understanding the case for PBSB in Somalia, it is not included among its index because of data restraints, thereby highlighting international development partners' "fear" that SGBV cases remain unreported, and that survivors are largely on their own when searching for resources, perhaps especially men (Klugman & Gaye, 2017, p. 36). In fact, there is limited information or interest in investigation about SGBV violence in Somalia against men and boys, and the underrepresentation of their experiences in rape statistics is not uncommon. For instance, between January and September 2016, the UN verified that at least 200 girls and 1 boy in Somalia were raped by armed and unknown elements – perhaps clan militia, Al-Shabaab, or even UN peacekeepers (United Nations, 2017). Rape statistics and reporting on SGBV cast Somalia men and boys negatively and often generalize them as perpetrators of violence, which has huge implications for the ability to meaningfully engage men in SGBV PBSB planning in the future (Bradbury et al., 2010). Ultimately, there is a need to look beyond the current levels of understanding and analysis that are congruent with liberal feminism. In essence, future programming for SGBV as a vital element for PBSB requires a larger integration of gender equality, as well as a broader consideration for the dynamic elements of Somali male identity and experience as per post-structural and institutional feminism. Not only will this allow men and boys the space to heal or discover and reflect upon the way they relate to women and girls, it may also be a critical step in enacting positive transformation in the conceptions of gender identity as a cross-cutting issue with the power to transform economic and political environments (Okoth & Gardner, 2013, Bradbury et al., 2010; Baranyi, 2008).

The *United Nations Children's Fund* (UNICEF) developed the *Communities Care Program* in Somalia, which was developed from the understanding that within the context of conflict and displacement, "there is an opportunity for positive change in social norms that support gender equity and decrease SGBV" (Glass et al., 2018, p. 1). The program's theory of change intends to enact social transformation by increasing the "quality, access, and coordination of compassionate care for women and girls" who experience SGBV in FCAS by "strengthening community-based response and readiness across diverse sectors" such as health, protection, education, and justice (Glass et al., 2018, p. 4). Although intended to change social norms and empower community-led prevention for the benefit of female survivors, the project is still in its first mapping stage, and uses a participatory approach that invites local partners and key stakeholders such as religious leaders, traditional elders, clan members, teachers, health care providers, human rights advocates, business leaders and women's organizations to participate in focus groups and individual interviews to "diagnose social norms that sustain SGBV" (Glass et al., 2018, p. 3). In the methodologies section of the project, there is a distinct reference to including male respondents as key participants in achieving project results (Glass et al., 2018). Though the project is directed towards improving community-led SGBV programming outcomes for women, there is still much to be done about emphasizing men's victimhood, and not just keeping stock of them as project 'blockers.' Although the project exhibits more elements from a standpoint feminist perspective, the project in its first phase sets out to engage with male participants more fully in order to identify attitudes and perceptions towards SGBV, thereby making the program unique among other programs conducted previously. With a commitment to being a useful reference for global and local stakeholders interested in implementing and evaluating future SGBV prevention and response programs in Somalia, perhaps later project stages of the country's New Deal implementation could expand upon the role of men and boys such that they are acknowledged as victims and survivors of SGBV in their own right.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the same way that violence and war devastate development, post-conflict periods provide opportunities for which PBSB can realize gender inclusiveness into the fabric of their creation, sustenance and permanence. Given a detailed look into the international documentation pertaining to the New Deal, the literature and evidence coming from Somalia and scholarship represents a refreshed commitment to gender equality generally, with greater potential for a dramatic shift to occur from liberal and standpoint perspectives to those of post-structural or institutional feminist PBSB paradigms. In achieving New Deal implementation, governmental and international approaches for PBSB interventions require investments in research to find solutions that best support the social, economic and political priorities of local contexts. In this way, a gender approach to state-building, one that follows a post-structural or institutional feminist model in considering the unique and specific contexts of how people relate to one another and how they act within their society, would “bring it down to earth” (El-Bushra, 2012, p. 11). However, the international fora have largely followed theories of governance, security, development, and gender that rely on external drivers of change (Baranyi, 2008; Zuern, 2009). The divergence between local ideas and western models of governance, or an idea of “state,” has often meant that the institutions created are not country-owned and are therefore unsustainable (Samuels, 2010, p. 86; Zuern, 2009). With a holistic understanding of local perspectives, Somali women and men need to be understood as economic and political actors with a rich history of mobilizing for peace and who have accomplished real and impactful results. For instance, in legitimizing their own political identities, women have engaged in political reform to achieve high-level representation in politics, a success many FCAS have yet to achieve at a comparable scale. Although international development organizations have traditionally considered women's representation in offices of elected representatives the endpoint of what inclusive governance should look like, there have been calls to question whether representation truly results in influence and power, and if not, what inclusive political programming could look like if this were a priority.

Similarly, although SGBV is often considered a violent action experienced by women that is perpetrated by men, little work has been done to understand the realities of both Somali women and men in view of this cross-cutting issue. In both cases, deepening the analysis of people's experiences, attitudes, and perspectives from a post-structural and institutional feminist perspective can result in a better understanding for the drivers of gendered conflict and insecurity in FCAS. Although advancing the S/RES/1325 agenda can promote women's rights generally, the PBSB process could be mutually enforcing for men if gender generalizations are avoided and addressed. Principally, reconciliation, healing, and freedom are agendas which underpin efforts to achieve human security, property rights, better management of natural resources and access to reproductive health. Gender inclusion in PBSB for New Deal and SDG16 implementation needs to go beyond quotas and must strategize gendered conceptions as they exist in daily life. It is undoubtedly important to recall that in the process of PBSB in FCAS, international development actors must accept that sustainable peace and development is predicated upon acknowledging that the impacts and causes of conflict are gendered, and that gender-sensitive approaches can instigate "more permanent" metamorphosis in the prevailing social norms that normalize violence and unequal distributions of power (LOGICA, 2013, p. 3-6; OECD DAC, 2013; Baranyi, 2008; CORDAID, 2015). As the international community and Somalia's commitment to better engaging gender in New Deal implementation continues, perhaps there will be a more comprehensive application of institutional and post-structural feminism, rather than wide usage of liberal and standpoint feminism.

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Tabitha Mirza is passionate about gender equality, heritage preservation, food security, and social enterprise innovation. She has previously presented her research examining gender, poverty reduction, and cultural tourism development at the University of Ottawa following an internship with the Tanzania Tourist Board in Arusha, Tanzania. Tabitha is an aspiring photojournalist, and she hopes to continue building a career as a gender and development specialist after university.

The Irish Gay Rights Movement and Political Opportunity Structures

Kaelan McCone[4], Amherst College, Amherst, MA, United States of America

Abstract:

It is commonly accepted that the more advanced a nation becomes, the more secular it becomes. While this is the case in the Republic of Ireland, the country is unique in its rapid secularization between 1990 to 2015, which allowed for great expansion of LGBT rights in the nation. I seek to explain that the AIDS crisis questioned the legitimacy of existing sodomy laws in Ireland, and therefore the legitimacy of the Irish Government, which limited the extent to which Ireland could enforce its laws banning same-sex intercourse in the 1980s. Compiled with rapid economic advancement due to Ireland's integration into the Eurozone and it's deepening into the European market, this created internal opportunity structures that LGBT rights activists took advantage of to advance their movement in Ireland.

Keywords: Gay, Rights, Sexual Identity, Secularization, Religious Identity, Political Mobilization

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Introduction

The Republic of Ireland, referred to as Ireland for the purposes of this paper, emerged from a history of deep religious and political division as recently one of the freest countries in the world. In 2017, the Cato Institute ranked Ireland as the fourth freest country in the world with a Human Freedom Index of 8.48 out of 10 (McGann, 2018). In addition to being one of the freest countries in the world, Ireland also ranked as one of the richest by GDP per capita. In 2017, as determined by the World Bank, the country ranked with a GDP per capita of USD $75,648 ("GDP per capita, PPP", 2018).

Ireland achieved this international status due to internal structural reforms, specifically with the Catholic Church, the penal code, and the economy. As a result of these internal reforms, Ireland experienced rapid political change accompanied by economic change and reform, particularly in regard to gay rights. In just over 20 years, Ireland evolved immensely in terms of their stance on homosexuality; in 1993, same-sex intercourse was legalized and in 2015, same-sex marriage was legalized. Both the government and civil society as a whole experienced massive disruption of their long-standing traditions due to movement activists who were able to use the changing political, legal, and social opportunity structures to advance their cause.

The Irish case highlighted the ways in which movement activists can take advantage of internal legal loopholes to advance their cause. In doing so, they disrupted domestic politics by using the internal structural reforms as an opportunity to expand social consciousness and sway public opinion. This case demonstrated how a social movement took advantage specifically of opportunity structures to explain a theory on how all movement activists can advance their cases in democratic countries.

Literature Review

In a very short period of time, Ireland experienced unprecedented rapid economic growth and social change, fundamentally shifting the dynamics of the nation. In 1990 Ireland ranked below 35th place in regard to GDP per capita in spite of Ireland's integration into the European Economic Community (EEC). Ireland's interactions with the EEC, and henceforth the European Union (EU) as of the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht were also subject to intrigue (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016). In 1973, Ireland joined the EEC after a battle to have its request for entry separated from that of the United Kingdom (UK) (The European Commission, n.d.). Since admission in 1973, Ireland has been an active member of the EEC/EU; for instance, seven Irish representatives have held the title of president of the council of the EU (The European Commission, n.d.). However, all controversies aside, the EU was of massive aid to Ireland, in particular after Ireland's 1999 incorporation into the Euro Zone (The European Commission, n.d.). Furthermore, Ireland's strategic internal tax and economic reforms, such as shifting the Irish economy to an information and communications technology (ICT) and pharmaceuticals-led economy provided the grounds for the Irish economy to expand greatly – a period known as the Celtic Tiger period ("The Atlas of Economic Complexity", 2015; Falvey, 2011).

Interestingly, Ireland's rapid evolution from a post-colonial nation to an economic powerhouse correlates with social change within the country itself, in particular gay rights. Same-sex intercourse was not legalized until 1993 when an 1861 colonial sodomy statute was repealed by the Oireachtas Eireann, or the Irish Parliament (*Electronic Irish Statute Book*, 1861). The Oireachtas, composed of the lower house of the Dáil Éireann and the upper house of the Seanad Éireann, issued a series of reforms in the early 1990s that liberalized Ireland in ways not experienced since the Irish Revolution (Oireachtas, 2018). Contraception was fully legalized in

1993 (*Electronic Irish Statute Book*, 1993), and divorce in 1995 (*Electronic Irish Statute Book*, 1995). As opposed to other Western nation that experienced massive social and political reforms decades prior, such as France who legalized access to abortion in 1975, these reforms represented a massive cultural shift in Ireland that snowballed and culminated with the legalization of divorce in 1995 (Chan, 2017).

Despite the social, political, and economic advances made in the early 1990s, there reforms stalled for a period of time. During the Celtic Tiger period, the Dáil introduced legislation to legalize domestic partnerships in 2005, which failed (Seanad Éireann, 2005). Yet two years after the economic crash of 2008, the Oireachtas passed the same bill in 2010 (Taylor, 2010). Generally, liberalization is expected during times of economic growth as according to Ozsahin, however, 2008 to 2010 represented only the recovery of the Irish economy as opposed to the exponential growth it experienced in the eight years prior (Cüneyt Özşahin, 2013).At this point, Ireland's legislation on gay rights lagged behind multiple European nations, most notably the Netherlands and Spain which had legalized gay marriage as early as 2001 ("Same-sex marriage | Family law | Government.nl", 2016) and 2005 (Renwick, 2005). Hence the first anomaly in Ireland's gay rights movement: how the island liberalized in times of economic hardship, directly contradicting widely accepted theory (Cüneyt Özşahin, 2013).

In 2015, the Oireachtas set the question of gay marriage up to a constitutional vote to create the 34th amendment to the Irish Constitution, with the wording of "Féadfaidh beirt, gan beann ar a ngnéas, conradh pósta a dhéanamh de réir dlí" or in English "Marriage may be contracted in accordance with law by two persons without distinction as to their sex" (Oireachtas, 2015). The amendment was not put up to a parliamentary vote, but rather to a popular vote (Hayes, 2016). In doing so, Ireland became the first country in the world to do so, and to date only one of two, with

Australia becoming the second in 2017 (Berlinger & Westcott, 2014). The vote further passed overwhelmingly in favor of the amendment, with a vote of 62% to 38% (Slattery, 2015). This thus represents the second anomaly in Ireland's expansion of gay rights. Generally, gay rights activists prefer to settle the issue of gay marriage with the courts or with Parliamentary/governmental action, as seen in every country in the world aside from Ireland and Australia (Sciupac, Masci, & Lipka, 2017).

Clearly, exterior factors contributed to the expansion of gay rights in Ireland, but the internal political opportunity structures allowed activists to disrupt and change the legal structure of the country. As a result, the 1980s AIDS crisis created political opportunity structures which allowed activists to put pressure on the Irish government to legalize same-sex intercourse. After this historic legal precedent was set, Ireland's government liberalized rapidly in the 1990s with the legalization of divorce and contraception (Clarity, 1993). These movements changed both the social and legal consciousness around homosexuality and opened the gateways to same-sex partnerships and marriage (Parker, 2017).

My research seeks to establish a connection between research on political and legal opportunity structures in Ireland and their relevance in creating economic and social domestic policies. However, the majority of research on this topic focuses solely on the impact of the Catholic Church on Irish culture and the decline of organized religion in Ireland. In order to fill in the gaps, my research adds domestic factors to the analysis in order to complicate the ways in which movements operate. In addition, analyzing the different legal and political opportunity structures that existed prior to the gay rights movement will allow activists to identify when it is an opportune time to disrupt domestic politics.

AIDS Crisis and Political Opportunity Structures

The AIDS crisis in Ireland, while devastating, was useful in bringing awareness to some of the major issues in the country in regard to healthcare, sexual education, as well as the role of the Catholic Church in politics and government. In particular, the Church's influence on domestic politics was fundamental to the functioning of Irish civil society, but the gay rights movement in Ireland disrupted the religious dominance of the Church. It became the first movement to force the Government to remove elements of Catholic dogma from the lawbooks. As such, the AIDS crisis and support from the general population put pressure on the government to bolster the gay community, most notably from the European Court of Justice case of Norris v. Ireland. In doing so, the stronghold that the Catholic Church had on the Republic was impaired. Various sociopolitical theories highlight the impact that a country's legal structures have on societal attitudes; the Irish gay rights movement exemplifies these theories and exposes the relationship between legal change and the social dynamics of a country.

As previously mentioned, contraception was illegal in Ireland at the time of the AIDS crisis. Until 1973, both the importation and sale of contraceptives was illegal; this made access to condoms and birth control nearly impossible. However, the McGee vs. the Attorney General case was one of the first times that the Irish Constitution was used against the Irish state. This case stated that the right to privacy in marriage blocked the Irish government from controlling the methods used for contraception in a marriage ("Ireland allows sale of contraceptives", 2009). In another case the Irish Oireachtas passed a bill limiting the use of contraception to "bona fide family planning purposes". Thus, effectively limiting the access to contraception exclusively to married heterosexual couples whose doctors had determined it was legally acceptable for said purposes ("Ireland allows sale of contraceptives," 2009).

The limited access to contraception was one factor that changed Ireland's views on gay rights, but the social dynamic of the country created a social opportunity structure that pushed gay people, mainly men, out of the closet. A 1985 editorial illustrated public opinion on AIDS by claiming that homosexuality was the killer disease, not AIDS (Kerrigan, 2017).

A 1985 editorial illustrated public opinion on AIDS by claiming that homosexuality was the killer disease, not AIDS (Kerrigan, 2017). The lack of response by the government, limited access to contraception, and social stigma pushed the gay community to create their first full response to the AIDS crisis. A group of activists released pamphlets detailing "safe-sex" practices despite a law that prohibited same-sex intercourse (Kerrigan, 2017). In other words, these activists broke the law and risked jail time in order to save their community. This put even more pressure on the government to recognize the severity of the AIDS crisis, as well as to acknowledge the plight of the gay community in Ireland. The Irish government could have arrested these activists and protestors, but this would have led to international rebuke. However, by refusing to arrest those disseminating the pamphlets, the government simultaneously gave legitimacy to the Irish gay community and acknowledged that the current laws were unjust. In this first way, the HIV/AIDS crisis helped Irish gay rights by legitimizing the community and also implicitly acknowledging that the country's laws that were meant to protect the morals of the Catholic Church were disproportionately and unfairly impacting the Irish gay community.

Furthermore, the pamphlets informed those engaging in same-sex intercourse of safe-sex practices and inadvertently raised the issue of the Catholic Church's control over the state, particularly in regard to hospitals. The Catholic Church is the largest provider of non-state health services in the world, and Ireland is no exception. Due to the Catholic Church's intense influence over Irish culture the Catholic hospitals did not allow these pamphlets to be distributed and insisted that heterosexual marriage was the only true way to prevent AIDS (Hogan, 2016). Since the Irish government was not enforcing its own laws, religious institutions were left to decide whether to distribute these pamphlets of not. By allowing the Catholic Church to act in this way, the Irish government was subtly limiting the amount of disruption that the gay rights movement caused to social structures and Irish culture as a whole.

In ceding the power of discretion to the cultural institutions of the island, the government shifted legal structures in support of gay people, but at the same time, it reinforced the beliefs of the Church's followers. The Catholic Church's influence on politics and society put the Irish government in a particularly precarious situation both domestically and internationally. On one hand, Ireland risked alienating a majority of their population who were anti-gay; However, given the concern of the international community and the severity of the global AIDS crisis, they could not jeopardize their reputation internationally, but more specifically, their status within the European community.

This dance between international and domestic politics created the legal climate under which activists began organizing themselves; these activists wanted to disrupt the existing legal and social structures in order to change the societal attitudes toward the gay community. In the case of Norris v. Ireland, avid Norris, an Oireachtas senator and openly gay man, too the Irish government to the European Court of Human Rights; Norris argued that the Irish law which made same-sex intercourse illegal was in violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Court of Human Rights, 1993). However, this case was passed to the European Court of Human Rights before the AIDS crisis fully erupted, but a ruling was made in 1988 at the height of the gay rights movement (European Court of Human Rights, 1993).There were cases similar to Norris v. Ireland in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland decades earlier, but the Irish case came at a time when Europe was gathering strength and preparing for deepened integration (Carter, 2018).

Moreover, the Norris v. Ireland case is notable for the way in which the citizens used one part of the Irish legal system and leveraged it against another. While activists on the ground were knowingly defying Irish law in an attempt to tarnish the government's reputation the Norris case took full advantage of the European Community and its laws. Andersen states that in order to take advantage of legal opportunity structures, activists must "articulate their claims so that they fall within the categories previously established by an amalgam of constitutional, statutory, administrative, common, and case law" (Andersen, 2006, 12). As a result, when defending individuals such as Norris, lawyers must find weak spots in the law as to contend that their client's case falls within the pre-existing law. However, they must also argue that these laws should be clarified as opposed to creating new laws.

In the case, the Republic of Ireland had to argue that the law itself was legal; this gave further legitimacy to the gay rights movement by showing the contradicting positions of the Irish government abroad and domestically. While they did not enforce the law in the 1980s Ireland presented their case to the European Court of Human Rights, where they contended that the law was legitimate and in accordance with European conventions. In combination with the court's decision to overturn the Irish sodomy law, these contradictory positions gave further legitimacy to the Irish gay community that had been legally neglected by the government for decades. This created a legal opportunity structure that activists could take advantage of in order to disrupt Irish politics; they did so by forcing the Irish government to repeal the law prohibiting same-sex intercourse, but also to bring to light the pitfalls of the deep influence the Catholic Church held over the public in all aspects of life. As a result, the cultural relationship with the Church and the legal relationship with the European community created quite the predicament for the Irish government. The gay rights movement questioned and criticized the legal relationship between the Catholic Church and the Irish government which disrupted both Irish politics and society. This paper asserts that due to these disruptions, deeply held Catholic beliefs and traditions began to decline in Ireland.

Subsequently, the gay community was able to secure funds from the government to create and distribute pamphlets detailing safe-sex practices. The government could not openly endorse this due to the existing laws. This paper also asserts that representatives feared losing the votes of their constituents as the “gay issue” was fundamentally a political issue. This further allowed Ireland to temporarily play both sides of the same card by funding gay groups under the table while publicly defending its laws and “sovereignty” (Dáil Éireann, 1993). Notably the National Gay Federation, which later became Gay Health Action (GHA), received funding in 1985 from the government for its work in educating the gay community in safe-sex practices (Nolan, 2018). However, this funding did not come from the Department of Health because the Irish government did not want to publicly recognize the AIDS crisis as a health crisis or a crisis that disproportionately impacted a marginalized group (Kerrigan, 2017).

Therefore, the AIDS crisis disrupted internal politics by forcing the Irish government to both defend its laws on an international stage while also ignoring the law at home; this contradiction created doubt amongst civil society in regard to the legitimacy of the laws banning same-sex intercourse. Civil society began to question what should be considered “moral” and “amoral” due to the government’s continued funding of these activist groups while allowing the Church to refuse treatment to gay individuals. The synergetic effects between these aspects of the gay rights movement fundamentally disrupted the deeply held religious beliefs and political institutions in the country; this allowed movement activists to avail of these opening social and political opportunity structures to advance their cause.

Economics

It cannot be stressed enough how economic opportunities can create opportunities within the political structure of a nation. Stating arguments on certain controversial issues in terms of economic potential can easily persuade governments to increase revenue influxes to the country. In regard to the gay rights movement, this has been especially advantageous. Following the massive gay rights movement in the 80s and early 90s, Ireland's weakened anti-gay stance allowed for the creation of an openly gay community in the country (Walsh, 2015). The disruption of political dogma on the topic of same-sex intercourse led the Irish government to consider the economic implications of openness towards minority groups. Thus, creating a spillover effect from positive political disruption to economic disruption. The essential "legalization" of same-sex intercourse proved to be beneficial, as theory suggests, to the economy of Ireland and created the political opportunity to advocate for more rights and equality in the country (Hicklin, 2012).

A 1998 BBC article more highlighted the economic prowess of the gay community in Europe due to their "pink pound" ("The Pink Pound," 1998). The "pink pound" refers to the money spent by the gay community ("The Pink Pound," 1998). This opened up a market that gave the gay community both economic and political influence in Ireland. The article states that "Because of family circumstances (or more precisely lack thereof) the gay community tends to have much more disposable income to spend." ("The Pink Pound," 1998). This statement may be controversial, but it clearly articulates the ways in which the struggle for gay rights quickly became a race for capitalist venues.

Moreover, the article contended that gays acted "similar to an immigrant market they stick together to support each other and vote for each other." (“The Pink Pound,” 1998). In other words, as early as 1998 many European countries noticed the economic potential that the gay community had and could thus be exploited. In 2011, Cregan articulated how capitalism and Irish identity intersect: “‘Irish identity is being refashioned to accommodate a market economy…in favor of a cosmopolitan liberalism not built on moral acceptance of queers but rather on their economic power and potential’” (Fawley & Cregan, 2011). Irish identity as historically constructed is intrinsically linked to the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, with the popular vote to decriminalize same-sex intercourse, the people forced the government to distance itself from Catholic values. However, most importantly, this gave Ireland the freedom to reconfigure what it means to be Irish in the 21st century.

Furthermore, the “An Tíogar Ceilteach”, or the “Celtic Tiger” period refers to the rapid period of economic growth in the early 2000s (Herrman, 2008). This growth was prompted by a number of factors including deepened involvement by Europe to aid Ireland in the adoption of the Euro as their official currency (The European Commission, n.d.). However, this paper asserts that the adoption to the Euro in conjunction with the transition of the Irish economy from low to high income created the political opportunity for gay activists to lobby for more legal protections and rights. The first effort to pass a domestic partnership bill in Ireland was in the early to mid-2000s but was postponed and then prohibited from being entered the debate (Clarke, 2008). Western countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Canada tend to liberalize socially and politically during a time of rapid economic growth (Ferguson, 2016). However, during Ireland’s period of economic growth, there were multiple attempts to pass a domestic partnership bill, but to no avail (Clarke, 2008).

While economic profitability and European integration helped provide the political opportunity structures for activists, it was lobbying and other forms of non-violent protest that allowed Ireland to legalize same-sex domestic partnerships. However, as the Irish government insisted on a referendum as opposed to legalizing same-sex marriage via the courts or the Oireachtas, gay rights activists turned to other methods such as lobbying for their rights ("Govt will 'actively support' same-sex marriage referendum in 2015", 2013). Additionally, the Irish gay rights movement ceded some of this power to the Oireachtas, but namely the Seanad where they had an ally in out gay senator David Norris (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019).

Furthermore, the Irish state worked against the gay rights movement in trying to minimalize the extent of political disruption by deploying its resources to cases that challenged the Irish constitution. For instance, in 2006, a lesbian couple attempting to file taxes together as a married couple took their case to court (Carolan, 2006). The judge ruled against the couple citing that "The legal basis for doing so has not been identified save to say that the Constitution is a living document that is not stuck in the permafrost of 1937 but there is no jurisprudential basis put forward which would enable the court to radically alter the concept of marriages provided in the Constitution save that it has been submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that the consensus of what marriage means is changing" (Mullins, 2013). The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and eventually used in the 2015 campaign for the gay marriage referendum (Mullaly, 2017).

The debates and early votes on the domestic partnership referendum were further stalled by the 2008 financial crisis. Ireland was hit especially hard by this crisis since Ireland's economy had been growing exponentially and was significantly setback by the economic fall (Bielenberg, 2018). Ireland's financial struggles are illustrated in the graph below with data taken from the World Bank ("GDP Per Capita, PPP", n.d.).



Figure 1: Irish GDP Per Capita. Adapted from World Bank Data. Retrieved April 3, 2019, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2017&name_desc=false&start=2017.

The economic crisis shifted the priorities of the government from expanding the rights of the Irish gay community to focusing on economic recovery. As such, movement activists were not able to make the same amount of gains as they did in the early 90s because the government was not able to allocate the same amount of energy or resources. The movement gained momentum again in 2011 by taking advantage of an improving job market and economy; this created the legal opportunity structure that activists took advantage of in 2015 with the gay marriage referendum (Parker, 2017).

With respect to the referendum, it was not the choice of movement activists to have gay marriage introduced to the state via popular vote. However, in 2013, a minister claimed that if the Oireachtas legalized same-sex marriage, then they would be violating the Constitution. The decision was put to a popular vote as to avoid a constitutional crisis as per the Constitutional Convention (Parker, 2017). This was a risky decision since the fate of the gay rights movement would be decided by Irish society instead of the Irish government. However, under Irish law, all constitutional amendments have to be passed via referendum with a simple majority of over 50% of the vote (Citizens Information Ireland, n.d.). The Irish MPs who were pushing for a referendum were aware of these factors, but this paper contends that they hoped that pushing the vote to referendum would stifle the gay rights movement in Ireland, as no other country in the world had legalized same-sex marriage before via referendum. With no legal remedy to escape the referendum, activists took to the streets and the media to try and win the favor of the Irish people (Parker, 2017). In doing so, they left a lasting impact on the Irish social consciousness which fundamentally disrupted the existing legal structures of the country.

Conclusion

The Irish gay rights movement disrupted and all aspects of Ireland's social and political world. Once described as an "Irish problem requiring an Irish solution", the gay rights movement sprung from the illegality of same-sex intercourse on the island and gained traction due to the AIDS. Oreland's shifting social consciousness in regard to the gay community were used to help movement activists lobby for change in the legal sphere. These elements were amplified by the case of Norris v. Ireland which forced the disruption of the Irish penal code and created the legal opportunity to expand gay rights in the country.

On the other hand, domestic partnerships and gay marriage had to exploit different elements of Irish society to achieve their goals. Firstly, gay rights activists brought awareness to the impact of the "pink pound" which took advantage of Ireland's booming market economy and disrupted Irish economic policy. These economic factors disrupted Irish civil society by evolving Irish identity into one that is fundamentally capitalist. While the 2008 recession slowed the gay rights movement, the economy recovered and gave the movement the momentum that it needed to legalize domestic partnerships and then gay marriage in 2015. It is important to note that many conservative MPs attempted to slow down the progress made by activists by using the law in their favor and forcing a referendum. However, movement activists focused on transforming the social consciousness which was achieved by challenging and reconceptualizing Irish culture and identity.

This research does not acknowledge all aspects of the Irish gay rights movement, but it does take into account the impact of the AIDS crisis and economic factors. These notable components of the movement disrupted politics, society, the economy, and the religious identity of Ireland. Disruptions in these areas led to the opening of political, legal, and economic opportunity structures which movement activists took advantage of to advance gay rights in Ireland.

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How Inequality Undermines Democracy: The Case Against the United States, and Beyond

Andrew El-Azzi, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Abstract

This paper investigates the negative relationship between economic inequality and democracy. It analyzes how economic inequality translates into the political sphere, and in particular, how it operates in the American case. This paper finds that the role played by economic inequality in distorting democracy takes place through three particular areas: the role big injections of money play into electoral campaigns and subsequent elections; the role interest groups play in policy making; and, the role that inequality in American society has come to play in creating, and reproducing an ideology that maintains that very inequality. To do so, the paper draws extensively on recent data concerning American congressional elections, U.S. policy making, and on Robert Cox's mechanisms through which institutions reproduce hegemony. Using Cox's analysis of institutional hegemony production, the paper finds five analogous claims on how the individual – as an institution – is used as a mechanism for maintaining a hegemonic order.

Keywords: Economic Inequality, Democracy, Political Inequality, Hegemonic Order, Hegemony

Introduction

Since what is likely the most surprising election outcome in American presidential history, many claims have been made about the reasons that led Donald Trump to the White House in 2016. Claims vary from the rise of nationalism, to Russian intervention, all the way through to democrat exhaustion; all however, seem to ignore the role of money and inequality in the subsequent outcome. Recent data on the 2016 election suggests campaign funding may be the likeliest reason explaining Trump's election. (Ferguson, T., Chen, J. & Jorgenson, P., 2018) That is, it suggests American elections are vulnerable to non-democratic external influence. This paper makes a more general claim: high levels of economic inequality in the United States undermines democracy and the democratic process, while creating a circumstance by which the individual reproduces a hegemonic order that maintains inequality. To demonstrate the claim, this paper is divided into three parts, as follows: first, an introduction to terminology and definitions concerning democracy and the economic elite; second, a literature review consisting of studies concerning American congressional elections, policy making, and political engagement in economically unequal societies; and finally, examination of how inequality creates a circumstance through which the individuals becomes a mechanism for hegemonic reproduction that. in turn, maintains inequality and undermines democracy.

Background

Democracy is by no means a simple term to define. The word, in and of itself, is derived from the Greek '*demokratia*,' the roots meaning being *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule) (Held, 1996, p. 13). Its practical modern-day meaning is divided into two main schools of thought: a procedural definition, and a functional one. The procedural view defines democracy as a finite process consisting of four essential attributes: "(1) free, fair, and competitive elections; (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press and association; and (4) the absence of nonelected "tutelary" authorities (e.g., militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials' power to govern." (Levistky & Way, 2010, p. 5-6) The functional view, on the other hand, sees democracy as an indefinite process that is, first and foremost, a way of constituting power. Sheldon Wolin defines it as follows:

> "Democracy is committed to the claim that experience with, and access to, power is essential to the development of capacities of ordinary persons because power is crucial to human dignity and realization. Power is not merely something to be "shared," but something to be used collaboratively in order to initiate, to invent, to bring about." (1987, p. 470)

According to Wolin, the functional view consists of more than just political participation in a finite process. Here, the functional and procedural view diverge in two respects. The first being a question of finiteness. On one hand, the participation in the process is definite and defines democracy. That is, taking part in the process is the democracy. On the other, democracy requires a prior political equality preceding the political participation. It is an ongoing process where the people *constantly* rule and political equality is *constantly* maintained. (Wolin, 1987, p. 471) It is not merely the freedom of expression at one particular moment in time, but rather, a process that continues to be legitimized by the manner in which power is constituted. Here, one can imagine a case where an individual's inequality in one particular field – say the economic sphere – allows for inequality in the political sphere.

The second respect concerns the concentration of power. In the procedural definition, power can be concentrated in a given structure – often being the state – thereby creating a hierarchy that flows from the top-down. The democratic element is in deciding whom receives that power, and in what manner. In the functional definition, the mere notion of hierarchy is antidemocratic, as it contradicts the assumption of equality. Instead, power can be concentrated, but into the hands of the collective.

In essence, these two views of democracy diverge on the prior assumptions they make on political equality. The procedural view takes the position that participation in elections is the political equality, while the functional view treats political equality as exclusive to the process. In considering the data about democracy in the United States, we will make reference to both these definitions, and show that independent of definition, economic inequality undermines democracy.

The economic elite in the United States

One must also seek to define economic inequality and its representatives in society – namely, the economic elite. It is generally defined in two strands: income and wealth. Income refers to a wage being earned on a given basis, while wealth refers to a net worth (assets minus liabilities). (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez and Zucman, 2018) Wealth, therefore, represents a more reliable long term variable to possibly define the economic elite. For example, in the U.S., the top 1% of income earners (85% of which are men) earn over 20% of national income. In addition, the increase in income of the top 1% has been proportional to the decrease in income of the bottom 50% since the 1980s. (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p.78) In terms of wealth, however, the numbers are more surprising. The top 0.1% own over 22% of national wealth while the top 10% represent over 70%. (Alvaredo et al., 2018, p.212) These numbers are comparable only to wealth inequality in Russia and China, but unparalleled in western democracies. Therefore, one can define the economic elite using economic definitions: that is, the group of income and wealth earners who represent a disproportionate portion of both wealth and income – commonly referred to as 'the 1%'.

However, the economic elite, as a group, is not merely a set of individuals who are characterized by a given attribute. They are in fact, a social group like any other – women, blacks, or Muslims. They identify one another, and with another. They are an expression of social relations defined in terms of economic criteria. Their defining characteristic with respect to other groups is their economic supremacy. (Domhoff, 2005, p. 6) Accordingly, they act in unison because they share a similar experience and view of the world, just as any other social group does. Therefore, to define the economic elite is not simply to associate an economic characteristic to a set of individuals; rather, it is to view this set of individuals as one, largely cohesive group, defined in terms of an economic characteristic. This will be the definition used throughout the remainder of the paper.

Literature review

In Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page's (2014) study on American policy making, they test theories of democracy with respect to data of public opinion on policy decisions accumulated between 1981 and 2014. This period also coincided with the neoliberal period that saw the wealth share for the top 0.1% grow from 7% to 22%. (Alvaredo et al., 2018) The data, in particular, investigates the exclusive impact average citizens, economic elites, and interest groups have on policy-making. That is, cases where average citizens receive a favourable outcome – because their interest may positively correlate with that of the economic elites – does not imply the average citizens had any impact on the policy's adoption. What they find first, is that the support or opposition of average citizens to any policies have little to no impact on the likelihood of adoption. (Gilens and Page, 2014, p.573) In other words, the support for or against a policy by the average citizen, isn't taken into account by lawmakers.



Figure 1: comparing policy-adoption with respect to economic elite interest, average citizen interest, and interest-group interest. (Gilens and Page, 2014, p.573)

Conversely, they find that when economic elites favour a certain policy, it is nearly two times as likely to be adopted. (Gilens and Page, 2014, p.573) In other words, the position of the economic elite matters with respect to policy adoption. This is not say the average citizens is deprived of any policy they favour; rather, it is to say that they have no impact over its adoption. As the authors note, there is in fact, a high correlation between economic elite interest, and average citizen interest. (Gilens and Page, 2014, p. 568) The point however, is that economic elites receive policies they favour twice as many times average citizens do, who don't have any significant impact in the process. As a consequence, it undermines democracy in so far as the average citizen – the majority of the population – is not represented in government policy making.

It undermines procedural democracy because it allows for non-elected bodies, such as those business groups, lobbies, and economic elites to limit, and even distort, elected officials' ability to govern. It also undermines functional democracy because, (1) it permits power to be used for the good of the few, and (2) it proposes a hierarchy whereby citizens with more economic power are allotted more political power, which means unequal division of power, and thus poses an ideological contradiction to the functional definition.

Equally as interesting as the results in Figure 1 was the impact interest groups, such as business groups, and lobbies, had in policy rejection. Figure 1 shows that when interest groups opposed a certain policy, its likeliness of adoption tended towards zero. One is therefore left with a rather condemning conclusion: when average citizens' interests disagree with those of the economic elites or that of interest groups, the average citizen loses almost all the time.

The findings provided by Gilens and Page (2014) are not to imply that, in theory, inequality renders democracy completely incapable of adjusting to economic inequality. As Houle (2018) notes in his study, there are in fact European democracies that are better able to represent the poor in face of large economic inequality. (p. 1501) Houle continues to demonstrate the mechanisms by which economic inequality distorts political inequality. As noted earlier, the United States is second to no Western democracy with respect to its economic inequality, and in turn, the extent to which this inequality impacts political equality is the significance of the Gilens-Page (2014) results. According to Houle, economic inequality, "increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor," "widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups," "reduces participation," and "depresses support for democracy." (Houle, 2018, p.1500) Thus, in the U.S., this points to a monopoly of power, and its manifestation, to an undermined democracy.

Congressional elections

The impact of the elites doesn't limit itself to policy; they also impact the electoral process. Recent studies on American congressional elections have investigated the relationship between money and electoral votes. (Ferguson, Chen and Jorgenson, 2016; Ferguson, Chen, & Jorgenson, 2017) In doing so, the paper finds that there was a "strongly linear relationship between Democratic candidates' shares of total two party spending in House elections and the percentage of major party votes they won." (Ferguson, Chen and Jorgenson, 2016, p.14)



Figure 2: the linear relationship between money and votes during the 2012 democrat house elections. (Ferguson, Chen and Jorgenson, 2016)

In addition to the 2012 democrat house elections, the researchers decided to investigate further, relationships in both the house and senate for a period spanning from 1980 to 2014. The results “confirm that the patterns we found for 1980, 1996, and 2012 are not flukes.” (Ferguson et al., 2016, p.16) With the exception of 1982 senate election, the linear relationship between money and votes received holds for all congressional elections spanning from 1980 to 2014.

One must still, however, demonstrate the correlation between the elites’ actions and these results. As a social group, defined by their economic power, the economic elite derive, what Domhoff (2005) calls “distributive power.” (p.12) Distributive power, in contrast to collective power, refers to the ability of a group to influence, so to “realize its goals even if some other group or class is opposed” to it. (Domhoff, 2005, p.12) The elite, therefore, can use their economic advantage to seek to influence voters. This can entail money being spent to advertise, promote, and advocate for certain candidates, policies, and campaigns. As a result, voters’ view of electoral campaigns is largely a function of their candidates ability to reach them, or be reachable – which in turn is largely a function of campaign donations. (Domhoff, 2005, p.153)

This much, has been demonstrated in studies relating the perception economic inequality and political mobilization. In Frederick Solt’s (2008) study on the relationship between economic inequality and political mobilization, he surveys 23 “advanced industrial democracies” (including the United States) where “coercion and clientelism are rare” therefore allowing for a direct relationship between economic inequality and political interests.(p.48) The results are quite condemning: Solt (2008) finds that income inequality had “a strong negative effect on the political interest of those with incomes in the median quintile or below” with the exception of “those in the richest quintile.”(p.54) Figure 3 shows that relation and makes an important point concerning the distributive power yielded by the economic elite.

Table 1 Effects of Inequality and Income on Political Engagement

Independent Variable	Political Interest Estimate	Political Interest (Std. Error)	Political Discussion Estimate	Political Discussion (Std. Error)	Electoral Participation Estimate	Electoral Participation (Std. Error)
Income Inequality	−7.911*	(2.745)	−8.118*	(2.300)	−5.331*	(2.271)
Household Income	−.129	(.098)	−.144	(.077)	.027	(.103)
Inequality × Income	1.093*	(.345)	.980*	(.271)	.458	(.353)
Individual Controls						
Age	.046*	(.003)	.060*	(.003)	.089*	(.004)
Age^2/100	−.031*	(.003)	−.052*	(.003)	−.069*	(.004)
Years of Education	.117*	(.002)	.110*	(.002)	.058*	(.003)
Female	−.600*	(.015)	−.472*	(.015)	−.011	(.021)
Married	−.073*	(.017)	−.036*	(.018)	.169*	(.025)
Number of Children	−.013*	(.006)	−.009	(.006)	−.036*	(.010)
Rural Household	−.119*	(.021)	−.099*	(.022)	.033	(.025)
Employed	−.010	(.018)	.064*	(.018)	.057*	(.027)
Union Member	.315*	(.019)	.327*	(.021)	.263*	(.030)
Active Church Member	.084*	(.019)	−.010	(.020)	.281*	(.031)
Country-Year Controls						
District Magnitude	.012*	(.006)	.007	(.005)	.011*	(.005)
Party Pluralism	−.016	(.040)	.059*	(.033)	−.105*	(.035)
Election Year	.083	(.106)	.019	(.113)		
GDP/Capita	.001	(.013)	.011	(.011)	.006	(.010)
Union Density	−.005	(.007)	.006	(.005)	.001	(.005)
Country Controls						
Presidentialism	.721*	(.232)	.556*	(.197)	.124	(.203)
Federalism	.825*	(.246)	.670*	(.202)	−.066	(.194)
Unicameralism	.859*	(.288)	.692*	(.226)	.222	(.206)
Compulsory Voting	−.067	(.267)	−.203	(.221)	1.192*	(.226)
Constant	.281	(.934)	−.164	(.804)	.740	(.848)
Second Threshold	1.658*	(.011)	2.879*	(.013)		
Third Threshold	3.862*	(.016)				
Individuals	68,907		71,596		64,092	
Country-Years	71		62		59	
Countries	22		22		23	
−2 × *Log Likelihood*	333621.8		276778.2		182587.2	

*$p < .05$

Figure 3: the impact inequality had on participants' political interest. (Solt, 2008, p.55)

Turning to the first column of Figure 3, one notes the dominant factor affecting individuals' political interest is incomparably income inequality. This remained true in the face of other possible factors such as employment or union membership. This helps demonstrate the relation between Houle's claim about political inequality as a function of economic inequality, and the U.S. case. That is, the fact income inequality more significantly impacts individuals'' political interests explains the case disenfranchisement of American voters. Furthermore, in analyzing the row variables, such as household income, age, education, all had little to no impact on political mobilization; instead, it was the knowledge that there are 'others,' the economic elites, with unequal ability to influence political discourse through their distributive power – that led to negative correlations with political mobilization. In addition, the results provided indicate that the impact of economic inequality enters both political and social spheres, that is, it also discouraged political mobilization, such as voting, and social mobilization, such as political discussion. These results seem particularly relevant in light of the fact that wealth concentration in the U.S. is second to none – far ahead any industrialized democracies and only comparable to China and Russia. (Alvaredo et al., 2018) Additional studies relating the same variables in Eastern Europe have drawn the same conclusion. (see Loveless 2013) It is therefore clear, that economic inequality harms political mobilization and participation. However, to properly understand the mechanisms by which inequality manifests itself, one must consider the notion of power.

Three principles power indicators lie in asking who benefits, who governs, and who wins? (Domhoff, 2005, p.9) The inability to influence policy, the distorting impact of money in elections, and the harming of political mobilization all point to the economic elite as having a monopoly in those power indicators. Referring to Houle's mechanisms by which economic inequality manifests itself, he points to fact that high levels of inequality lead to equally high levels of resource concentration, which in turn translates into differing policy interests that are almost always won by the elites. Democracy, therefore, from the average citizen's point of view, becomes but a burden, and its ability to function, ineffective, in both its procedural and functional sense.

Inequality, and its facilitation of hegemony

Economic inequality's negative impact on democracy is clear. Since democracy is "embedded in a socioeconomic system" that "systematically grants a 'privileged position'" to the interest of the wealthy, inequality therefore undermines both the procedural and functional meanings of democracy. (Held, 1996, p.215) Moreover, the effect inequality has in creating a circumstance that facilitates a hegemonic order is equally as important. That is, its ability to create a culture of inequality, an ideology, that justifies, legitimizes, and spreads its hegemony. In particular, the role assumed by the individual in a given society becomes the very mechanism by which a hegemonic order is maintained.

Hegemony, according to Gramsci, was the idea that an individual is not uniquely ruled by force, but by ideas. (Bates, 1975, p.351) It meant that to be in a state of hegemony, was to determine "a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge." (Gramsci and Forgacs, 1988, p.192) It is the idea that hegemony is to represent an ideological fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact. As Gramsci put is, "when one succeeds in introducing a new morality in conformity with a new conception of the world, one finishes by introducing the conception as well." (Gramsci and Forgacs, 1988, p.192) That is to say, when one is able to create a circumstance, where it is possible to secure the 'free' consent of the masses, then that circumstance would be considered hegemonic. In Robert Cox's (1983) essay *Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method*, he considers the role international institutions play in maintaining a world order and producing a hegemony. He concludes that international institutions help create a hegemony through 5 principle mechanisms:

> Among the features of international organisation that express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt elites from peripheral states; (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. (p.172)

In an analogous manner, I claim, the individual, viewed as an institution, is a mechanism by which hegemony is created. The individual embodies the rules which facilitate the expansion of the "unequal" ideology. Whether conscious or not, the individual's personal belief that personal advancement – economic, cultural, or otherwise – is equivalent to individual uniqueness is the very embodiment of inequality that facilitates its expansion. In other words, the misplaced belief propagates the expansion of the ideology.

Individuals are themselves products of the "unequal" ideology. As economic elements, the individual is a product of the hegemonic order as this inequality creates an elite with unequal political power, as demonstrated earlier. As a consequence, the rules and policies that govern the individual are largely decided on by the ruling elite, which in turn makes the role assumed by the individual a product of this order.

Individuals ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order by taking part in its process and being themselves embodiments of the ideology. That is, independent of economic class, individuals believe they are right to pursue their personal advancement at the cost of others, because such is the principle of inequality. Money and fame are in and of themselves justification for their pursuit. Therefore, to function according to these principles is to legitimize the dominant ideology of inequality.

Individuals co-opt elites within and outside national boundaries. Due to their status experience as a social group, individuals are able to co-opt elites within and outside the state, and across social groups. They form alliances through networks that help them further their own interest, and allow them to transfer their collective power into distributive power, which in turn, is used to further group interest. An interesting example was the recent support by civil rights groups, backed by the telecom industry, to support Donald Trump's campaign, provided he was to rollback net neutrality once president. (Fang, 2017)

The individuals absorb counter-hegemonic ideas. For example, the reality of class division has been transformed into an opportunity for social mobility. Instead of the view that economic inequality leads to social and political inequality, and must therefore be changed, individuals view this inequality as an opportunity for social mobility, to achieve the American dream, to represent one's individuality, in spite of numerous studies demonstrating the myth of such a claim. (see

Rank, Yoon and Hirschl, 2003) This ability to absorb a counter-hegemonic idea, and transfer it into a hegemonic one is a product of the introduced conception Gramsci references. Ideas are not simply challenged by the hegemonic narrative; they are subordinate to them.

An example of the individual as a mechanism to spread hegemony can be considered in educational reforms in investment. (Harmes, 2001, p. 113) In the American case, this can viewed from marketing strategies targeting children like Stein Roe's 'Young Investor' and AIG's 'Children's World' to educational programs like the 'JumpStart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy' in addition to new "guidelines for teaching basic investment skills" in schools. (Harmes, 2001, p. 114) The idea is to reach children at a young age, in the hopes of introducing and integrating them into a certain way of thought, the mainstream way of thought. In doing so, children, once adults, become a mechanism that justify and reproduce the circumstance (inequality) that makes way for a hegemonic order. They become the product of the hegemony; they legitimate the hegemony by taking part in it; and, they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas through the indoctrination and prioritization of one particular idea above others. In other words, social relations become defined by this hegemonic force, and consent ensues.

Gramsci believed that hegemony was rooted in social relations, and as a result, any change of hegemonic order must also be rooted in those relations, which in turn, are derived from the hegemonic ideology. (Cox, 1983, p.175) Change in culture and in social relations among the non-elites is therefore the only way in which circumstances can present themselves for radical change. The relevance to inequality's impact on democracy is not trivial. Inequality negatively impacts democracy, as was shown earlier. However, inequality also creates a circumstance which produces a hegemonic order. One where individuals are tools (mechanisms) by which that hegemony remains, and spreads.

Conclusion

This paper analyzes the negative relationship between democracy and economic inequality. It studies, in particular, the effects money has in influencing elections; the influence the average citizen has in policy making; and, the harm inequality does to political mobilization. In addition, building off Robert Cox's study of institutional reproduction of hegemonic order, the study produces 5 analogous mechanisms that the individual reproduces a hegemonic order. Namely, the study finds that the individual, as an institution, is used as a mechanism to maintain hegemonic order through the five following mechanism: first, the individual embodies the rules which facilitate the expansion of the "unequal" ideology; second, individuals are themselves products of the "unequal" ideology; third, individuals ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order by taking part in its process and being themselves embodiments of the ideology; fourth, they co-opt elites within and outside national boundaries; and fifth, they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.

The study's shortcomings do exist, and lie in its ability to quantify the extent of which economic inequality influences democracy. Further research ought to engage such a question, and seek to determine a threshold where inequality most endangers democracy – provided its discovery is of importance. A great benefit in having conducted the research with a qualitative approach, however, is that the notion of inequality, by definition, is antidemocratic, and that the research need not only apply to the American case or provide a quantifiable threshold, but in fact, can be extended to all democracies where inequality persists. As a result, little seems more disruptive to politics, than the undermining of democracy.

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Andrew El-Azzi is an undergraduate student at the University of Ottawa. Currently in his final year of study in the Political Science program, Andrew's areas of interest include political theory, social movements, and logic and philosophy. He hopes to be able to continue to further explore these themes in graduate studies and future work.